

LITHUANIAN
**POLITICAL
SCIENCE**
YEARBOOK
2004



INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
VILNIUS UNIVERSITY

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The *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook* aims to provide a wide picture of the main fields of Political Science in Lithuania – Political Theory, Institutional Design, Electoral Process, Public Policy and Public Administration, International Relations and related disciplines. However, it is by no means limited to publications on Lithuania or by Lithuanian authors. Contributions are welcome both from Lithuania and abroad.

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PREFACE

Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 2004 is the sixth volume of the *Yearbook* in its present form. Launched with the first volume in the year 2000, this issue has a new Editorial Committee and International Advisory Board from the representatives of prominent political science institutions. This renewed editorial team will assist the publishers to increase the international knowledge of the *Yearbook* as well as to help improve the quality and prestige of the publication.

The present volume of the *Yearbook* follows the previously employed structure and principles. The main topic of this volume is the Parliamentary Elections in Lithuania 2004. Elections are a key moment in the life of a democracy when many political processes can be observed and assessed. The citizens of the Republic of Lithuania for the fifth time participated in the general elections of the highest legislature institution. One of the *Yearbook's* focuses on the Parliamentary Elections 2004 is the Left–Right dimension in Lithuania, which provides an account of the unstable electoral preferences and fluidity of the party system. The author analyses expert opinions of the Left–Right dimension in Lithuania in 2004 and concludes that political analysts identify a withering of the old Communist–Anticommunist cleavage and hold social and economic issues as those most important for the Left–Right dimension in Lithuania.

In addition, the reader of this *Yearbook* is invited to get more about the perceptions of democracy and political representation in Lithuania, of Kant and of the Kaliningrad problem.

The *Yearbook* continues the analysis of the public policy and public administration issues. This time, the topic revolves around the process of policy transfer in the new member states after the EU enlargement.

As usual, the sections of International Relations and Euroatlantic Integration are rich in the diversity of academic insights. Here, the contributors to the *Yearbook* analyze the impact of the small(er) states to the EU's common foreign policy, as well as the urgent issues of terrorism and Russia's energy policy; concerns related to the Kaliningrad region are once again revisited.

**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
IN LITHUANIA 2004**

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION AND LEFT–RIGHT CHANGE IN LITHUANIA

Mindaugas Jurkynas

Abstract. The parliamentary election of 2004 was the second “earthquake” shock for the Lithuanian party system after 2000. The number of parties and voter volatility increased. Distrust in older parties, issue divides of centre-periphery, better-off-socially disadvantaged, urban-rural, religious, anti-Russian, and transitional relevance of personalities in politics and miscommunication between politicians, experts and voters on the Left-Right dimension provide account for the unstable electoral preferences and fluidity of the party system. Recent studies reveal diminishing importance of the Left-Right dimension in Lithuania. However, this article considers the Left-Right dimension of political conflict as “empty boxes”, which are filled in with most important political *problematique*. Therefore political conflict always exists, but its contents might change from country to country. The study analyses expert opinions of the Left-Right dimension in Lithuania in 2004 and concludes that political analysts identify withering of old Communist-Anticommunist cleavage and hold social and economic issues as the most important for the Left-Right dimension in Lithuania. According to experts, parties line up along the Labour-Capital cleavage.

Introduction

The 2004 general election ended in increasing the ‘political noise’ in Lithuania.¹ A considerable number of political events took place in 2003–2004: the referendum on the EU membership in May 2003, the impeachment of the president Rolandas Paksas in April 2004, the preliminary presidential and the first European parliamentary elections in June 2004, and finally the regular general election in October 2004. The 1990–2000 period revealed a moderate fragmentation of the party system, with one largest party controlling over 50% of parliamentary seats and two largest parties

¹ The author is grateful to Ainė Ramonaitė for comments on the article.

representing 60–70% of MPs; however the picture has changed ever since. Changes came about with the first general “earthquake” election of 2000, when Social Liberals and Liberals stormed in the *Seimas* and pushed out Christian Democrats and the Centre Union (which later merged with the Liberal Union) political margins. The new addendum to the party system loomed in the elections to the European Parliament in 2004 and eventually manifested in the general election several months after. The populist Labour Party, the rural Agrarians and the radical and quasi-anti-system Liberal Democrats furnished the political scenery. The volatility of voters and the fragmentation of the party system increased. Established parties received half of the votes cast in 2004. Low trust in politics, underdeveloped structure of cleavage, personalisation of politics and finally miscommunication among experts (politicians) and voters on the Left–Right dimension largely explain the unstable electoral preferences and the fluidity of the party system. The Left–Right dimension portrays the basic ideological values in choosing different policy packages offered by parties and therefore serves as a useful tool in establishing positions of electoral choices. First, the article discusses the general election of 2004 and characterises changes in the Lithuanian party system. Second, the study conceptualises and outlines the development of political conflict and then turns to expert opinions about key the Left–Right contents.

Earthquake elections to continue

The general elections and the elections to the European Parliament in 2004 enable to have an eyeball inspection of the latest electoral preferences. It is a moot question whether ‘news’ in the party configuration are temporary oscillations or a general change (Smith 1989), but the first changes in the party system came along with the earthquake election of 2000 when the Social Liberals and the Liberals entered the political arena. After the parliamentary election of 2004, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Agrarians supplemented the ranks of the party system. The party supply increased to seven parties. The Liberal and Centre Union and the Conservatives represent rightist parties, the Peasant and New Democracy Union, the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals stand to the left of the centre, the Liberal

Democrats are a rightist and populist quasi-anti-system party, and the Labour Party represents the new populist Left, which has occupied a niche abandoned by the old Democratic Labour Party (Ramonaitė, 2004). The party system became more fragmented than after the 2000 election. The voter volatility has beaten the record. Half of the votes cast went for the new parties.² In general, the voter volatility has been rising since 1992. This trend shows voters as lacking stable voting preferences. The election to the European Parliament in summer 2004 served as a dress rehearsal before the general election several months later: only 9% of electorate changed their preferences between the elections (Jurkynas 2005).

Table 1. Electoral support for major parties, % of valid votes cast in the multi-member constituency

	1992 <i>general</i>	1995 <i>local</i>	1996 <i>general</i>	1997 <i>local</i>	2000 <i>local</i>	2000 <i>general</i>	2002 <i>local</i>	2004 <i>euro</i>	2004 <i>general</i>
Democratic Labour Party	44	16.9	9.5	14.9	11.1	See ¹	-	-	-
Social Democrats	6.1	4.8	6.6	9.2	6.6	31.1 ¹	17.1	14.4	20.7 ³
Conservatives	21.2	28.8	29.8	33.2	12.7	8.6	11.2	12.6	14.8
Christian Democrats	12.6	16.6	9.9	12.1	6.3	3.1	6.4	2.8	1.4
Peasants	-	7.0	1.7	5.6	13.4	4.1	8.0	7.4	6.6
Centre union	2.5	5.0	8.2	9.1	11.1	2.9	8.7	-	-
Liberal and Centre Union	1.5	2.7	1.8	3.6	10.6	17.3	12.6	11.2 ²	9.2
Social Liberals	-	-	-	-	17.3	19.6	7.5	4.9	See ³
Liberal Democrats	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.9	6.8	11.4
Labour Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.2	28.4

Source: Central Electoral Commission of Lithuania and the calculation of the author.

1 – joint list of the Democratic Labour Party, and the Social Democrats. 2 – the merger of the Liberal and Centre Union; 3 – a joint list of the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals.

² Volatility scores were calculated only for the voting for party lists and did not include single-mandate districts. This volatility score is representative enough as it reveals the main tendencies of voter preference change.

Fragmentation of the parliament in 2000–2004 increased from 3.5 to 6 relevant parties and conditioned coalition practices. The left-of-centre parties acquired 57% of parliamentary seats in 2004, whereas the corresponding number after the 2000 general election was 60%. The share of new parties increased from 20.6% to 35.5%.³ On the other hand, the share of the new parties that overstepped the 5% threshold dropped from 44.7% in 2000 to 42.6% of votes cast in 2004.

Table 2. Main electoral indices

	1992 general	1996 general	2000 general	2004 Europarliamentary	2004 general
Volatility, %	No data	35.3	41.2	47.5	50.1
Effective electoral parties	3.8	7.9	5.6	6.4	5.8
Effective parliamentary parties	3.0	3.3	4.8	4.3	6.1
Unrepresented votes, %	16.2	31	23.4	11.7	9.0

* – for proportional voting in the elections.

Source: Calculation of the author.

The Lithuanian party system is even (Blondel, 1990) as party shares do not substantially differ and four largest parties control 72.4% of seats. The parties that have overstepped the 5% threshold hold 95.1% of parliamentary mandates. Bipolarity at the parliamentary level vanished in 2000 – neither party alone controls the Parliament. The party system slightly shifted from a moderate to slightly polarised pluralism as the centripetal competition decreased, the party system became more fragmented, populism became a norm in party discourses and an opposition from both the Left and the Right is feasible. Yet, the general election of 2004 had the highest representation of votes. The share of wasted votes plummeted from 23% to 9% between 2000 and 2004, though the turnout hit the bottom, disclosing a rising political apathy among the electorate.

³ The share of new parties in 2000–2003 was 41% in Estonia, 36% in Latvia and 23% in Poland (see Krupavičius and Lukošaitis, 2004).

Table 3. Voter turnout, %

1990 general	1990 local	1992 general	1993 presidential	1995 local	1996 general	1997 local
I and II rounds: 71.7; 66.4	No data	I and II rounds: 75.3; 64.8	78.6	44.8	I and II rounds: 52.9; 38.2	39.9
1997 Presidential	2000 Local	2000 General	2002 Local and Presidential	2004 Euro and Presidential	2004 General	
I and II rounds: 71.5; 73.6	54.2	58.6	53.8 Presidential I and II rounds: 53.9; 52.7	48.4 Presidential I and II rounds: 48.4; 52.5	46.1 I and II rounds: 46.0; 40.2	

Source: Central Electoral Commission.

Explaining electoral results

The parliamentary election brought new parties which for the first time participated in the distribution of parliamentary seats from the proportional voting. Newcomers received 46.1% of votes cast. Discontent with mainstream parties came largely about because of remaining social, political and economic problems: the lack of social justice, regional differences, low pensions and salaries, corruption scandals and ideological discrepancies – all of which pestered the ‘old’ party era. Voters in new democracies possessed idealist expectations about the country’s development in the beginning of the 1990s. Many people anticipated a fast growth of economy, generous social provisions, transparent politics and privatisation and the like. Failed expectations turned to blame the political Establishment and no wonder that new and populist parties like the Labour and the Liberal Democrats found their way to the *Seimas*.

Political “tourism” of politicians among different parties and fractions did not increase the level of trust in parties either, let alone ideologically discrepant and unstable coalitions in local municipalities. Political organisations have been ‘enjoying’ the lowest trust among all political institutions. Anti-establishment voting, which had resulted in votes for Rolandas Paksas or anti-politicians, continued. The Labour Party absorbed a deal of political discontent stealing the show from the radical Liberal Democrats of Paksas. An anti-Russian factor held true in the case of Paksas’ party too, as his impeachment and links to his Russian adviser Yuri Borisov, Russian

Table 4. Factors influencing voting preferences

	<i>Programme</i>	<i>Promises</i>	<i>Leader</i>	<i>Team</i>
Agrarians	27	16.2	56.8	37.8
Labour Party	32	32	47.5	15.5
Social Democrats and Social Liberals	29.5	13.6	39.8	34.1
Conservatives	41.9	2.2	24.7	46.2
Liberal and Centre Union	24.4	2.2	11.1	71.1
Liberal Democrats	20.4	22.2	64.8	20.4

Source: Opinion poll company Vilmorus, 4–17 October 2004.

public relations companies and alleged shady links to Russian intelligence services were widely despised across the country, save for a handful of radicals. An idea that the Labour Party and its Russian-born leader Viktor Uspasskich can rein the country made the majority of voters vote against the Labour Party which scooped one third out of 48 party mandates competing in the run-off.

Personalities remain important in politics of new cleavage-less democracies in which politicians rather than parties became the first objects of identification and largely remained so. Electoral rules for presidential and single-mandate constituencies and low party discipline institutionally stress personalities. According to the opinion polls carried out by the opinion poll company Vilmorus, the party leader was the most important factor in voting for 39.5% of respondents. The political team mattered for 31.1% and party programme – for 29.5% of respondents. Only 18% of respondents thought electoral promises held any relevance. The party leader was the most important factor for the electorate of the Leftist and the new parties (Agrarians, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats and Social Democrats/Social Liberals).

Social cleavages in Lithuania are still developing and have only partly influenced electoral sympathies (Duvold and Jurkynas, 2004). Voting patterns are gradually embedded in centre/periphery, urban/rural, better-off/socially disadvantaged, anti-Russian, and post-Communist transformation issue divides (Jurkynas, 2004). Rightist parties enjoy a wide support in the capital, major cities, among educated, pro-Western and part of the electorate that is better-off.⁴ The Conservatives additionally receive the support of religious

⁴ Presidential election revealed that Adamkus, supported mostly by the rightist parties, was backed in major cities and the leftist Prunskienė in provinces and small towns.

people and seem to increase the party chances with setting up the Christian Democrat faction within the party. On the other hand, rural and provincial areas, the losers of the post-communist transition, who are nostalgic towards “social security” of the Soviet times opt for the Leftist and often new populist parties.⁵ European and post-material cleavages do not loom on the horizon yet (Jurkynas, 2005).

Conceptualising the Left-Right Schema

The Left–Right schema is the most prevalent mechanism of organizing and structuring the political beliefs and orientations. The Left–Right identification of the public reflects both the cognitive abilities and the political competence of the citizens. Moreover, the level of the Left–Right schema’s recognition and understanding indicates the intensity of political engagement of individuals. The more a citizen is able to place himself/herself on the Left–Right scale, the more he/she seems to be informed about political constellations in the country and involved in political life. Conversely, the low level of the recognition of the schema indicates the inability of an individual to understand political world and/or his/her political apathy or political alienation.

The Left–Right dimension has a cognitive function as it enables voters to distinguish and choose parties and politicians according to certain policy packages. Parties also benefit from the communicative function, by establishing patterns of amity and enmity in politics and informing their constituency about vectors of political promises. A competition of values and ideas comprises the essence of political conflict in an ideal case. The Left and the Right are extreme poles of political conflict, i.e. a binary space in which parties compete. The terms “left” and “right” originated from the French Legislative Assembly of 1791. Radical *Montagnards* sat on the left and moderate *Feuillants* supporting royal and aristocratic interests on the right (Bobbio, 1996).

⁵ The opinion poll company UAB Vilmorus disclosed in February 2004 that 53.5% of people believed they had economically lived better during the Soviet times, though only 8.4% thought Lithuania should be more dependent on Russia. 77% of people missing the “Soviet times” intended to vote for the Labour Party, 67% – for the Liberal Democrats and only 22% – for the Liberal and Centre Union and 15% for the Conservatives.

The main party families – the Communists, the Socialists and the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats, the Agrarians, the Liberals, the Conservatives, extremist, regional/ethnic and post-material parties line up on the Left–Right axis (Ware 1996). Their place depends upon which problems are the most important in politics: democracy vs. authoritarianism, cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism, labour vs. capital, and so on. The Left and the Right can be treated as empty boxes filled with a relevant political *problematique*. Historically, party families surfaced around such social conflicts as the Reformation, as well as the Industrial, National, Proletarian and Bolshevik revolutions and post-materialism (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Ingelhart, 1977; Arter, 1999). Gradually, the Labour/Capital or state/market conflict in economic strategy became dominant in the Left–Right dimension, whereas the other divides shrank to electoral bases of different parties. Left-wing parties are considered to support intervention of the state in the economy, higher taxes, redistribution of economic output. The rightist parties defend market supremacy, private property and economic freedom. However, in the run of history, the Left and the Right became inflated by embracing a number of other issues, the last of which stresses the repercussions of immigration in politics.

However, it is hard to automatically transplant well-established Western concepts in new democracies. The Labour/Capital divide was definitely not the dominant political conflict polarising voter preferences due to the absence of societal stratification along socio-economic interests. The fall of the Soviet Union thawed frozen political, social and economic processes and opened the way for post-communist transformation. Soviet society was pseudo-egalitarian, i.e. had no clear-cut class differences. A number of political organisations resurfaced mainly at the parliamentary level and became para-societal structures with an underdeveloped ideology, organisation and network. Therefore, political parties flocked around the conflict of Communism / Anti-Communism, which, in turn, was preconditioned by the reestablishment of independence. The left-wing parties (the Social Democrats, the Democratic Labour party) were moderate in judging the Soviet past and foreign policies towards Eastern neighbours and the rightist ones (the Conservatives, the Christian Democrats) were pro-Western and fiercely anti-Communist. Party names, manifestos and membership in party federations reminded rather of the classic names of European *familles spirituelles*.

However, party behaviour in the new democracy obscured the understanding of the traditional Left–Right domain. The post-communist transformation to a market economy and Europeanisation generated the required macro-economic policies from left-wing and rightist governments. The Communist / Anti-Communist divide became the dominant conflict in politics according to politicians, experts and voters. Yet, the old conflict started withering among the political establishment at the end of the 1990s. The victory of Lithuanian-American Valdas Adamkus who was not connected to the Soviet past, and the manifestation of the New Politics block meant the abandonment of anti-Communist political discourses. Besides, the share of the main carriers of the Communist / Anti-Communist conflict – the Democratic Labour Party and the Conservatives – substantially shrank after 2000. The political elite has gradually submerged into socio-economic narratives.

Yet, this does not automatically guarantee a return of the traditional Left–Right divide, since the self-identification of voters has been sinking. Political “tourism” among parties and fractions, anti-ideological party behaviour, including a legion of “pizza” coalitions at the municipal level, reveals office-seeking party behaviour which has an impact on the amorphous perception of the dominant political conflict among voters.

Discussing the Contents of Left–Right

Definitions of „Left“ and “Right“ have been examined in a dozen of studies, which established the prevalence of value-laden Communist–Anti-Communist cleavage in Lithuanian politics throughout the 1990s. Political debates indicate that anti-Anticommunist rhetoric has gradually been withdrawing from discourses of politicians (save the Conservatives), experts and even the media. However, it is still unclear what replaces the old political conflict.

Opinion polls of policy makers, political experts, voters, analyses of party manifestos, rhetoric of party leaders and party behaviour in government and opposition help to ascertain the contents and dynamics of the main political conflict(s). The Left–Right dimension in Lithuania has so far been analysed in terms of party positions towards key issues, surveys of policy makers, party manifestos and reflections of historical conscience.

The particular aim of the following chapter is to clarify the notions of political conflict and examine perceptions of the Left–Right dimension.

The investigation rests upon quantified measured median positions of opinions of Lithuanian experts, surveyed in 2004. The experts identified social and economic issues as the most politically important. Parties, thus, can be distributed along the Labour / Capital divide. Yet, voters still see the Anti-Communist / Communist conflict as the basis for political conflict. The Left–Right dimension does not seem to function as a communicative tool for voters and complicates political reality. On the other hand, the ability of voter self-identification in terms of the Left–Right has been plummeting since the mid-1990s due to the end of the Communist / Anti-Communist conflict among policy makers, anti-ideological party behaviour and socio-economic discourses among experts and the political elite. Party programmes and party utterances in 2004 basically revolved around social and economic issues.


Expert evaluation of the Left–Right dimension

Expert opinions take into consideration various aspects of political life and can yield relevant insights into political conflict(s). Analysts also participate in the creation of public discourses, which become relevant in societies with limited political experience. The investigation relies upon expert evaluation of key political issues in Lithuania and party stances towards these issues. Two separate surveys were carried out in 2004 (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2004; Benoit and Laver 2005). This study calculated the median positions of expert opinions on each issue. The scale of the first survey ranges from 1 to 20 positions: the higher support for a position, the higher the score. The second opinion poll falls between 1 and 7. Eighteen political experts participated in the first survey and ten in the second one.⁶ Organisers of opinion polls chose the experts. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the general distribution of parties along different issues according to the first opinion poll.

Figure 4 provides with two positioning of parties on the Left–Right schema. The first is a calculation of median positions of expert opinions and the second is an arithmetical average of party median positions along


⁶ Huber and Inglehart (1995) argue a minimum of five experts per country is sufficient.

Figure 2. Party distribution on different issues




Source: Benoit and Laver, 2005. Calculation of the author.

Figure 3. Party distribution on different issues




Source: Benoit and Laver, 2005. Calculation of the author.

Figure 4. Distribution of parties along the Left-Right dimension



Source: Benoit and Laver, 2005. Calculation of the author.

Figure 5. Party distribution on different issues




Source: Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2004. Calculation of the authors.

the aforementioned issues. The second median is calculated in order to check consistency in expert opinions of the general positions of parties. According to the data, the parties line up according to the classic Labour / Capital divide: the Liberal and Centre Union and the Conservatives are the rightist and the Agrarians and the Social Democrats the leftist parties.


The next figures originate from the second opinion poll carried out by Rohrschneider and Whitefield and include a political newcomer, the Labour Party. The issue dimensions slightly differ from the first opinion poll.

Figure 6. Party distribution on different issues



Source: Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2004. Calculation of the authors.


Figure 7.



Source: Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2004. Calculation of the authors.


However, the second opinion poll confirms the same pattern of party distribution along the Left–Right axis. The second survey consisting of 10 experts, on average, lined up the parties following the same logic as in the first survey, though all parties but the Agrarians shifted to the right of the centre where the Liberals and the Conservatives occupy straightforwardly rightist positions. The populist and ideologically inconsistent behaviour of the Labour Party posed difficulties for experts to establish its general position. Nonetheless, an arithmetical average of this party along different issues clearly set the Labour Party left of the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals. Following self-

Figure 8. Polarisation and relevance of political issues




Source: Benoit and Laver, 2005. Calculation of the authors.

Figure 9. Relevance of political issues



Source: Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2004. Calculation of the authors.

Figure 10. Distribution of parties along the Left-Right and Anti-Communism axes



Source: Benoit and Laver 2005, Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2004. Calculation of the author.

definitions and political practices of parties, the Labour along the Social Democrats, the Social Liberals and the Agrarians unquestionably comprise a camp of Leftist forces. Definitely, the picture might look different in case the surveys were conducted after the parliamentary election, since coalition practices and preferences would have adjusted party distribution on a general Left–Right scale, though a similar line-up could be expected.

The analysis now turns to the evaluation of the most relevant and polarising dimension in Lithuanian politics. According to the first survey, the biggest difference surfaced in issues related to land sale to foreigners and rural / urban division, whereas a consensus prevailed on the EU membership, decentralisation and environmental questions. On the other hand, EU membership and the expenditures – low taxes divides remain the most relevant political issues according to the experts. Consensus on Europeanisation among political elites and voters leave the state/market conflict as the dominant divide.

The second survey included fewer conflict dimensions, yet the patterns of the most relevant political issues remain similar to the consensus on EU integration, socio-economic issues at the top, whereas the Anti-Communist division seems to be withering. According to the experts, parties possess Western criteria of left and right and can be placed along the traditional Labour / Capital conflict axis.

The basis for the Left–Right dimension has been calculated on the arithmetical basis of party positions on all issues from the Benoit and Laver survey. The position of the Labour Party in the Left–Right schema has been transposed from the Rohrschneider and Whitefield 7-point scale into a 20-point scale used by Benoit and Laver.

Ainė Ramonaitė reveals that the opinion of experts is not widely shared among the electorate.⁷ The level of the Left–Right recognition among voters is rather low. The respondents are also usually unable or reluctant to establish their orientations on the scale. Many respondents claim that differences between left and right in Lithuania are disappearing, since the positions of established parties become more similar. The quantitative data confirm the voters to associate the Left–Right cleavage with the political and cultural rather than the socio-economic dimension. The self-placement on the Left–Right scale is linked with individual political and moral values, such as the assessment of the communist regime, patriotism and religiosity rather than incomes or economic views. All in all, the electorate identify the key political conflict in Lithuania as a blend of East /West, future/past, Communism / Anti-Communism, atheism/religion categories.

Conclusions

The general election of 2004 was the second “earthquake” shock for the Lithuanian party system. Mainstream parties of the 1990s received merely half of the votes cast and the populist Labour Party, the rural Agrarians and the radical Liberal Democrats became relevant parliamentary parties. The newcomers took roots in the parliament. The former two parties participate in the joint decision making as partners of the left-of-centre ruling coalition, whereas the Liberal Democrats seem to be political outcasts, as parties on the Left and on the Right are eager to cooperate with them. It is too early

⁷ The argument is developed in Jurkynas and Ramonaitė, 2005.

to predict whether the success will last after the next general election of 2008, as only the Labour party enjoys quite a high support according to the latest opinion polls of December 2005. The popularity of the Agrarians and the Liberal Democrats, including the Social Liberals and the Liberal and Centre Union, plummeted below 5%.

The voting patterns showed a high volatility and fragmentation. Polarisation rose as well. The party system has been in flux since the 2000 general election and revealed a more fragmented configuration. Distrust in established parties and parties as institutions in general, issue divides (centre / periphery, better-off / socially disadvantaged, urban / rural, religious, anti-Russian, and transitional) rather than developed cleavages, the relevance of personalities in politics and finally miscommunication among politicians, experts and voters on the Left–Right dimension provide an account for the unstable electoral preferences and the fluidity of the party system.

The present research revealed a changing perception of the Left–Right dimension among experts and to some extent among parties. Classic Labour–Capital cleavage (i.e. socio-economic issues) becomes the most salient for political experts and politicians. However, bearing in mind the fact that voters prefer to think in Communist / Anti-Communist criteria, the Left–Right dimension does not fully serve as a communicative tool, since it handicaps political communication by complicating political reality. Different discourses on the level of experts (and policy makers) aggravate the capacity of voters to place themselves in the Left–Right schema. Experts operate with specific knowledge which enables them to make broad insights based on research of party behaviour, party manifestos, ideology and the like. However, expert knowledge does not become the only truth but just one of arguments competing in discussions (Albæk, 2004).

The Communist/Anti-Communist divide became the key political conflict due to the reestablishment of independence and the lack of social cleavages in the new post-communist democracy. Nowadays, the old political conflict withdraws from the narratives of the political elite and experts. Voters “get lost” in their Left-Right self-identification, since political analysts and politicians speak of the Labour–Capital axis related issues. The voters seem to identify political conflict as a blend of the East / West, future/past, Communism/Anti-Communism, atheism/religion categories. However, in the general elections of 2000 and 2004, voters opted for new parties that did

not represent Communist/Anti-Communist stances. The capacity of the electorate to recognise the Left–Right dimension is likely to fade away. The most important factors accounting for this process are the withdrawal of Anti-Communist discourses from politics, anti-ideological party behaviour and political discourses oriented to socioeconomic *problematique*, and finally a general disillusionment with politics. The new voting preferences bringing new parties increasingly look for solutions of socio-economic rather than value-laden problems, and we hypothesise that the socio-economic content has good perspectives to become the classical Left–Right divide.

It is too early to predict when and whether the Left–Right dimension will acquire the communicative function. We reasonably expect that expert and political discourses will gradually permeate the perceptions of voters whose political experience grows in the context of emerging socio-economic cleavages. Surveys of policy makers and analysis of party manifestos and political behaviour would provide a broader view of political conflict in Lithuania.

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PARTY SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL EAST EUROPE

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Abstract. Contemporary transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy in many ways represent institutionalization and consolidation of parties and multi-party systems in new democracies. Still the post-communist polities often are characterized as taking an anti-party stance, political parties as lacking responsiveness and accountability, party systems as being in flux and unconsolidated.

Central East European party systems are differing from one country to another: there are no two identical party systems in the region. But general trend is that a model of multiparty system without a dominant party is most popular here. Still high rates of electoral volatility in Central East Europe might be potentially a single most dangerous factor to party system stability in its current configurations.

Despite all challenges that new Central East European party systems still facing, there is no danger that general principles of competitiveness and multipartyism might be rejected by one or another party, or voted out by citizens favouring authoritarian choice in foreseeable future in one or another country.

The effective parties that work well can serve multiple functions in democracies by simplifying and structuring electoral choices; organizing and mobilizing campaigns; articulating and aggregating disparate interests; channeling communication, consultation and debate; training, recruiting and selecting candidates; structuring parliamentary divisions; acting as policy think-tanks; and organizing government (Dalton & Wattenberg 2001). Contemporary transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy in many ways represent the institutionalization and consolidation of parties and multi-party systems in new democracies. The post-communist polities are still characterized as taking an anti-party stance, political parties as lacking responsiveness and accountability, party systems as being in flux and unconsolidated.

From a comparative perspective, Central East European countries represent most successful cases of democratic transition after 1989. For this reason, it is important to explore more deeply the processes of institution-

alization and stabilization in Central East European party systems. Among the countries covered by this analysis are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. All these countries are current or prospective members of the enlarged European Union.

Change and types of party systems in Central East Europe

Historical and institutional accounts suggest that many particular factors affect the process of party system development. In Central East Europe, mass movements served as the most common vehicle for mass mobilization and elite recruitment during the first phase of democratization. The first free and competitive elections in the region go a long way towards accounting for the initial salience of these mass movements. These democratic elections are frequently referred to as founding or constituent elections, which make good sense considering that “without elections the full array of institutions that constitute a new democratic political society – such as legislatures, constituent assemblies, and competitive political parties – simply cannot develop sufficient autonomy, legality, and legitimacy” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 71). The elections were marked by a minimum of violence, they allowed the citizens to express their political views freely, they encouraged political participation, and, after years of political repression, they served to provide the emerging democratic governments with the seal of legitimacy (Garber & Bjornlund 1992). Free elections meant that the major political players accepted political competition as the only meaningful way of establishing a sustainable democratic order, and it also meant that these actors made “the convocation of elections an increasingly attractive means for conflict resolution” (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1993: 40).

The founding elections differed very much from subsequent elections, primarily, by virtue of the importance of the broad, amorphous, umbrella organizations, which tended to break up and recombine into smaller groups or factions once they had been elected into office. At least four groups of the elite were playing important roles in the transition to democracy; these were hard-liners and soft-liners within the ruling elite, and radicals and moderates within the opposition. These groups of the elite were often regarded as strategic or decisive groups. The traditional point of view is that the two moder-

ate groups must join forces and work out some kind of pact to make for a successful transition to democracy. An elite-level negotiated transition was considered as the most favourable option for the future consolidation of democracy. Political parties in the Western European understanding simply did not exist in Central East European polities at that time.

Still would-be party systems here were actually more dependent upon coalescence within the initial democratic reform movement than upon splits within the surviving communist parties (Olson 1998: 11). As David M. Olson points out flux, splits and coalitions of would-be party formations in and outside of parliament, which tended to be more frequent as elections approached, were common characteristics in the early developmental stages of democratic party systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Olson 1998: 12). The general fluidity of the initial party systems, notwithstanding, the political stage of the new democracies, was reconfigured along multiparty lines well before the second round of democratic elections.

The above-mentioned four groups of the would-be political elite, i.e. hard-liners and soft-liners within the ruling elite, and radicals and moderates within the opposition, played a very important role in the establishing new party systems in Central East Europe. Here it is possible to draw a certain general pattern how these different elite groupings fostered the development of new parties. Small part of hard-liners from the old elite in few cases re-joined slightly reformed new communist parties as did the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Republic and the Communist Party of Slovakia. However, most of the hard-liners disappeared from the political scene forever. Soft-liners of the old elite created or joined various would-be social democratic and socialist political groupings in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, where they managed to establish popular and influential left-wing political organizations. Rather an exception is the case of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), which entered Slovenian politics as a reformed party from the former Alliance of Socialist Youth of Slovenia, but later on turned to centrist and more liberal positions. Moderates from the former democratic opposition stimulated development of various liberal and centre-right parties as Estonian Coalition Party, Latvia's Way, Liberal Union in Lithuania, Alliance of Free Democrats in Hungary, and so on. Radicals from the former opposition initiated and created a

number of the right-wing and nationalist parties, for instance, For Fatherland and Freedom / Latvian National Independence Movement, Movement for Democratic Slovakia, Homeland Union in Lithuania, etc.

However, it would be an oversimplification to state that only members of the former ruling elite and mainstream mass opposition movements were the only ingredients to the new party systems in Central East Europe. In 1988-1991, simultaneously in many countries there were re-established a number of the so-called historical parties as the successors to the pre-war political organizations. These parties mainly included four types of political organizations, such as social democratic like the Social Democratic parties in Hungary and Lithuania, Christian democratic like Slovenian Christian Democrats or Czechoslovak People's Party, agrarian as the Independent Smallholders Party in Hungary, and, last but not least, some nationalist parties as the Lithuanian Nationalist Union. During a decade and a half after the beginning of democratization, only a few historical parties survived in Central East Europe. Christian democratic parties were marginalized within the new party systems because of intense secularization of Central East European societies during the communist regime. Some former agrarian parties maintained certain electoral support, but they played a minor role in the democratic system. Nationalist parties, as soon as nationalist sentiments lost importance in late 1990s failed to enter national parliaments. The only group of historical parties, social democrats, was more successful; as usual, in the long run they merged with the left-wing parties created by the soft-liners of the old regime, for example, Lithuanian Social Democratic Party which ruled the country in 1992–1996 and again continuously since 2001.

Along with the former ruling elite and mass opposition movements, the re-established historical parties were an additional independent component in party system building, i.e. totally new parties as Greens, a few regional parties as Christian coalition of Somogy in Hungary, Movement for Moravian and Silesian Self-Government, would-be parties of ethnic minorities as Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, Movement for Rights and Freedom in Bulgaria, Hungarian Christian and Democratic Movement Coalition in Slovakia, and finally, the embryonic political organizations of certain social or even interests groups as Democratic Party of Pensioners in Slovenia, Bulgarian Business Bloc and Beer Lovers' Party in the former Czechoslovakia.

The transitional framework of political competition was a short-lived phenomenon, and since 1992-1993 there appeared a substantial ground to speak about institutionalization of more permanent and more stable parties and party systems in Central East European polities. A stable party system dominated by pro-systemic political parties is a prerequisite of functioning democracy. In countries with party systems in flux, voters tend to align with populist political leaders, instead of developing more or less stable loyalties with pro-systemic parties. Established and institutionalised parties tend to preserve the democratic rules of political game and to promote an efficient party government. The legitimacy of pro-system parties is an essential part of the process of democratic consolidation in all new democracies. It is a product of a drawn-out and complicated process involving a variety of factors including legal regulations, changes of public opinion, performance in government, historical political subcultures, and the style of leadership. What are the structural characteristics of party systems in Central East European countries? The most conventional way to evaluate party systems is to classify them along the numbers and relative sizes of political parties. Jean Blondel pioneered in the field by proposing a four-dimensional classification along the mentioned criteria, i.e. two-party, two-and-a-half party, and a multiparty system with a dominant party, multiparty systems without a dominant party.

Some aspects remain to be very important in the analysis of the Central East European party systems in this context: a) the numerical profile of party systems as such; b) the extent of system changes or the number of party system turnovers.

However, one additional remark is appropriate here. Because of the non-party character of the founding elections (except, maybe, Hungary and Slovenia), it is relevant to consider the party system profiles only starting from the first multi-party elections.

Let's start from elucidating the second aspect. Surprisingly, the numerical profiles of the Central East European party systems were relatively stable from the very first multi-party elections. Only a few countries changed their party systems in a more drastic way, e.g., Poland which moved from an extremely fragmented multipartyism of 1991–1993 to a multiparty system with a dominant party in 1997. Another case is Lithuania, which from a multiparty system with a dominant party in 1992–2000 turned to

system without a dominant party in 2000. A general trend, which is clearly indicated by a change of the number of effective parties in Central East European countries, was that pluralism within party systems increased in all countries after the founding elections. However, in general the “hundred party system” was a short-lived phenomenon in Central East European countries, and a clear trend towards a decrease in the number of parliamentary parties could be observed as early as during the second set of multi-party elections. In this respect, four cases need an additional review; these are Bulgaria and Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.

The case of Slovakia can be explained rather easily. The Movement for Democratic Slovakia was one of the driving forces to the velvet break-up of the former Czechoslovakia in 1992 and successfully monopolized power institutions of Slovakia after it. The MDS led by Meciar used even some non-democratic means to constrain the development of opposition parties in 1992-98.

However, in the case of Bulgaria the main reasons for a limited fragmentation of parliamentary parties was rooted in the preservation of two major umbrella transitional players the Bulgarian Socialist Party and Union of Democratic Forces during the next multi-party elections. Also, rather convincing is the observation that the overall slowdown of political as well as social and economic transformations in the country was a factor of limited party fragmentation in Bulgaria.

In Hungary as well as in Slovenia, pluralism during the second democratic elections decreased, because in both countries even the founding elections might be named multi-party elections as far as parties were the main players shaping electoral choice.

Clearly, the *two-party system* was the most unpopular party system type in the region. However, after the last elections in 2002 Hungary's party system might be characterized as having some sort of two-party configuration, because the political stage of this country was dominated continuously by the leftwing Hungarian Socialist Party, on the one hand, and two parties on the rightwing, i.e. Hungarian Civic Party and Hungarian Democratic Forum, on the other.

Two-and-a-half party system seems to have been established only in Bulgaria as far as here competed the leftwing Bulgarian Socialist Party and on the rightwing the Union of Democratic Forces in 1992-1997, which was succeeded by Simeon II National Movement, named after the Bulgarian King

Simeon Saxen-Coburg, which won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections of 2001. A minor partner of National Movement Simeon II was the liberal Movement for Rights and Freedom.

Only two countries of Central East Europe, the Czech Republic and Poland, have had a *multiparty system with a dominant party*. Both countries might be described as having strong left-wing parties. In Poland, the leftwing was represented first of all by Democratic Left Alliance (DLA), and in the Czech Republic the stronghold of the left was the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSDP). A distinct feature in the party system of the Czech Republic was existence of the quite influential Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, which was able to win no less than 10 per cent of votes in all parliamentary elections since 1990. However, Czech social democrats in 1995 passed a resolution in a party congress on a non-cooperation with the Communist Party as a political organization still having roots in the old repressive regime. These political self-constraints of the CSDP not allowed the party to build the leftwing coalition with the communists after the 1998 and 2002 general elections. In 2002, Czech social democrats decided to sign a coalition agreement with centre-right parties, i.e. Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party and Freedom Union-Democratic Union. However, the political strength of the Czech Social Democratic Party might be well illustrated by the fact that this party was not only able to form a single party (minority) government in 1998-2002, but also to win two consecutive parliamentary elections. Such cases are still very rare in Central East Europe. There are only few exceptions from the rule that the ruling party was losing every new election. Except Czech social democrats, only Romanian Social Democratic Party together with Conservative Party in 2000 and 2004, and Slovenian Liberal Democracy in 1996 and 2000 achieved such electoral victories.

The Polish Democratic Left Alliance outperformed divided right-wing parties in the 1993 and 2001 parliamentary elections, but was not able to form a single party government. The Polish Democratic Left Alliance ruled the country in coalition with the Polish Peasants Party from 1993 to 1997, and once again formed the government with Peasants Party and the Labour Union in 2001.

The political Right in the Czech Republic and Poland was permanently divided into liberal, conservative, Christian democratic and nationalist parties. However, the right-wing parties in the Czech Republic were much

more clearly positioned than in Poland. Here the leading position took the conservative Civic Democratic Party, but the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, and Freedom Union-Democratic Union took junior positions on the right flank. After a major attempt to consolidate the political Right by establishing the coalitional Solidarity Electoral Action which ruled the country in a coalition with liberal Freedom Union in 1997–2001, in 2001 it disintegrated once again into four political groupings, i.e. into Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right, the Law and Justice Organization, the League of Polish Families and the Civic Platform.

Party systems in all other Central East European countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia might be characterized as *multiparty systems without a dominant party*. This party system might be considered as most popular in Central East Europe. However, there are significant differences among these countries. The most exceptional and a border case here is Romania, which might be classified even as having a multiparty system with a dominant party. The Social Democratic Party of Romania was the leading political organization in the country after 1992. However, the Social Democratic Party only in a strange ideological tandem with the Conservative Party was able to win parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2004. Moreover, the National Liberal Party, the conservative Democratic Party, the ethnic Democratic Alliance of Hungarians as well as the nationalist People's Party of Great Romania successfully challenged the Social Democratic Party from the right. And finally, the changing number of effective parties in Romania shows that the party system here might be better described as a multiparty system without a dominant party. This index takes into account not only the total number of political parties taking part in the competition for votes and seats, but also measures their relative parliamentary strength. In addition, the effective number of parties reflects well the degree of party system concentration.

Another problematic case here is Lithuania. Till the 2000 Seimas elections, many researchers of Lithuanian party politics were able to conclude from the effective party number and shares of the largest parliamentary parties that "the Lithuanian party system is not characterized by the kind of fragmentation typical of Latvia and Estonia; the underlying structure of the Lithuanian party system is rather reminiscent of that of Poland. Party

Table 1. Number of effective parties in Central East European countries, 1989–2004

	<i>Founding elections</i>	<i>First multi-party</i>	<i>Second multi-party</i>	<i>Third multi-party</i>	<i>Fourth multi-party</i>	<i>Standard deviation*</i>	<i>Median of country**</i>
Bulgaria	2.42	2.40	2.72	2.97	3.06	0.30	2.85
Czech Republic	2.22	4.80	4.14	3.70	3.80	0.50	3.97
Hungary	3.78	2.89	3.44	2.48	-	0.48	2.89
Estonia	2.89	5.70	4.14	5.49	4.67	0.73	5.08
Latvia	1.97	5.05	7.58	5.48	5.01	1.22	5.27
Lithuania	1.98	2.98	3.40	4.20	5.40	1.06	3.80
Poland	-	11.05	3.87	2.95	3.59	3.81	3.73
Romania	2.14	4.74	4.27	3.69	4.86	0.53	4.51
Slovakia	4.98	3.18	6.51	6.51	-	1.92	6.51
Slovenia	10.33	6.58	5.51	4.85	4.89	0.81	5.20
Average	3.63	4.94	4.56	4.23	4.41	0.30	4.48

* Standard deviation calculated only since the first multiparty elections in each country;

** median of the country calculated only since the first multiparty elections.

Sources: BEC; W. Ismayr, *Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas*; Election Database Eastern Europe; Studies on Parties and Elections; Wolfram Nordsieck calculations, 2000 (<http://www.parties-and-elections.de>).

labels, at least those of mainstream parties, sound familiar to students of West European politics. In fact, Lithuanian political parties have a tendency to imitate West European and particularly Scandinavian parties. This may result in programmatic and social profiles not conducive to converting existing divisions into lasting cleavages. Yet the simple structure of the Lithuanian party system has proven a major source of political stability. In the Lithuanian context of low-density civil society, political parties may even serve as vehicles of political modernization” (Žėruolis 1998: 139).

During the 2000 Seimas elections, the wave of party fragmentation shook the ‘perfect and stable’ Lithuanian party system as far as two new political parties, the Liberals and the New Union (Social Liberals), suddenly entered the stage of parliamentary politics. In 2000, the political novice, the New Union (Social Liberals), took almost 20 per cent, and another 20 per cent of the total vote was received by the Liberal Union.

The second wave of political earthquake came to the Lithuanian party system in the general elections of 2004. The new challenger was the Labour

party (LP) led by Viktor Uspasskich, the Russian-born businessman and member of parliament since 2000; this party was officially registered by Lithuanian Ministry of Justice as the 38th political party in the country in November 2003. The Labour Party held its founding congress in October 2003 and according to polls immediately became the most popular party in the country, receiving a 16.3 per cent public support, i.e. more than the ruling Social Democrats with their 13.6 per cent. This party was regarded as a populist political organization with no clear ideological direction and identity. However, the LP victory in the European elections in 2004 was an overture to its success in the forthcoming national parliamentary elections.

In the 2004 Seimas elections, the largest share of seats went to the Labour Party. Most support for the Labour Party came from rural and peripheral areas, especially in central Lithuania, as well as from low income and socially insecure voters. The little-known political novices from the Labour Party won 16 out of 48 possible mandates participating in the runoff. In general, the LP was more successful in the multi-member constituency, winning as many as 31.43 per cent of all available seats versus only 23.94 per cent of seats in single-mandate districts. Another protest party, Coalition of Rolandas Paksas "For the Order and Justice", which was formed after the impeachment of President Paksas, was relatively successful and gained 11 mandates. Paksas personally was not able to stand in the elections as a candidate because of the decision of the Constitutional Court banning him to hold any public position that requires the oath. In total, the new parties grasped 46.1 per cent of total vote in 2004.

After the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary elections the Lithuanian party system should be defined as a multiparty system without a dominant party.

Least controversial cases here are Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia, as far as the share of votes for the largest parliamentary party in these countries was higher than 30 per cent only four times since the introduction of multiparty elections. Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia crossed the 30 per cent vote barrier in 1992 by receiving support from even 37.3 per cent of electorate, Latvia's Way gained 32.4 per cent of total vote in 1993, Estonian Coalition Party achieved major victory in 1995 with its 32.2 per cent, and Liberal Democracy of Slovenia received as many as 36.3 per cent of total vote during the 2000 parliamentary elections. All in all, multiparty systems with-

out a dominant party developed in these countries almost immediately after transition to democracy.

From the time perspective and for all countries together, we could observe three different waves of changes in the effective number of parties, which also means changes of the types of party systems in Central East Europe. The first wave coincided with the founding elections, and it might be called “limited pluralism”, because the average number of the effective parties was relatively low, reaching only 3.6. This happened so because political competition in many countries was restricted during the initial phase of democratization and involved only two or three political subjects, mainly non-communist opposition, reform communists and hard-line communists. The second wave started with the first multi-party elections, and the number of relevant parties increased to 4.9. This phase might be called “oversized pluralism” (or segmented pluralism in Stein Rokkan’s terminology) and this meant the turn of most Central East European countries to a model of multiparty system without a dominant party. More interestingly, the same sudden growth in the party numbers was a phenomenon of democratizing Germany (in 1945–49 the effective number of parties was 4.9, but it was reduced to 2.8 in the second half of the 50s), or Spain (4.3 in the late 70s and 3.4 in early 80s), and Greece (3.7 in 1975–79 and 2.7 in 1980–84) (Lane & Ersson 1994: 184).

The second–fourth sets of multiparty elections brought a new trend again and initiated the third wave of changes, i.e. a very gradual reduction of the effective number of parties to 4.4 points on average. Hopefully, it is an initial step into the phase of “stable pluralism”. Of course, it does not mean that the number of relevant parties will stay fixed. On the other hand, it will be hard to expect that their number in the years to come will rise so sharply to more than 10 or in the next few elections it will be reduced to less than 4 relevant parties as it happened in Poland in the mid-nineties. Moreover, the current average of ten countries with 4.4 relevant parties correlates well with the Western European mean of 4.3 parties as in 1989.

The effective number of parties shows substantial variations on country-by-country basis. After the last set of democratic elections the number of relevant parties compared to the average of Central East Europe was higher in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. Other countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) had lower indices of effective parties than

Table 2. Strength of largest parliamentary party in Central East European countries, 1989–2004 (percentage of seats), 1989–2004

	<i>Bul-garia</i>	<i>Czech Republic</i>	<i>Hun-gary</i>	<i>Esto-nia</i>	<i>La-tvia</i>	<i>Lithua-nia</i>	<i>Po-land</i>	<i>Roma-nia</i>	<i>Slove-nia</i>	<i>Slova-kia</i>	<i>The CEE average</i>
Founding elections	52.8	63.5	42.5	46.6	65.2	70.2	37.6	66.4	17.5	32.0	49.43
First multi-party elections	45.8	38.0	54.1	28.7	36.0	51.7	13.5	34.3	24.4	49.3	37.58
Second multi-party elections	52.0	34.0	38.3	40.6	18.0	51.1	37.2	35.2	27.8	40.7	37.49
Third multi-party elections	57.1	37.0	46.1	27.7	24.0	34.0	43.7	43.2	37.7	28.6	37.91
Fourth multi-party elections	51.3	35.0		27.7	26.0	27.7	46.9	34.0	32.2	18.6	33.27
Average	51.8	41.50	45.25	34.26	33.84	46.94	35.78	42.62	27.92	33.84	39.14

Source: PARLINE Database, Inter-Parliamentary Union, <http://www.ipu.org>; Rose, Munro & Mackie 1998.

the region's mean. Still the intense proliferation of "hopeless parties" (the term coined by Rose & Munro 2003: 37) indicates the fact that in all ten countries of Central East Europe as many as 246 parties gained 1 per cent or more of national votes in at least one election, an average of 24.6 parties per country, and 147 parties (or 14.7 per country) were able to win at least two seats in national legislatures (calculated from Rose & Munro 2003: 39).

The over-supply of political parties in Central East European party systems is indicated not only by the high number of effective parties; this trend is also well reflected in the decreasing share of a largest parliamentary party.

The strength of the largest parliamentary party reflects structural opportunities and choices for the Cabinet formation and signalizes about the stability of parliamentary majorities rather than overall party system stability. Nonetheless, the share of the largest party mirrors the aggregation capacities of leading political parties, as an element of party system stability too.

Only in two countries, Bulgaria (till the year 2005) and Lithuania (only till 2000), the largest parties were able to secure one-party dominant parliamentary majorities without major interruptions since 1990. In all other countries stable parliamentary majorities were produced only on a basis of party

coalitions. But even in Bulgaria the concentration of votes for one party does not mean that here was a single party dominant system as far as three different parties gained absolute majorities since 1990, i.e. the Socialists twice, in 1990 and 1994, the Union of Democratic Forces in 1997 and Simeon II National Movement in 2001.

Instead of single party majorities, the coalition government is a common reality of Central East European countries. During the first and second set of multiparty elections, an average share of a largest party stabilized around 37 per cent of seats in the lower house of national legislature and once again decreased to 33 per cent after the fourth set of multiparty elections. The low shares of a largest parliamentary party led towards formation of various coalitional cabinets in the countries of the region. Moreover, "given absence of large parties and the limited number of seats in the parliaments of most new democracies, a party does not need a lot of seats to be relevant in the post-election bargaining leading to the formation of a coalition government" (Rose & Munro 2003: 40).

However, practical implementation of a coalition's potential depends on many different but interrelated factors. One of them is the ideological composition of a party system.

Left–Right dimension in Central East European party systems

Various scholars have argued that mainly the ideological left–right dimension structures the behavior of parties in most democracies. Historically, left–right orientation has played a more or less pronounced role in structuring political identification, but if it loses ground in a situation marked by a destabilization of the configuration of the orientational metaphors it will not be able to bend these other orientations towards itself (Dyrberg 2004: 6).

In the new democracies, it is common for many parties to present multidimensional platforms "fragmented along up to half a dozen different dimensions" (Rose & Munro 2003: 50). Such fragmented appeals are frequently characterized as fuzzy-focus political programs. On the other side, voters also commonly lack the experience and knowledge to differentiate parties along issues and dimensions (see more Rose & Munro 2003: 50–52).

Nevertheless, political theory tells us that programmatic and tightly knit mass parties provide a pool of human resources broad enough for recruitment of the party elite through competition and according to democratic procedures

(Kitschelt et al 1999: 46–48). Meanwhile, in the vast majority of the parties in Central East Europe, a small group of leaders was firmly in charge of all strategic decisions where the left–right ideology was less important in structuring party behavior compared to idiosyncratic factors.

Moreover, the ruling parties quite frequently were entering into not ideologically “connected” coalitions in terms of left–right positions. A socialist–liberal ruling coalition was a reality of political life in Czech Republic after the 2002 general elections. Moderates in Estonia, which in February 2004 decided to take back their old name of Estonian Social Democratic Party, were partners of the ruling coalition with the right-wing Pro Patria Union and centre–right Reform Party in Estonia in 1999–2002. In Slovenia, Liberal Democracy, the United List of Social Democrats and People’s Party were partners in several governments. Moreover, some Slovenian analysts noticed that even during general election campaigns traditional ideological issues are almost completely absent because of the inclination of key Slovenian parties towards Bobbio’s principle of “liberal socialism”.

Also, we should keep in mind that “ideologies change continuously as a consequence of social changes and subsequent shifts in the focuses of party political conflict. As their meaning is continuously reproduced and transformed in the course of political debates, different focuses of party conflict become associated with ideological terms such as left and right. So, even when a left–right division remains the dominant structuring principle of party political conflicts [...], different issues will be associated with this ideological dimension” (Brug 1999: 149).

However, the political scene in new democracies is changing rapidly, and party competition, political mobilization gradually become more and more based on the left–right ideological premises where clear-cut programmatic identity becomes almost a necessary condition for a party’s survival and future success. Moreover, the left–right dimension is important for party identification within a certain party system.

If to classify Central East European party systems along the left–right schema, there are at least several possible models: a) bipolar party systems with a few united and strong left and right parties; b) unipolar left systems with one or two united and strong left parties and with a divided and relatively weak political right; c) unipolar right party systems with a few united and strong

right parties, but a split and weak left wing; and finally d) multipolar fragmented or party systems without dominant parties of any ideological leaning.

Hungary and Bulgaria fit best the first model of party systems with a few united and strong left and right parties¹ or a *bipolar party system* which produces a high degree of party unity. Poland, Romania and partially Czech Republic represented *unipolar left party systems* with one or two united and strong left parties and the split and relatively weak political right. In all three countries there are no doubts that the left-wing parties (Polish Democratic Left Alliance (DLA), Czech Social Democratic Party and Romanian Social Democratic Party) have successfully mobilized no less than one fourth of participating voters since the early 1990s. Meanwhile, Czech social democrats were facing the genuine Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia on the leftwing Christian Democratic Union (Czechoslovak People's Party and Freedom Union-Democratic Union) from the centre-right and Civic Democratic Party on the right. Moreover, Civic Democratic Party enjoyed the support of no less than 24 per cent of voters since 1992 in each parliamentary election. All this implies that the Czech party system is able to move to a bipolar model with a few united and strong left and right parties.

Unipolar right party systems with a few united and relatively strong right parties, but a split and weak Left wing were developing in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. However, in the case of Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia the saliency of the left-right division is rather low. The best confirmation of this trend in Estonia and Latvia is victories of new non-ideological parties in the latest parliamentary elections and their ability to form ruling coalitions with older and better established as well as more strictly ideologically oriented parties. In 2003, Estonian Res Publica gained 24.6 per cent of votes in the Riigikogu elections after an election campaign with the populist slogan "Choose order!" After formal talks Res Publica agreed to form a new government with the liberal Reform Party and agrarian People's Union. A very similar situation developed in Latvia after the 2002 Saeima elections, when a political novice, the populist conservative New Era Party made a coalition with the Christian democratic Latvia's First Party, nationalist For Fatherland and Freedom / Latvian National Independence Movement and Green and Farmers Union.

¹ See details on Bulgarian and Hungarian party systems above.

To sum it up, in the long run consensual centrist and / or centre-right policies with an emphasis on radical pro-market positions were common in both Estonian and Latvian cases. Centre-right and centrist parties secured parliamentary majority after the Riigikogu elections in 1992, 1995, 1999 and 2003 in Estonia. Here, even five out of six Cabinets of Ministers were described as centre-right governments in 1992–2001. Mikko Lagerspetz and Henri Vogt noted that since the 1992 elections all governments have resigned only as a result of highly personal conflicts and all “incoming governments have made a point of continuing the policies pursued by their predecessors” (Lagerspetz & Vogt 1998: 76).

The ideological homogeneity of Latvian governments was even more striking, because all five Cabinets in the period between 1993 and 1999 had an identical (centrist) orientation and parliaments were dominated by liberal and centre-right parties since 1993. In 2000, as a compromise, Andris Berzins from Latvia’s Way became the prime minister. His four-party coalition lasted until the elections of 2002. After the elections, again the centre-right Einar Repse’s party Jaunais Laiks (New Era Party) gained most seats and Repse headed a four-party coalition government.

Slovakia’s case might be characterized as a *multipolar fragmented or party system without dominant parties* of any ideological leaning after 1998 when the nationalist Meciar’s Movement for Democratic Slovakia was voted from power. On the left wing of the political spectrum were competing the Direction – Social Democracy, Party of Democratic Left and the Communist Party of Slovakia. No less intense internal struggles characterized the situation of Slovakian Right, in which a place under the sun were searching three Christian democratic parties (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, Hungarian Coalition Party and Christian Democratic Movement), the liberal Alliance of a New Citizen, and two nationalist parties (Slovak National Party and still politically alive Movement for Democratic Slovakia). The picture of the highly fragmented Slovakian political scene would be not complete without mentioning that in the 2002 parliamentary elections there ran as many as 26 political formations (Ucen 2003: 1071).

Along the left-right party system dimension, Lithuania is a highly controversial case to evaluate. In two parliaments out of four, the mainstream left and right wing parties secured stable parliamentary majorities (the Lithuanian

Democratic Labour Party in 1992 and Homeland Union in 1996). From 1992 to 2000, Lithuania showed all necessary elements of a bipolar party system with a few united and strong Left and Right parties. Bipolar fluctuation was a structural feature of Lithuanian party politics of the period.

After the 2000 elections the Seimas was dominated by the centre–left majority of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and New Union, which failed to form the government immediately after the election, but the agreement was reached in mid-2001. After the 2004 Seimas elections, two former ruling parties retained positions in the parliamentary majority along with the Labour Party and Union of Peasants and New Democracy Parties in a new four-party centre–left coalition. Among nine governments there were as many as five centre–left, three centre–right and one centrist government during the period 1992–2004.

Meanwhile, after the 2000 Seimas elections, the shares of votes of individual parties became much more equal. Only in relatively stronger positions remained Social Democratic Party, which in a coalition with New Union gained 20.7 per cent of total vote in 2004 and 31.1 in 2000 when finishing ahead of all other parties. Main challengers to the Social Democratic Party in the last two elections were such populist parties as New Union in 2000, the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties in 2004. On the political right, the Liberal and Centre Union and Homeland Union were competing. The fragmentation of the Lithuanian party system since 2000 stimulated formation of a multipolar party system without dominant left and /or right parties.

The degree of left–right polarization varies in Central East Europe from country to country. If the left–right dichotomy in Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland or Romania was a rather strong element for party system structuring, it played rather a marginal role in Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia. Meanwhile, the left–right scale is an incomplete device to frame the political conflict structure in new democracies.

Party system stability: voter and party connection

The initial post-transitional party competition and voter identification in new democracies of Central East Europe was defined by two crosscutting cleavages. The first, of socio-economic nature, represents the discord between support for the neo-liberal free market / free enterprise policies and the option in favor of state interventionism in the economy and welfare

state-type social policy. The other, labeled in various ways by different authors, reflects a conflict of ideological or even axiological nature and was based on the conflict of the contrasting assessments of the Communist past (Jasiewicz 2002: 2).

In Western Europe, the party systems were a by-product of the underlying social structures. S. Berglund, T. Hellen and F. Aarebrot, following Lipset–Rokkan’s logic, have noted that social cleavages “structure the behaviour of voters and parties alike and they determine the number of parties and the nature of partisan conflict; they are thus of obvious importance for the way democracy works. Indeed, the cleavage concept is crucial to the study of parties, party systems and regime change” (1998: 9).

Moreover, these authors described the importance of social cleavages in the following manner: “Cleavages go beyond issues, conflicts and interests of a purely economic or social nature. They are in a sense more fundamental, as they are founded on culture, value orientations and ideological insulation; they constitute deep-seated socio-structural conflicts with political significance. A cleavage is rooted in a persistent social division, which enables one to identify certain groups in society: members of an ethnic minority, believers of a particular denomination, residents of a particular region. A cleavage also engages some set of values common to members of the group; group members share the same value orientation. And finally, cleavages are institutionalized in the form of political parties and other associational groups” (Berglund, Hellen & Aarebrot 1998: 10).

If in Western democracies institutionalization of parties and development of their ideologies were closely connected to the freezing of social cleavages, the picture was very different in the new democracies of Central East Europe. These societies have been described as “flattened societies”, where social class identities played a marginal role in the development of party loyalties. Class identities were replaced by various socio-cultural and purely political identities such as the old regime vs. the new, national independence vs. dependence, autocrats vs. democrats, and so on. Moreover, “political parties which operated in the period immediately following the political transition may have articulated only theoretical interests of social groups that did not exist at the time. Class certainly was a weak predictor of electoral behavior, far behind age, education, union membership and, in particular, religion” (Berglund, Hellen & Aarebrot 1998: 11).

In contemporary Central East Europe political changes initiated the development of a completely new economic and social order in the early 1990s. Here social divisions of the standard West European variety were emerging only gradually and as a result of political decisions and the dynamics of transitional economies. In organisational terms, the very elite group that engineered and masterminded the transition to democracy had to create would-be parties as institutional expressions of interests and collective identities, which had to be articulated and constructed before they could be aggregated by the political elite (sic!). At this stage of the development, the new political elites were reminiscent of a horse standing not before but behind the cart trying to push the transitional carriage forward.

The initial stimuli of political competition and formation of party preferences, i.e. the issues of high or macropolitics – independence and democratization – lost their mobilizing potential immediately after establishing a more or less functioning framework of institutional democracy in each country. From this momentum the issues of medium- and short-range, or low politics dominated the political agenda of the newly independent states. A tentative analysis of cleavage structure in most of Central East European countries shows that ethnicity, urban–rural division, religion, evaluation of the old vs. new regime and foreign policy (national traditions vs. European integration) defined developing political and party preferences. Meanwhile, the question of the strength and influence of certain cleavages on voter choices is left open. It is a well-known fact that civil society institutions are weak in Central East European countries, implying that individual parties and party systems as a whole here do not reflect and are not firmly based on social cleavages as is the case in Western Europe. Election results in Central East European countries often “show how citizens respond to the choices that political elites supply, but leave open whether voters favour a party because they agree with its policies or the party is viewed as a lesser evil” (Rose & Munro 2003: 54).

In this context, it might be appropriate to remind an observation by Juan Linz in which he concludes that “the new political parties are not likely to be mass membership parties, parties anchored in homogeneous and socially distinct electorates. They will be “catch-all parties”, parties less committed to integrate their supporters into a variety of mass organizations, and even less into an encapsulated subculture, as some socialist

and Christian democratic parties did in the past. There will be fewer voters with a strong party identification, and more of them will be “floating voters” (Linz 1997: 416).

The weak social rooting of political parties is a major source of party system instability, but it is not the only one. Among the other factors that show well the high potential of party system instability on the side of electoral behaviour are the declining voter turnout and the high level of volatility, on the one hand, and the increasing popularity of the new, in most cases populist, parties.

High variations of voter turnout can be observed in Central East Europe not only on a cross-national basis, but also from the time perspective. The latter factor seems to be most important in new democracies. Because of the plebiscitarian character of the founding elections and democratic opening of political participation for citizens of the Central East European countries, the average voter turnout here slightly exceeded the level of Western democracies in early 1990s (77.7 per cent in European Union).

After the founding elections the voter activity was clearly moving down in all countries with no exceptions. The voter turnout from 80.2 per cent in the founding elections decreased to 59.5 per cent of eligible electorate in the last cycle of parliamentary elections, or more than 1/5 of the previously active electorate has been ignoring national elections. A number of reasons can explain the declining turnout in Central East Europe. Among them are the raising of the electoral threshold, high distrust in parties and in the efficiency of governments to fulfil the voters’ demands and expectations, over-supply of parties, weak party loyalties, etc.

However, significant turnout variations were observed in different countries. In Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria the turnout has averaged around or more than 70 per cent. At the same time in Lithuania and Poland the turnout during the last elections was only 45–46 per cent. In general, the growing voter apathy is an indication of potential (rather than actual) party system instability in Central East Europe.

Volatility of votes is not only a good indicator to observe the voters’ switches from one party to another in subsequent elections, but also an indicator measuring the relative strength and social rooting of leading parties. Moreover, the index of voter volatility demonstrates well the capabilities, especially of major parties, to mobilize supporters on a permanent basis or, on the contrary, their

lack of stable support in the society. Sometimes the voter volatility index is named as a single most important criterion of party system stability.

As far as West European democracies are concerned, the index of voter volatility is relatively low and does not exceed 21 points (Rose, Munro & Mackie 1998: 118). Only a few countries of Central East Europe had the volatility indices similar to Western European ones: Slovakia 20 (1992, 1994), Romania 15.5 (1996), Czech Republic 15.8 (1998) (calculated from Rose, Munro & Mackie 1998: 119). In ten Central East European countries, from 1991 to 2000 the volatility levels did not decrease and on average remained at 25.9 points (Sikk 2005: 395). Only the Czech Republic and Slovenia experienced a decrease in volatility, but in Estonia (34.4 in 2003), Latvia (41.7 in 2002), Lithuania (45.6 in 2004), Poland (50.15 in 2001) and Slovakia (44.1 in 2002) the volatility index substantially increased. Electoral behaviour theories predict that voter volatility is high during the first few cycles of democratic elections. For instance, in Austria the volatility index was 24, in West Germany 52, in Italy 46 points for the first two postwar elections, but later it decreased (Rose & Munro 2003: 80). However, voter volatility level is not falling and even moves to the opposite direction (see more Rose & Munro 2003: 81). Fluctuation of voter preferences might be well illustrated by the fact that during four electoral cycles since 1992 to 2004, nine out of ten Lithuanian citizens changed their party preferences and a party for which they voted once. In general, the voter volatility index is more than twice higher in Central East Europe than in Western Europe. Again, it is a clear sign that the multiparty and competitive party systems in the region are still unstable.

Richard Rose and Neil Munro have recently noted that electoral volatility is a coin with two sides as it reflects the influence of both supply and demand. The supply-side volatility is structural as it shows consistency or inconsistency in the supply of parties or accounts entry and exit of parties on political stage. When voters change their party preferences, this results in demand-side volatility. Supply-side changes in parties, according to Rose and Munro, are the primary cause of electoral volatility in all Central East European countries, except Hungary (Rose & Munro 2003: 81–82).

Electoral success of new political parties also reflects the oversupply of parties on the political scene of new democracies in Central East Europe. However, there is at least one substantial problem in studying new political parties; it is

the definition of a new party. Here might be useful a definition formulated by A. Sikk who describes new parties as political organizations “that are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members” (2005: 399).

From 1991 till 2000, genuinely new parties received 11.7 per cent of votes and gained 5 per cent of parliamentary seats (Sikk 2005: 401). These figures are quite comparable to the performance of new parties in Western Europe. Meanwhile, data on the performance of new parties are very contradictory. According to Rose and Munro observations, the third set of democratic elections (1993–1998) showed that an average of 6.8 parties dropped out of competition while 3.5 new parties entered and won seats. In the fourth set of elections (1997–2002), the number of parties dropping out was 5.0 and was greater than the new parties winning votes (2.3), but in the fifth set (2001–2004) the number of new parties winning votes reached 3.0 and was greater than that of disappearing parties². The electoral influence of new parties in Central East Europe is hardly explainable exclusively by institutional or electoral arena features, i.e. district magnitude, federalism or legislative-executive relations, as is possible in the case of Western democracies (see Wiley 1998: 236–239). A relative strength of new parties in the Central East European countries is based rather on underdeveloped and changing party attachments mainly affected by short-term factors, i.e. social and economic conjuncture, the low efficiency of a party in government to meet voters’ expectations, high dependency of parties on personal leadership, and eventually a high frequency of conflicts on party leadership level, party oversupply, etc.

The last but not the least threat to the stability of party systems in Central East Europe is the growing popularity of populism. A number of scholars regard populism as a political tactics, a style of communication or an anti-political and oppositional stance, but such interpretation misses the essence of populism. However, populist ideology includes the rejection of the establishment, the idea that governing should be grounded on the

² Rose and Munro into calculations about the performance of new parties included Russia along ten Central East European countries, but as far as Russian figures are close to the CEE average they do not change the general trends (see more in Rose & Munro 2003: 78–79).

‘volonté général’, proposals to break down intermediary structures and to construct more direct links between the people and the leader (De Raadt, Hollanders et al 2004: 5–11). It is more than clear that the number and political weight of populist parties has increased substantially in Central East European parliaments and governments over the last decade.

Richard Rose and Neil Munro have argued that “the stable party system is completely institutionalized when there is a *stable equilibrium* between supply and demand, in which the same parties compete at successive elections and votes change only a few percentage points from one election to the next” (Rose & Munro 2003: 71). However, the situation within most of the Central East European party systems should better be named “*structural disequilibrium*,” a condition in which there is plenty of competition among parties but the supply of parties changes substantially from one election to the next, and the current structural disequilibrium will end in Central East Europe only if there is a stable supply of parties (Rose & Munro 2003: 71, 87).

Conclusions

Central East European party systems, like Western European ones, differ from one country to another: there are no two identical party systems in the region. But the general trend is that a model of multiparty system without a dominant party is most popular here. In some countries the perspectives of system reorganization might be quite predictable, but in most of Central East European countries the centripetal forces leading to some sort of party system stability are more powerful than the centrifugal ones.

The high rates of electoral volatility in Central East Europe might be potentially a single most dangerous factor to party system stability in its current configurations, because reflect that even major parties lack capabilities to mobilize stable numbers of supporters, not to mention attracting the undecided voters. A substantial part of voters have simply moved away from electoral process and political participation for an indefinite period of time since 1989–1990.

Despite all the challenges that the new Central East European party systems are facing, there is no danger that the general principles of competitiveness and multipartyism might be rejected by one or another party, or voted out by citizens favoring authoritarian choice in foreseeable future in one or another

country. On the contrary, the major parties seem to have understood that they depend on permanent supporters, stable party electorate as far as their ideological identities and organizational institutions are becoming more articulated.

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POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY

KANT AND THE KALININGRAD PROBLEM

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Abstract. The aim of the article is to disclose a possible view of Kant towards the solution of the Königsberg problem after World War II. Nowadays philosophers usually show little interest in debates on the so-called “Kaliningrad Puzzle”. This is a kind of misunderstanding. As one of the most prominent representatives of the idealistic paradigm of international relations, Kant may be a competent participant of the debates on the future of the Kaliningrad region. His political philosophy contributes to a better understanding of certain important aspects related to the Kaliningrad problem.

Current debates on Kaliningrad’s problems usually do without philosophers. There is no doubt that different philosophies meet in these debates, but philosophers aren’t direct participants. It is a great paradox of the recent political debates about Kaliningrad: diverse philosophies clash in these debates, but without direct participation of philosophers. This paradox is particularly interesting, because no one has ever earned as much fame for Königsberg as Kant did. Königsberg cannot be imagined without Kant as Athens without Plato and Aristotle.

Immanuel Kant originated one of the most important revolutions in the Western philosophical thought. Over the last two centuries many original authors arose, but only Kant can be paralleled with Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Descartes. He is, undoubtedly, the most prominent citizen of Königsberg. In present-day Kaliningrad debates on renaming this city in the honour of Kant do not die away. It would sound “Kantograd” in Russian, another of the numerous similar predictable experiments with East Prussia’s place-names.

Kant was very much attached to his native city. Throughout his life he never left Königsberg further than 120 kilometres away. Here he graduated from the Collegium Fridericianum school, studied in the university and

became its best-known professor. A lot of people know the depiction of his house in Schlossgrabe: “Two tables usually laden with books, a modest couch, several chairs, and a chest of drawers comprised the total furnishings of the space, its sole decoration consisting of portrait of Rousseau, which hang on the wall.”¹ This description of philosopher’s surrounding is well known to his fans, but unfortunately it cannot be restored by any museum that would claim any authenticity. In 1893 Kant’s house was demolished, and today in its place only an empty crossroad can be found.

Citizens of the old Königsberg turned Kant into a legend. In the city there were many stories about his punctuality, pedantry, ability to foretell the year of his death, lightning conductors for kirches and his funeral that had lasted for more than two weeks. Kant’s academic mobility was equal to zero. He worked for the same university throughout all of his life. When his academic career was not going in the best way, he received invitations from other Prussia’s universities, but he politely turned them all down, stating, besides other reasons, his great attachment to Königsberg. Its citizens paid him back in the same coin – Kant’s remains were buried under the cathedral of Königsberg, in the “tomb of professors”, and in 1924, when celebrating his 200th birth anniversary, a memorial created by Professor Friedrich Lahrs from the local Academy of Art was opened in the north-eastern corner of the cathedral and miraculously survived to this day.

East Prussia and Königsberg are often described as symbols of Prussian militancy, chauvinism and blind submission to the established order. This image distinctly contributed to its tragic fate after World War II. However, Kant does not fit this conception of Königsberg. His philosophy now is one of the most influential sources of liberal philosophical thought. Philosophers of the generation of John Rawls (Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman) are often described as followers of the “Kantian liberalism.”² Hundred years ago Kant’s ideas on cognitive theory and cultural philosophy were favoured. Now he is mostly influential in the philosophy of morality and politics.

Kant not only managed to make “Copernican revolution” in philosophy. After he made it, ever unseen prosperity of German philosophic thought begun, which was described by historians as the beginning of German intellectual dominance. By then being famous only for mystics and members of *Leibniz*–

Wolff's school, Germans soon afterwards earned the reputation of a philosophical nation. Johann Gottlieb Fichte came to Königsberg in 1791 desiring to meet Kant and thus created a unique chain of philosophical influences - Kant, Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Artur Schopenhauer.

For the first time a provincial town of northern Europe became a place of a revolution of philosophical thought important for all Western culture. Kant proved that authentic philosophies could originate not only in established European cultural centres, but also in such provincial cities as Königsberg. That made a huge effect on the region's philosophical life. Descartes' ideas progressed to Lithuania for almost a century whereas Kant's critical philosophy reached Vilnius almost at the same time as universities in Germany. Since 1804 it had been taught at Vilnius University by Johann Heinrich Abicht, Kant's follower and opponent.³

Königsberg of the late 18th century cannot be called a "philosophical province". It's hard to characterize in this manner the city where Kant taught Johann Gottfried Herder, and his biggest opponent was Johann George Hamann. Though Herder lived in this city for just a short while, putting together his and Hamann's philosophical works one can say that Königsberg not only contributed to the German Enlightenment, but also to the development of German Romanticism. According to Isaiah Berlin, Hamann "was the first author in modern days to denounce the Enlightenment and all its works."⁴ Behind Kant's and Hamann's dispute stood not only personal disagreement, but also a clash between the two major philosophical ages – the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Our contemporary cultural self-consciousness is strongly influenced by the debate of Kant and Hamann. According to Charles Taylor, "these two big and many sided cultural transformations – the Enlightenment and Romanticism – with their concept of the human have made us such as we are today."⁵

The Lithuanians have two additional reasons to talk about the link between Königsberg and Kant. Firstly, Prussian tribes ethnically were closest to Lithuanians. Till now East Prussia in Lithuanian cultural consciousness acts as Lithuania Minor (*Klein Litauen*). This term is not a Lithuanian nationalist invention. German annalists had used it since the 16th century, thus describing the ethnical constitution of one part of Eastern Prussia. Historical

investigations show that up to the beginning of the 18th century the majority of population in some parts of Eastern Prussia were Lithuanians.

Anyone who has studied the history of Lithuanian culture knows that in Königsberg in 1547 Martynas Mažvydas produced the first Lithuanian book, Daniel Klein published the first Lithuanian language grammar, Johann Bretke (Jonas Bretkūnas) arranged the first Lithuanian translation of the Bible, and the foremost Lithuanian writer of the 18th century Kristijonas Donelaitis graduated from the city's university and worked in Tolmingkehmen (Tolminkiemis). The history of Lithuanian culture is unthinkable without the University of Königsberg.

The rector of this university Ludwig Rhesa (Liudvikas Rėza) not only studied Lithuanian songs but also wrote a dissertation on Kant's philosophy and composed several praising pieces of poetry about him.⁶ There is no doubt that Kant had multiple encounters with East Prussian Lithuanians and their culture. One of his last written texts is *Nachschrift eines Freundes* (*Friend's postscript*), printed in 1800 in Königsberg as a foreword to Christian Gotlieb Mielcke's Lithuanian–German and German–Lithuanian dictionary.⁷ In this short preface Kant advocated Prussian Lithuanians: “Prussia's Lithuanian truly deserves to sustain his character's peculiarity.”⁸ He emphasized the importance of the Lithuanian language for the cultural individuality of Prussian Lithuanians and the world's humanities. *Nachschrift eines Freundes* consolidated the positive feelings of Lithuanians towards Kant. None of the classics of Western philosophical thought earned so many translations to Lithuanian as Kant did. Almost all of his main works can be read in Lithuanian.

It's been more than a full century of discussions on Kant's Lithuanian background. His ties with German culture are well known, however, it is his ancestors that intrigue historians. In the letter to Swedish bishop Jakob Lindblom, written in 1797, Kant indicated his Scottish ancestry.⁹ However, at the end of 19th century German historian Johannes Sembritzki questioned this claim. By using the archives of Königsberg he argued that Kant's grandfather Hans couldn't have moved from Scotland, because his grand grandfather Richard had already been living in East Prussia.¹⁰ This version was supported by the researches made by Hans and Gertrude Mortensen.¹¹ These authors confirmed the version of Kant's Lithuanian descent. In their

opinion, Kant's ancestors were from the Lithuanian village Kantwein (Kantvainiai) and were speaking a dialect close to the Lithuanian language.

It should be admitted that Kant failed to overcome the militaristic image of Eastern Prussia and Königsberg. The main actors in the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam were sure that Königsberg was the major centre of Prussian expansionism, chauvinism and imperialism. Winston Churchill continually repeated that Prussia was the root of all evil, his colleague Roosevelt demanded to weaken Germany and especially Prussia as much as possible. Stalin seized the opportunity using those moods. At the Teheran conference he formulated a particular request of the Soviet Union: "the Russians require ice-free Königsberg and Memel ports and an adequate territory of Eastern Prussia."¹² In the 1945 Potsdam conference this request was fulfilled. The conference agreed to give the Soviet Union the city of Königsberg and the surrounding territories. Till now at issue is only one sentence of the concluding report of the conference – the participants of the conference agreed that Königsberg went to the Soviet Union "pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement."¹³

Since 1946 Kant's native city has a dual reference – "Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) or Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg)." It is a big historical irony. Kant made his city famous by his work *Perpetual Peace*, whose Second preliminary article declared: "No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift."¹⁴ Königsberg suffered the worst consequences of the Second World War. It's hard to find another territory in Europe to have suffered so much from the decisions of the Potsdam conference.

Russian researchers describe the current condition of Kaliningrad as just deplorable: "For almost fifty years since World War II the Kaliningrad region had been inaccessible to Europe. When the wall had finally fallen, it revealed that the region was very poor and the living standards were very low."¹⁵ Old Prussian legacy had suffered even greater strikes and stands literally in ruins. Kaliningrad and its area disappeared from the cultural map of Europe. Since 1945 Kant's native city became a place of a unique social experiment – local authorities were trying to convince that the new population which had come from the Soviet Union could live without reference to old Prussia's history. Any greater allusions to the old culture of East Prussia and Königsberg were

prohibited. Kant predoomed the overcoming of this paralysis of Kaliningrad population's historical consciousness. Despite the forced destruction of historical memory, citizens of Soviet Kaliningrad were allowed to speak about separate passages of Kant's life in Königsberg. On the occasion of the 250th anniversary of his death, in 1974, at the Kaliningrad State University a museum in his memory was opened, – a cabinet that contributed much to the old East Prussian history research.

During the Soviet time Kant preserved the history of his native city. According to a particular Soviet Marxist interpretation, German classical philosophy was treated as one of the sources of Marxism. This factor allowed Kant to find rather influential patrons such as Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Soviet ideologists were obliged to take care of Kant's grave, situated in the centre of the city, also having to sustain the nearby ruins of the old Königsberg cathedral. Soviet bureaucrats did not care much about East Prussia's cultural heritage, however, they had to regard Marx and Lenin's favourable, though critical, words about Kant. That paved the path for further talks about the history of Königsberg. Any major reference to Kant was also a reminder of the history of old Königsberg.

Soviet government did not suspect that they could have huge problems with Kant's worldwide authority. Admitting his philosophical merits implied Königsberg history studies. Kant hadn't been sensitive on historical issues, however, it was his authority that during the Soviet times made the history of Königsberg to come back. It is difficult to find another person that had contributed so much to shaping the image of the present Kaliningrad. In post-communist times, Kant received the citizens' benevolence unknown even at the times till 1939. The old Königsberg cathedral was made a memorial in his honour.

When talking about the relation between Kant and Königsberg, it is difficult to avoid philosophy of history. Seeing present Kaliningrad inevitably leads to the question: "What is the reason for Königsberg's tragic fate?" Kant loved to write on some historiosophical questions, however, he had always been a more cautious author than Hegel, Marx or Oswald Spengler. He loved to speak about the purpose of nature and history, the progress of the humanity and perpetual peace, though he avoided any extensive references to particular historical events. That was motivated by the general

cautiousness of his philosophy: avoid speaking about any thing that cannot be cognised by pure reason and experience.

Kant's cautious approach as a philosopher suggests an idea that he should not be involved in present day disputes over the future of Kaliningrad region. Herder and Hegel can say considerably more on this topic. Herder excellently felt the peculiarity of every culture and civilisation, and Hegel was brilliant in perceiving the general patterns of historical development in individual events. Kant's transcendental philosophy does not serve well to rethink cultural changes. It is a philosophy written from the perspective of permanent pure reason. Kant was not concerned with Herder's *Nationalismus* or with Hegel's *Volksgeist*. He saw culture and politics not in the sense of national sentiments, but from the view of a global citizen.

However, is it really true that Kant cannot contribute to the present discussion about the so-called "Kaliningrad Puzzle"¹⁶? If we admit that, a paradoxical situation would occur: famous for his reasoning about international relations, Kant would suddenly become incapable of participating in discussions about the fate of his native town. A more convincing answer seems to be the opposite: Kant actually can be a competent participant in the debates about the "Kaliningrad Puzzle." His philosophical works may help to understand some important aspects of the puzzle.

The interconnection of Kant and Kaliningrad topics is an intriguing idea. However, its implementation is confronted with a big problem: Kant couldn't know the details of the present fate of his native town, so the presentation of his attitude might easily turn into poorly reasoned speculations. It requires to sustain the discussion on the level of principles instead of historical details unknown to Kant. Similarly as the Constitution of the United States, which is two centuries old but still helps in solving many problems of the present-day U.S. society, Kant's political philosophy can also be adapted to understand the new political reality unknown to this author.

Kaliningrad Region is a unique phenomenon in the political map of present-day Europe. Its distinctiveness is determined by three main factors. Firstly, Kaliningrad Region is a unique legal-political formation invoking particular discussions about the status of its international recognition to the Russian Federation. Secondly, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad Region became an exclave (like East Prussia after the Treaty of Versailles) separated

from the metropolis by a few hundred kilometres. Thirdly, as a subject of the Russian Federation, this region is compelled to prove constantly its distinctiveness to other territories of the country. This spawns a fair amount of tensions between the region and the central government.

Nowadays usually it is not believed that the philosophers can say something significant about the international relations. Sociologically oriented political science is far more trusted. It is probably one of the biggest changes since the times of Kant. This philosopher always was speaking about the primacy of the faculty of philosophy over all other faculties. In the preface of *Critique of Pure Reason* he clearly states that philosophy is the primary tribunal in discerning the legitimate and illegitimate demands of reason.

Kant often is described as the creator of the idealistic theory of international relations, and his work *Perpetual Peace* is introduced as a classical work of this theoretical paradigm. However, Kant would dislike such approach to his work. It contradicts the main intentions of his critical philosophy. Kant was seeking to create a synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, not an idealistic theory. He was interested in something not only transcendently ideal, but also in something empirically real.

Speaking about the present “Kaliningrad Puzzle” Kant would firstly say that everyone who considers it to be a merely empirical problem is mistaken. In his point of view, international relations ought not to be reduced to empirical things such as the pursuit of profit, military and economic power. Far more important is the respect of the principles of morality and law. The main intentions of Kant’s political philosophy are well reflected in the distinction between a politician and a statesman, introduced by Rawls: “The politician looks to the next election, the statesman to the next generation.”¹⁷ The politicians become statesmen only by consolidating the principles of legal and political cooperation that are important to the society of all nations.

Kant was convinced that the task of a real statesman was not to change the world’s political map. His goal is much more modest and honourable – to take care of the principles of fair political justice that help to establish permanent peace between people. By following this viewpoint, Kant’s adherent Rawls is arguing that Otto von Bismarck, Napoleon and Adolf Hitler weren’t statesmen: they had changed the history of humanity, but they had not created moral and legal premises for perpetual peace. Following

this idea it could be said that in solving the question of Königsberg the main actors of the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences were only politicians, not statesmen.

It is easy to understand Kant's attitude to the decisions of the Potsdam conference that concern his home city. In the treatise *Perpetual Peace* he unambiguously says that a victorious war does not solve the question of justice.¹⁸ Kant would severely criticise the decisions of the Potsdam conference. These decisions contradict his conception of international relations. Kant's political philosophy serves well not only the criticism of unfair decisions of an international peace conference, but also helps to find a solution in complex situations when the consequences of an unfair political decision have become a rule in everyday life. The analysts of Kant's work often overlook the proposed ways of implementation of the second *Preliminary article*, which is very important for the solutions of controversial problems of international politics. In Kant's point of view, the articles that forbid occupation and war, if violated, should not be repaired immediately. Speaking about the implementation of the preliminary articles of perpetual peace he wrote:

“All of the articles listed above, when regarded objectively or in relation to the intentions of those in power, are *prohibitive laws (leges prohibitiveae)*. Yet some of them are of the *strictest sort (leges strictae)*, being valid irrespective of differing circumstances, and they require that the abuses they prohibit should be abolished *immediately* (Nos. 1, 5 and 6). Others (Nos. 2, 3, and 4), although they are not exceptions to the rule of justice, allow some *subjective* latitude according to the circumstances in which they are applied (*leges latae*). The latter need not necessarily be executed at once, so long as their ultimate purpose (e.g. *restoration* of freedom to certain states in accordance with the second article) is not lost sight of. But their execution may not be *put off* to a non – existent date (*ad calendas graecas*, as Augustus used to promise), for any delay is permitted only as a means of avoiding a premature implementation which might frustrate the whole purpose of the article.”¹⁹

This quote shows that Kant indeed would not demand a prompt decision on the Kaliningrad problem. He would agree to delay the implementation of the articles of peace and as a conservative would demand to consider the circumstances. This is the flexibility worthy of praise from the advocates of *real politics*. However, Kant did not have even a slightest doubt as to the necessity of correcting injustice of bad political decisions. In his opinion, the restoration

of justice cannot be delayed until doomsday, or as emperor Augustus used to say, *ad calendas Graecas*.

Kant is sometimes presented as the one who philosophically based the idea of the European Union. However, that is a questionable interpretation of this author's philosophy. Kant wanted much less than the creators of the present-day European Union. He proposed a federation of states resembling rather the contemporary United Nations than the European Union. The latter would appear as a huge challenge to the sovereignty of the state. In this respect we should agree with Habermas who states that the idea of the sovereignty was a sacred thing for Kant and that he was talking just about a federation of states, not some political union with a more extensive authority.²⁰

The fall of the Soviet Union created a new situation – Kaliningrad Region, closed till 1991, today is already confronted by a thing called by Kant “the cosmopolitan right” (*Weltbürgerrecht*). Kant believed that “the peoples on the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt *everywhere*.”²¹ The Kaliningrad region lies between two cultural and political environments varying in their pace of modernisation – the Russian Federation and the European Union. One can try to guess that Kant would prefer the European way to modernisation. However, the main question still remains unanswered: would Russia, which is considered by Samuel Huntington a different civilization to its neighbours²², want to choose this way?

Speaking about perpetual peace Kant demanded that “the constitution of every state shall be republican”²³ That is a belief not easily compatible with the ideas of true liberalism. A true liberal cannot demand the all world to live by his concept of morality and politics. Yet this point of view is acceptable by many people in the present-day European Union. Therefore it is possible to say that the European future of Kaliningrad Region is mostly resting upon the ability of its population to solidify the political principles enunciated by Kant – freedom of citizenry, the supremacy and rule of law. This is probably the most important lesson by Kant to the contemporary citizens of his native town. The creation of a strong civil society is the most important item in the solution of the “Kaliningrad Puzzle.”

Kant assumed that the decisions of government must depend on the will and choice of the people. The present-day Kaliningrad Region belies some serious demands by the civil society. It is rather a hostage to the central government than a free association of citizens. The citizens that are really free start to treat the affairs of the region as their own ones. By holding this view of Kant's political philosophy it can be stated that the Kaliningrad region so far did not seize the opportunity to become an association of free citizens. It is the only reliable way for this hostage of the 20th century international policy to become part of the uniting Europe's cultural and political life.

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CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN POST-SOVIET LITHUANIA

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Abstract. The purpose of the article¹ is to analyse the popular views of democracy in a post-communist society. It seeks to explore how the meanings of democracy are formed by the citizens that were socialised by the Soviet regime and have neither knowledge nor direct experience of democratic rule. The article will draw on qualitative research data collected in 2004 in four Lithuanian districts.

The data reveal two conceptions of democracy dominating among ordinary citizens in Lithuania: 1) democracy as an opposition to the Soviet rule, and 2) democracy as an “ideal” type of government. The first conception mainly relates democracy with the freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of religion, and, in some cases, with a capitalist economic system. The second conception associates democracy mostly with justice and order.

The evidence also shows that the citizens endorsing the first conception of democracy are more satisfied with the current regime, while the individuals who think of democracy in terms of “good governance” are largely negative about the post-communist regime. For them, democracy is rather an anti-thesis to the current regime and some of them, paradoxically, refer to the authoritarian inter-war regime of Antanas Smetona as approaching the ideal of democracy.

Introduction

The studies of political beliefs and values of post-communist societies reveal some substantial differences between the attitudes towards democracy in Western and post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe.

¹ This article was originally prepared for presentation at the 3rd ECPR Conference, Budapest, 8–10 September 2005.

On the one hand, post-communist citizens seem to support democracy as an ideal form of governing as much as their Western counterparts (Klingemann, 1999; Inglehart, 2000; Mishler and Rose, 2001). On the other hand, the support for the functioning of democracies in practice is much lower in post-communist states than in Western democracies (see Toka, 1995; Klingemann, 1999), even though the Western world itself is said to face a crisis of non-confidence (Norris, 1999; Pharr and Putnam, 2000).

What did post-communist citizens who had neither had democratic experience nor democratic civic education have in mind when answering the survey questions about the ideal of democracy? Is their understanding of democracy comparable to the established definitions or to the concepts of democracy presented in Western civic textbooks? There is some evidence to assume that the citizens of post-communist societies are more committed to collectivist values and more inclined towards the socioeconomic definitions of democracy than the citizens of Western societies (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 2001). The investigations on the subject, however, are rather scarce.

In the article, the “common sense” definitions of democracy of Lithuanian citizens are explored. The first question addressed in this article is how the meanings of democracy are formed in a post-communist society by the citizens who were socialized by the Soviet regime. The aim is not only to trace the meanings ascribed to the term “democracy” by Lithuanian people but also to understand how these definitions were arrived at. The second aim is to demonstrate how the seeming inconsistencies of the attitudes towards democracy of Lithuanian people can be explained. As it will be demonstrated by the data from mass opinion surveys, the absolute majority of Lithuanian population claim to endorse the ideal of democracy (see Klingemann, 1999); at the same time, however, about half of population in Lithuania support the authoritarian alternatives of democracy (Duvolt and Sedelius, 2004; Berglund et al., 2004).

The third question addressed in the article is whether the understanding of democracy of ordinary people has an impact on their assessment of the functioning of the current regime. As will be illustrated further, Lithuanian people are among the most dissatisfied ones in the Central and Eastern Europe with the way democracy works in their country. The aim here, therefore, is to

examine the probable links between the meanings ascribed to the ideal of democracy and the level of satisfaction with democracy “in practice”.

In the first section of the article, a brief historical overview of regime changes in Lithuania is presented. Further, some methodological issues on measuring the attitudes towards democracy in post-soviet countries are discussed and the data and methods used for the analysis in this article are introduced. In the next section, the dominant conceptions of democracy of Lithuanian ordinary people are disclosed. Finally, a relationship between the meanings of democracy presented by the respondents and their satisfaction with the regime working in practice is examined.

Regime changes and democratic experience of citizens in Lithuania: a brief overview

In its modern history Lithuania experienced two short periods of democracy: several years during the inter-war period of independent Lithuania, and 15 recent years after the collapse of communism. After long oppression of the Russian tsarist rule, Lithuania enjoyed a short independence period from 1918 to 1940. The country was quickly modernized and multi-party parliamentary democracy was established. The regime, however, was short-lived. The crisis of democracy that was outspreading in Europe at the time had reached Lithuania as well. A *coup d'état* in 1926 has brought to power Lithuanian Nationalist party (Lietuvos tautininkų partija) and the authoritarian regime of President Antanas Smetona. The political opposition and the press were severely limited. The regime, though, was fairly mild in comparison with some other European countries at the time. As the years of Smetona's rule were the last years of independent Lithuania before the Soviet occupation, the regime of Smetona appears in the collective memory of Lithuanians as the “golden age” in modern history of Lithuania.

After the Second World War, Lithuania fell under the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union. Many Lithuanian citizens underwent direct repressions being deported to Siberia or imprisoned. The drastic period of Stalin's rule was followed by a post-totalitarian regime characterised by pragmatic rather than ideological politics and very limited cultural and economic pluralism (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

As Gorbachev's reforms opened the way for the regime change, the dominance of the Communist party was challenged by the national liberation movement "Sąjūdis". In 1989, partly competitive elections to the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the USSR and to some vacant seats of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet were held for the first time after the soviet occupation. In February 1990, free elections to the Supreme Soviet were held and Lithuania's independence was soon restored. Lithuania in fact was the first Soviet Republic to declare independence and to create the democratic governing institutions.

As can be seen from the short overview of the history of modern Lithuania, before 1990 Lithuanian inhabitants had no direct experience of democracy as almost nobody could remember living in the democratic regime of inter-war Lithuania. Most people were educated by the Soviet education system, and the oldest generation received their education (usually primary) in times of Smetona's regime. Only the youngest generation (people under 30 years of age) have received some theoretical knowledge of the principles of liberal democracy at school.

Measuring attitudes towards democracy in post-communist societies

As Rose and Mishler (2001) claim, measuring the attitudes towards the ideal of democracy in incomplete or transitional democracies is particularly problematic. In many surveys which include questions about the support for democracy as an ideal, there is an implicit assumption that the respondents have meaningful ideas of what democracy means and that they share the meaning of the terms used in the questionnaire with the investigators. The problem, however, is that citizens of new democracies do not have direct experience of democracy and were socialized by the old regime into a distorted view of democratic principles (Mishler and Rose, 2001: 305). It is therefore very likely that some of them have no clear understanding of democracy, or their conception of democracy might differ substantially from the theoretic model employed by investigators.

Some evidence from Lithuanian public opinion surveys might be used to support this assumption. Table 1 presents the data drawn from European

Table 1. Support for democratic political system and political system with strong leader (%)

		Strong leader				Total
		very good	fairly good	fairly bad	very bad	
Democratic political system	very good	23.4%	17.1%	34.3%	25.1%	100.0%
		30.6%	13.8%	26.1%	44.9%	25.8%
	fairly good	15.0%	36.4%	36.4%	12.3%	100.0%
		45.5%	68.2%	64.3%	51.0%	59.9%
	fairly bad	32.1%	41.0%	24.4%	2.6%	100.0%
		18.7%	14.7%	8.3%	2.0%	11.5%
	very bad	36.8%	36.8%	15.8%	10.5%	100.0%
		5.2%	3.2%	1.3%	2.0%	2.8%
Total		19.7%	32.0%	33.9%	14.4%	100.0%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


Note. Wording of the question: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what do you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; having a democratic political system."

Source: European Values Survey 1999/2000.

Value Survey on the attitudes of Lithuanian population towards different political systems. In the table, I have cross-tabulated the assessment of the democratic political system and the assessment of the strongman rule. The question the respondents were asked reads: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what do you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; having a democratic political system."

As one can see from the table, there is an extensive overlap of those endorsing the ideal of democracy and supporting authoritarian political system. Indeed, the two items (support for strongman rule and support for democracy) are only weakly correlated (Pearson's correlation is -.188, significant at the 0.001 level). In fact, about 40 per cent of those with strong support for the democratic political system at the same time approve the strongman rule, and only 25 percent of them strongly disapprove the authoritarian rule of one leader. Similarly, about 30 per cent of those who think that strongman rule is

Figure 1. Evaluation of the current regime in Lithuania (%)



Source: Lithuanian Political Culture Survey 1999, data from Jankauskas (2002).

a very good way of governing their country think the same about the democratic political system. This suggests that the concept of “democracy” in the eyes of some people is, paradoxically, fully compatible with the authoritarian institutional framework.

Similarly, a discrepancy might be tracked between the “objective” evaluation of the current regime in Lithuania and the “subjective” assessment of the regime by Lithuanian population. The survey on Lithuanian political culture of 1999 demonstrates that as much as 43 percent of Lithuanians believe that democracy is not yet established in Lithuania² (Figure 1) even though international institutions do not have complaints about the democratic procedures in Lithuania. (Lithuania is classified by Freedom House as a free country since 1991.) This again suggests that many Lithuanians’ perception of democracy disagrees with established definitions of democracy. If this is the case, a different approach to the measurement of the attitudes towards the regime in new

² Tentative results of the mass opinion survey of Lithuanian population made in 2005 demonstrate that similar trends are still prevalent in Lithuania.

democracies should be introduced and the conceptions of ordinary people should be investigated without imposing *a priori* definitions of the terms.

Data and method of research

Although most of the studies of political attitudes in post-communist societies are based on the quantitative data of mass opinion surveys, qualitative research methodology was considered to be more appropriate than mass surveys for our purposes. Mass surveys depend on the respondents and researchers sharing the same interpretations of words and requires the respondent having clear ideas about the subject (Carnaghan, 2003). In our case, these preconditions are not satisfied as the subject itself is rather complex and the purpose of the study is to investigate if and how the “common sense” understandings of democracy differ from our *a priori* definitions. In-depth interviews, in contrast, allow the respondents to disclose their own thinking and to explain their ideas in their own terms. The qualitative methodology enables the researcher to grasp the meaning of the concepts the respondents use and to understand how the beliefs and opinions of the respondents are formed.

The data used in this article are drawn from the research that was carried out in July 2004.³ During the research, 40 in-depth interviews with ordinary people were made. The interviews were taped and transcribed. The interviews were conducted in four Lithuanian districts: Vilnius, Joniškis, Klaipėda and Tauragė. Vilnius and Klaipėda were selected as the biggest and the most prosperous cities in Lithuania, and Joniškis and Tauragė were selected as the poorest province regions of Lithuania. The respondents in the regions were selected using the quota sample according to the criteria of age, gender, education and profession. As shown by numerous quantitative studies, these characteristics appear to be the most important determinants of political attitudes and electoral behavior in Lithuania (e.g., Degutis 1995, 2001; Gaidys, 2004).

³ It is part of a larger research project on the ‘Welfare and Democracy: Socio-Economic Differences and Satisfaction with Democracy in Lithuania’ sponsored by the Democracy Commission Small Grants Program of the US Embassy in Lithuania. Principal investigators: Mindaugas Degutis, Klaudijus Maniokas and Ainė Ramonaitė.

During the interviews, the respondents were asked how they understood the term “democracy” and what the most important attributes of democracy are. Moreover, they were asked to evaluate the functioning of democracy in Lithuania and to compare the current regime with that of the Soviet times.

Meanings of democracy among Lithuanian public

Communication with the respondents revealed that most of them (except some young people with university education) had no theoretical knowledge of the principles of liberal democracy. Their understanding of democracy was based on common sense and on the experience of the Soviet regime or the regime of Smetona. Some of the respondents had difficulties in defining the concept of democracy as they had never thought about it before. “I cannot explain (*laughing*). But I think nowadays there are many people who don’t know...who don’t understand very much those political words.” (30-year-old unemployed woman). “Democracy... it doesn’t mean anything to me. I don’t understand what kind of democracy [you are asking about]. I don’t understand” (69-year-old pensioner).

The data allow us to trace two conceptions of democracy dominating among ordinary citizens in Lithuania: 1) democracy as an opposition to the Soviet rule and 2) democracy as an “ideal” type of government. The first conception mainly relates democracy with the freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of religion, and, in some cases, with a capitalist economic system. The second conception associates democracy mostly with justice and order (for a detailed list of the attributes of democracy mentioned by the respondents, see Appendix).

Freedom was the first most frequent association of democracy presented by the respondents. “Democracy is when you can choose what to do, where to work, when you can choose a job by yourself, you can choose where to study [...]” (30-year-old librarian). “You are free. Free in speech, free in belief, free in everything. It was different under the Russians” (84-year-old pensioner). “Democracy means first of all the freedom of the press. This is the most important thing. The expression of one’s thoughts without being afraid of being expelled to Siberia or somewhere else as it used to be” (59-year-old

technician). Usually the respondents referred to the freedom of speech and press, but the freedom of movement and religion that were severely limited in Soviet times were also mentioned.

The explanations and examples given by the respondents show that the concept of democracy as freedom is directly related with the experience of living in the anti-democratic Soviet regime. Interestingly, however, the same results are found in other countries with a different historical experience. As was shown by various studies, freedom is the most frequent association of democracy both in the Western world and in Central and Eastern European societies (Thomassen, 1995; Miller et al., 1997; Rose et al., 1998; Hofferbert and Klingemann, 2001).

In some cases the understanding of democracy as freedom acquired negative connotations, i.e. it was related with unlimited freedom in a negative sense or even defined as an anarchy: “[Democracy is] when everyone does what he wants. Is it good or is it bad, he does it anyway... That’s how I understand it” (76-year-old pensioner). These people usually complain that there is too much democracy in Lithuania: “If people speak what comes to their mind and there is no culture any more I think it is too much of that democracy [here]” (45-year-old accountant).

Another definition of democracy which derives apparently from the understanding of democracy as related with the “West” is the association of democracy with capitalism or free market. As one of the respondents explained, “Democracy, as far as I understand it, is when everyone is on his own. One has his own undertakings or buildings” (57-year-old peasant). This association, although very natural in post-socialist context, occurred in very few interviews.

The second group of definitions of democracy is derived from the understanding of democracy as an “ideal” regime. People usually perceive democracy as a good and just way of governing, i.e. they ascribe to democracy the attributes of their vision of an ideal political system. This is the reason why some of the respondents associate democracy with the regime of Antanas Smetona. As one aged respondent explained, “Yes, I understand democracy very well. But I would say there is not much of it here. In times of Smetona it was true democracy. [...] You could say there was then *true* democracy. There were no thieves, no rogues in the Seimas [Parliament of the Republic of

Lithuania]. Everything was sacred” (84-year-old pensioner). As the citation illustrates, the attribute of a good political system is an order based on a sacred authority. The motif of “sacred order” was repeated in several interviews, especially in the conversations with aged respondents remembering the times of Smetona’s rule.

Another important attribute of democracy is justice. As it appears from many interviews, a good regime first of all is supposed to be a just regime. As 79-year-old pensioner explains: “I don’t know what this democracy is. I truly don’t know, I cannot tell you... Democracy, as I understand, must be some kind of grand justice. And there is no such justice here...”

The symbols of “order” and “justice” for these people seem to represent the essential elements of the vision of a good regime. This vision, however, is embodied by a strong leader rather than parliamentary discussions and the multi-party system of governing. The symbol of order is first of all associated with stability, strong authorities, law enforcement and respect to the government. This apparently explains the paradox of an overlap between the supporters of democracy and supporters of authoritarianism, presented in the previous sections.

One more aspect of a good system of governance is social welfare. We expected the association of democracy with welfare to be one of the dominant, since it is both the element of ‘good society’ and the attribute of the ‘West’ that was lacking in the Soviet times. Contrary to our expectations, however, the association of democracy with welfare was quite rare. Moreover, individuals relating democracy with socioeconomic conditions mainly emphasized social security or social rights rather than the level of life. “Democracy is when one is not afraid of old age, not afraid to lose the job or working capacity. That’s democracy” (75-year-old pensioner). “Democracy, I believe, is when every child has a job after finishing the school, so that he wouldn’t go to steal, that he wouldn’t damage cars, wouldn’t steal cars. That’s how I understand it” (81-year-old pensioner). “Everyone is an individuality. He has ... he has some kind of rights, the right to work, the right to a job, the right to have a family...” (20-year-old student).

Missing definitions: elections and political participation

When analyzing the conceptions of democracy that prevail among Lithuanian citizens it is important to note the definitions that were not mentioned or were mentioned by very few respondents, even though they constitute the core elements of the most established theoretical models of democracy, e.g., free and fair elections and political participation of the public. Only three respondents out of 40 mentioned among the others the criteria of free elections as an attribute of democracy. Two of them were civil servants (38-year-old Vilnius inhabitant and 33-year-old Tauragė inhabitant) and the third one was a secondary school teacher (25-year-old Joniškis inhabitant). All of them were young urban citizens with university education and all of them apparently got some basics of democratic civic education. No other respondent mentioned any attributes related to political participation and/or the rule of people.

This finding seems somewhat surprising as the free elections were one of the first and the most tangible achievements of the “singing revolution” in Lithuania. As it appears from the interviews, however, the right to vote in the elections is regarded by many people as a natural continuation of the Soviet tradition rather than a newly achieved right.

Earlier I used to like elections very much. [On the day of election] they used to supply all kinds of deficit goods like oranges or something else that was difficult to get [in shops]. Music used to play. You go and the music plays – you already feel that elections take place, that there is a festival. And now you come and everyone seems somehow glum. One goes to vote and another does not. And earlier you couldn't abstain; if you were a citizen, you had to go to vote. People were afraid to abstain [...] and they used to go. And now you can go if you wish or you can abstain, and then you elect you don't know whom...” (44-year-old unemployed).

As can be seen from the citation, the respondent does not make much difference between Soviet and democratic elections as she perceives both as a civic right or rather as a civic duty. Surprisingly, she takes a right to choose to go or not to go to vote as a negative feature since it diminishes the value of the elections. Moreover, she does not take into account the fact that elections in Soviet times were not free and fair and that there were no

choice of candidates. She regards as worthless the current right to choose among the candidates and the parties, because this freedom creates a mess. "Now of course there is a right to choose; it is even too much of it. People are confused; they do not know who to vote for. All of them [the candidates] give promises, there are many of them, everyone looks better than the other and you get confused and it becomes some kind of mess." This kind of thinking was very common among the respondents, especially among the persons of the middle and old age. Dissatisfaction with the current political procedures and the feeling of continuation between the Soviet and current elections might explain why the procedural attributes did not appear in the definitions of democracy presented by the respondents.


The concepts of democracy and satisfaction with the functioning of the current regime

As mentioned before, the post-communist democracies are characterized by a comparatively low level of satisfaction with the functioning of the democratic regime.

In Lithuania, the level of scepticism towards the practical functioning of the regime is particularly high. As can be seen from Figure 2, according to the newest data of Standard Eurobarometer, citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Lithuania in 2005 is the lowest among the new EU countries. Only less than one forth of Lithuanian population claim to be very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. The average satisfaction in 25 EU countries is 53 percent.

Citizens' satisfaction with the regime depends first of all on the tangible outputs the regime provides for its citizens (for the socio-economic determinants of satisfaction with the regime, see Lockerbie, 1993; McAllister, 1999). Nevertheless, it can be argued that the assessment of the regime depends also on the expectations of the citizens. In other words, the evaluation of democracy is dependent not only on the real performance of the political institution, but also on the criteria of evaluation, i.e. on the citizens' vision of "true democracy." The purpose here is to explore if the concept of democracy presented by the respondents is linked with their assessment of the functioning of the current regime.

Figure 2. Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in new EU states (very satisfied + fairly satisfied, %)



Source: Standard Eurobarometer 63, 2005

Tables 1 through 3 in the Appendix summarize the information on the level of satisfaction with the current regime, the meanings of democracy and demographic background to the respondents. Table 1 presents the respondents that are satisfied with the way democracy functions in Lithuania. Table 2 presents the respondents with moderate satisfaction or mixed feelings about the functioning of the regime. Table 3 provides information on the respondents who are highly unsatisfied with the current regime in Lithuania.

The tables provide support for the hypothesis that there is a clear link between the concept of democracy and the level of satisfaction with its functioning. As one can see from Table 1, the respondents who are satisfied with the way democracy works in Lithuania tend to understand democracy in terms of freedom and/or political rights. Most of them are young and urban citizens, except two pensioners with strongly anti-communist orientations. One of them defines democracy in terms of the freedom of speech and of religion. The other one associates democracy with the Lithuanian government as opposed to the Russian rule, i.e. she links the term “democracy” with Lithuania’s independence from the Soviet Union.

The pattern is less clear in the second group of the respondents. The meanings of democracy presented by those who are moderately satisfied or have ambiguous feelings about the functioning of the regime vary from freedom to anarchy and capitalism. None of the respondents in this group, however, mentioned “order” or “justice” as an attribute of democracy. The respondents in this group come from different social background including students, civil servants, unemployed and pensioners. The age of the respondents of this group varies from 18 to 86.

The third group of the respondents are highly unsatisfied with the way democracy functions in Lithuania. Many of them in fact do not think Lithuania is a democratic country at all. “Democracy? Is it democracy? Are you kidding?” (38-year-old cook). “I would say if this is democracy in Lithuania, I don’t need such a democracy as it is now. [...] If democracy is a positive thing, then there is no democracy here” (39-year-old petrol station operator). Many respondents of this group, however, could not provide any explicit definition of democracy. Those who had presented a concept of democracy usually indicated justice and order and sometimes social rights or social security as its main attributes. Most of the people in this group have secondary or specialized secondary education and a relatively low social status.

To sum it up, the individuals that define democracy as an opposition to the Soviet regime usually link this concept with current realities and assess the functioning of the current regime in more or less positive terms. And those who understand democracy as a “good” political system are inclined to present it as an anti-thesis to the current regime, i.e. they do not consider Lithuania to be a democratic state. The link between the conception of democracy presented by the respondents and the level of satisfaction with the functioning of the current regime seems to be rather straight.

Conclusions

Popular support for the principles of democracy is thought to be one of the most essential preconditions of a stable and effective functioning of democratic regimes. Measurement of such support is consequently one of the most important tasks of the researchers studying the societies of new democracies. When asking people if they endorse the ideal of democracy, however, we should first determine what kind of democracy we are asking about.

Mishler and Rose (2001) are indeed right to notice that asking about the support for the ideal of democracy in new democracies in fact does not reveal the support for the democratic procedures of the regime. It does not mean, however, that we should not strive to trace the support for the regime on the most diffuse level, i.e. to determine the level of adherence to the principles of the regime. As was argued by David Easton (1965, 1975), the diffuse support, i.e. the support for the principles of political system as opposed to the evaluation of the functioning of the current regime is a more important factor of the stability of the system than the evaluation of the regime performance.

An open-end question about the meaning of democracy seems to be an efficient way of finding out the attributes the citizens of new democracies ascribe to the term “democracy”. The rich data from qualitative interviews enable us to explore the “common sense” understandings of democracy of ordinary people as well as to trace how these definitions were framed. Qualitative data, however, do not indicate the distribution of the attitudes among the population. In addition to the in-depth interviews, an open-end survey question or a closed-end question which offers a list of attributes drawn from a qualitative study would be helpful to see the whole picture.

Preliminary analysis presented in this article reveals that some people in post-socialist Lithuania in fact are not able to give any explicit definition of what democracy means. This, however, should not come as a surprise. Verbalizing the meaning of abstract terms is a demanding task in itself (for discussion, see Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990). Moreover, we should have in mind that most citizens of post-Soviet societies have never received any basic knowledge on the values and institutions of liberal democracy. Nonetheless, the most widespread definition relating democracy with freedom is shared by the citizens of both the Western and the post-communist world.

The present research has allowed us to detect how the definitions of democracy are arrived at by ordinary people. Mainly, there seem to be two different ways of reasoning. The first way is to deduce the attributes of democracy from the differences between the Soviet regime and the “Western world.” The second way is to equate democracy with an ideal system of governance. People using the first way of reasoning generally relate democracy with freedom of speech, freedom of beliefs, increased opportunities or market economy, while respondents from the second group usually relate democracy with order, justice and social rights.

In-depth interviews with ordinary people in Lithuania have revealed that seeming inconsistencies of the attitudes of some post-soviet people indeed are not inconsistencies, as their understanding of democracy is simply different from our *a priori* definition. The term “democracy” implies for them the values that are lacking in the current regime, such as order, justice and security. These values are inherently linked rather with a strongman rule than with the institutions of liberal democracy.

Finally, the analysis has demonstrated that the vision of the ideal of democracy is related with the assessment of the functioning of democracy in practice. Naturally, the citizens defining democracy in terms of the freedom of speech and beliefs are much happier about the way democracy works in Lithuania. People relating democracy with order, justice and economic welfare, in contrast, are much less satisfied with the functioning of the current regime. Interestingly, some procedural attributes of democracy such as free and fair elections almost did not occur in the popular definitions of democracy in Lithuania.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Respondents highly satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Lithuania

<i>Concept of democracy</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Occupation</i>
Freedom of speech	59	Klaipėda	Specialized secondary	Technician
Rule of law, human rights	26	Vilnius	Higher	High level specialist
Freedom, opportunities	22	Vilnius	Secondary	Student
Lithuanian government (as opposed to Russian rule), political freedom	77	Tauragė region	Primary	Pensioner
Freedom in general, freedom of press in particular	30	Klaipėda	Higher	Librarian
Possibility to be heard, free elections	25	Joniškis	Higher	Secondary school teacher
Freedom of speech, freedom of belief	84	Klaipėda	Primary	Pensioner
Political freedoms, freedom of beliefs, freedom to be a candidate in elections	27	Tauragė	Secondary	Journalist
Freedom of press, free elections	38	Vilnius	Higher	Civil servant

Table 2. Respondents moderately satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Lithuania

<i>Concept of democracy</i>	<i>age</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Occupation</i>
Freedom of speech, negative freedom	55	Vilnius	Secondary	Museum employee
Human rights including social rights	20	Klaipėda	Secondary	Student
Anarchy, publicity	76	Vilnius	Secondary	Pensioner
Publicity, certain political culture	62	Vilnius	Specialized secondary	Engineer
Unrestricted freedom	45	Joniškis	Unfinished higher	accountant
<i>No answer</i>	86	Joniškis region	Primary	Pensioner
Freedom of movement, freedom of speech	68	Klaipėda	Higher	Veterinarian
Freedom of speech	18	Joniškis	Secondary	Unemployed, high-school graduate
Freedom of speech, free elections	32	Tauragė	Higher	Civil servant
Freedom of speech, freedom of press	30	Klaipėda	Specialized secondary	Guard
Freedom, especially freedom of speech	44	Klaipėda	Secondary	Unemployed
Bourgeoisie	79	Tauragė region	Primary	Pensioner
Capitalism	57	Tauragė region	Secondary	Unemployed
Freedom	24	Tauragė	Higher	Computer specialist
Freedom	44	Tauragė	Specialized secondary	businesswoman

Table 3. Respondents unsatisfied with the functioning of democracy in Lithuania

<i>Concept of democracy</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Occupation</i>
Justice, order	38	Vilnius	Specialized secondary	Cook
Order, justice	47	Tauragė region	Secondary	Unemployed, peasant
Equality before the law, responsiveness of the government	21	Klaipėda	Secondary	Student, manager
Freedom	43	Vilnius	Specialized secondary	Unemployed
Social rights, social security	65	Vilnius	Specialized secondary	Pensioner
Order	84	Joniškis region	Primary	Pensioner
<i>Unclear definition</i>	36	Joniškis	Higher	Medical doctor
<i>No clear answer</i>	51	Joniškis	Specialized secondary	Obstetrician
<i>No clear definition</i>	50	Joniškis region	Specialized secondary	Unemployed
Social rights	81	Klaipėda	Specialized secondary	Pensioner
Justice	61	Klaipėda	Specialized pensioner	Pensioner
<i>No definition</i>	39	Tauragė	Specialized secondary	Petrol station operator
<i>No answer</i>	69	Vilnius	Secondary	Pensioner

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THE IDEA OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN LITHUANIAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION

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Abstract. The aim of this article is to discuss the idea of political representation in Lithuanian political imagination. The starting point for a discussion is existence of two opposite doctrines of political representation: “independent mandate” and “imperative mandate”. Constitutional Court of Lithuania has decided that Constitution establishes the “independent mandate” for a political representative. Any institutional arrangements that tend to bind the independent judgment of a politician are unconstitutional. This article argues that the doctrine of independent mandate, however, does not adequately express the idea of political representation in Lithuanian political imagination. On the basis of discourse analysis, an alternative articulation of the image of a political representative is provided.

Political representation is a key institution of modern democracy. The “discovery” of political representation in the 19th century transformed democracy from a doctrine suitable only for small city-states into the one applicable to large modern political communities.¹ The importance of the institution of political representation lies in its capability to ensure the “presence” of all citizens in political decision-making. Even though literally absent, citizens are present, because their representatives discuss and act in the way citizens themselves would discuss and act. Still, despite the importance of political representation in modern democracies, there is no agreement concerning what political representation as an activity implies. Two different understandings of political representation are available in modern political thinking. According to H. Pitkin, the essence of the disagreement between these understandings could be summarized in the following question: “Should (must) a representative do what his constituents want, and be bound by mandates or instructions from them; or should (must) he be free to act as seems best to him in pursuit of their welfare?”²

The claim that a representative is bound by instructions of his constituents is central to the “imperative mandate” doctrine. A logical conclusion of this claim is that once the constituents instruct their representative to act in their certain interests, a representative is obliged to do this even if the satisfaction of these interests would be against the common interest as he himself understands the latter. However, a different position concerning the activities that are proper to political representation is also available. It is the position that claims a representative to be free “to use his own judgment” and does not have to abide by the wishes of any particular group which has elected him to the position of a political representative. To use one’s own judgment does not mean to act as one pleases but to pursue the welfare for the whole community. Such an understanding of political representation constitutes the “independent mandate” doctrine.³

The idea of political representation is determined by the political and cultural tradition of a country and is reflected within constitutional and institutional political arrangements.⁴ In this article, I shall explore which of the conceptions of political representation dominate in Lithuanian political imagination; that is, I shall focus upon the question how Lithuanian politicians understand the role and the rules of activities proper to a political representative. The first part of the article briefly discusses the hypothesis that after fifteen years of democratic experience the idea of independent mandate has firmly established itself in the imagination of the political elite. The second part of the article, on the basis of analysis of political discourse, gives an argument that the doctrine of independent mandate does not fully express the understanding of political representation that gives the guidelines of actual political choices and their justifications.

The transformation of the conception of political representation

Article 77 of the Provisional Basic Law of the Republic of Lithuania, which has been adopted on 11 March 1990, stated: “A deputy shall give an account of his or her activities as well as those of the Council to constituents, collectives, political parties, public organizations and movements which nominated the candidate to the post of deputy. A deputy who has not

justified the trust of his constituents may be recalled at any time by a decision of the majority of voters according to the procedure established by law.” Article 73 of the same law specified the normative orientations for the activities of a political representative: “In his or her activities, a deputy shall be guided by the interests of the state, shall take into consideration the needs of the people of his or her constituency, shall seek to effect the implementation of his or her constituents’ mandate.” The Provisional Basic Law provided for an imperative mandate of a representative. Such provisions have reflected the convictions of many of the politicians of these days concerning the duties of a representative.⁵

On the other hand, the alternative to imperative mandate – the doctrine of independent mandate – was equally influential. In summer 1992, before the new constitution has been adopted, the provision concerning the possibility to recall a deputy has been abolished on the grounds that it does not fit the democratic idea of political representation. Though for some politicians the difference between the two doctrines seemed to be superficial, others argued that it would be contradictory to live by both doctrines. The first two years of the independent democratic regime opened the eyes of politicians to the conflict between local interests and common interest, and consequently to the controversy between the independent mandate and the imperative mandate.

The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, approved by the referendum on 25 October 1992, provided an independent mandate for the members of parliament: “in office, Seimas members shall act in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, interests of the State, as well as their own conscience, and may not be restricted by any mandates” (Article 59). During thirteen years after the adoption of the Constitution, several cases have been initiated by members of Seimas in the Constitutional Court on the basis that the legal regulations of parliamentary activities contradict the provision of the Constitution which gives an independent mandate to a political representative. Nevertheless, the conclusion that Lithuanian politicians acknowledge the independence of representatives would be too fast. The idea of party discipline was pretty vivid as can be illustrated by the efforts to guarantee this discipline by the norms of Seimas Statute.⁶ Party discipline is often considered to express an intermediate way between the two opposite understandings of political representation. It rests on the ideal of accountability of a parliamentarian to his constituents, which is

guaranteed by his strict adherence to the political program of his party, which got approval of constituents in the elections.

The regulations that have been declared as contradicting the Constitution reflect, to my mind, the elements of the image of political representative which are not in accord with the independent mandate. In various ways the idea that a representative has to fulfill what he has promised and, therefore, what he was delegated to perform, comes to the surface and is reflected in political practices. According to H. Pitkin, both of these opposite doctrines of political representation only partly express our intuitively held convictions and understandings of what political representation is: “each has part of the meaning of representation”.⁷ In other words, it is possible to state that the independent mandate doctrine as formulated by Constitutional Court only partly reflects the implicit conception of political representation. The following question can be raised: has the doctrine of independent mandate, which is provided by the Constitution of Lithuania, replaced the inherited conception of a political representative as bound by the mandate of his constituents, or shall we look for alternative images of political representative, which guide actual political practices, because none of the aforementioned doctrines does not fully express the image of political representation as understood by Lithuanian politicians.

***Discourse analysis:
the image of a political representative***

To answer the question about the current ideas of political representation in Lithuanian political imagination, analysis of political discourse has been conducted. The choice of the method rested on the assumption that to articulate the image of political representation a closer look the actual political practices and choices was needed. Discursive practices are one of the ways for social actors to express and to construct their identity.⁸ By the very way of speaking, selecting the words and expressions, giving descriptions and arguments social actors negotiate certain identities, i.e. try to imitate certain normative ideals which they have in their imagination and which guide their actions.

The discourses analyzed in this article have been “produced” by the members of Seimas in the plenary sessions in which the Bill on Higher Educa-

tion and subsequent amendments of the Law on Higher Education were discussed.⁹ The selection of these discourses was motivated by their peculiarities: discussions concerning the law on higher education were and still are very intensive, they reveal the conflict of divergent interests, and this conflict is clearly perceived by politicians themselves. For that reason, it can be expected that the principles of a just solution of these conflicts, implied by the idea of political representation, are more explicit and can be more easily articulated in these discourses.

The underlying theoretical assumption of interpretation was that the identity of political representative is enacted in choice. There are many different possibilities of decision open to a politician, but as a representative he is obliged to choose only certain of them, namely those which are in the interest of the groups he represents or in the interests of the nation which he is obliged to protect. The decision he chooses determines whether he is or is not a political representative. Because of the importance of choice in constructing the identity of a representative, the analysis of political discourse should focus on the ways politicians describe their choices.

Extract 1. (Context: 11 January 2000, the voting procedure concerning Article 27 of the Law on Higher Education No.P.-1789 is taking place. Ž. Jackūnas, Head of Seimas Committee on Education, Science and Culture, argues against the proposed amendment of Part 2 of Article 27, which proposes not to limit the number of hours the staff of higher education institutions is allowed to work. Ž. J. Jackūnas argues for the provision that teachers and research workers may work in science and higher education institutions for more than the equivalent number of hours as a full-time and part-time job combined.)

Ž. J. JACKŪNAS. The second part is a principal one in this case. It provides that lecturers and researchers can work in the academic institutions or other institutions for no more than the equivalent number of hours as a full-time and part-time job combined. Yesterday our colleague Mrs. K. Prunskienė has proposed that lecturers can work in several academic institutions, that lecturers and researchers can work in additional workplace after they have informed the executive of their institutions and have got the approval. I want to say that such provisions have been chosen not accidentally. *They have been coordinated with the Conference of Rectors, members of the Conference of Rectors have completely approved of it.* It is proposed *in order to prevent a very undesirable and objectionable practice* when some lecturers work at the same time in several institutions, in several universities. In these circumstances it is often very

difficult to do the job and to perform the duties qualitatively, besides, *it costs pretty much for the state*. For this reason, yesterday, after a repeated close consideration, the provision which is proposed now has been not changed. This is a decision of principle. *We could significantly raise the salaries of lecturers*, if we refused this outspread and negative practice when a person works in different academic institutions. *Full time and part time combined is enough to realize the cooperation between higher schools and research institutes*, between different universities. This is ensured. So this was a position of the Committee, members of the Committee can confirm it.

Extract 1 illustrates the strategies of representation of a supported law, which are typical of the political discourse:

1. “*It has been coordinated with the Conference of Rectors, members of the Conference of Rectors have completely approved of it*”. One of the ways to describe the bill or its provision is to indicate that the bill has been approbated by the interested parties – Conference of Rectors, Science Council, Students Union or other groups. Accordingly, to argue against the bill is to show that there are social groups which do not approve it.

2. “*It is proposed in order to prevent a very undesirable and objectionable practice*”. Another way to describe the bill is to indicate and evaluate its consequences in terms of the interests of the state. For example, in this particular case the information concerning the provision of the bill is that it prevents the practice which is undesirable for the state, because it is too costly and consumes too much of the limited resources available to the state.

3. “*We could significantly raise the salaries of lecturers*”. Here the bill is described by indicating and evaluating its consequences in terms of the interests of particular social groups, for example, as in this case, in terms of the interests of lecturers. The defended provision of the bill is “attractive”, because its consequence – increasing salaries – is desirable for the lecturers. The social groups whose interests are taken is such a way into consideration can be various. For example, in the same extract, Ž. Jackūnas notices that the provision under discussion is good for universities as well. If the interest of universities is cooperation and attracting qualified specialists, then the limitation of hours which teachers and researchers are allowed to work can be described as being a sufficient condition for realizing the interest of co-operation among higher education institutions.

Members of Seimas ensure the identity of political representation for their activities by discursively constructing their choices as the choices of the whole nation or its separate groups. Success of political argumentation requires denying the politician’s authorship of the choice: the audience has to be persuaded that it is not the politician himself who made the choice but that the whole society has expressed its position in the voice of the politician. Such discursive strategies of constructing the identity of a political representative could be summarized as follows:

A speaker is a political representative because

He supports the bill (or its provision)	He does not support the bill (or its provision)
Which is approved by X	Which is not approved by X
Which is in the interests of Y	Which is not in the interests of Y

The question is whether the subjects referred to in the scheme as X and Y correspond to some constant actors and interests. In other words, can we say that a politician tends to evaluate a bill always from the perspective of the same interests (for example, always judges from the perspective of lecturers’ interests or from the perspective of common interest)? Independent mandate states that a political representative will judge on the basis of the interests of state and nation and will not surrender to the wishes of local groups. This implies that in the case of independent mandate we shall expect that all justifications of political choices have to rest on the references to the common interest. The imperative mandate, on the contrary, implies that we shall find constant references to the interests of local groups and that the common interest will be “discursively” sacrificed to the interests and wishes of constituents.

The first step of the analysis was to measure the distribution of different sorts of arguments in the political discourse. The measurement revealed that more than 60 percent of all arguments gave references to the common interest.¹⁰ Common interests are understood in a pretty similar way – they include security of the state, competitiveness, progress, integration into the world and survival of the nation. To justify a choice means to show that a chosen decision is a necessary means to ensure these common interests. For example,

demands of more state allocations to higher education were grounded on the argument that when properly financed, high education will benefit society by producing educated citizen able to work for the sake of the state's progress.

The quantitative domination of political choices, which are justified in terms of state's interests, can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it is possible to say that such domination implies the existence of the ideal of a representative who is independent and not bound by the wishes of his constituents. On the other hand, it could be interpreted as being in accordance with the idea of imperative mandate. The imperative mandate requires to be a mouthpiece of the groups that have nominated a representative, but does not oblige to make a judgment when the represented groups had expressed no preferences or are simply indifferent to any solution of a political problem. Today many political theorists talk of the massive withdrawal of citizens from politics, which is caused by the fact that political problems are too remote from the daily affairs and thus cannot be of interest to ordinary citizens. V. Laurénas presumes that all the fears of political withdrawal could become a history, if the political agenda could accommodate the daily problems of people and if the daily life, which is the sphere of immediate concern, could be politicized.¹¹ The lack of interest in politics is strengthened by vanishing the ideal of collective responsibility. A democratic citizen today does not consider himself as an author of solutions of public problems and draws a clear line between the responsibility of politicians, who are the authors of such solutions, and his own responsibility. It is for these reasons that society does not express any preferences or does not have any preferences with regard to the public problems. From this it follows that the only guidelines for a choice of a political representative are common interests and not the interests of the group that has delegated him.

To summarize, the fact that political choices are described in terms of common good could be explained in the following way: the constituents are uninterested in the question under discussion and do not give any instruction to a representative how to solve the question. Such conclusion is supported by the analysis of the nature of the problems that are solved by politicians on the basis of local interests. These problems can be divided into two groups. One group is composed of the problems that have been "solved" by the social groups

themselves and these solutions and positions have been communicated by the groups to politicians in a written form or in the meetings with members of Seimas. The understanding of the position of interested groups can be based not only on their verbal communications, but also on the personal experience of a representative and his capability to imagine what could be the interests of that particular group. The imperative mandate is an agreement with the requirement to a representative not merely to follow the instructions of represented groups, but also to define by himself what could be in the interests of these groups.¹² In the latter case, the best resource for the members of Seimas is their own personal experience.

Extract 2. (Context: the first discourse extract was produced on 7 June 2001 in the discussion of “The development of science, studies and technologies in Lithuania”. During the discussion, the outline of the higher education reform was presented. The second discourse extract was produced on 19 June 2001, when higher education bill amendments regarding the implementation of this reform were presented. B. Vėsaitė argued that the proposed reform concerned the ways how to increase the funding of the universities from state budget and not how to ensure the quality of studies and a just accessibility of high education to all social groups.)

B. VĖSAITĖ. In principle, the obligations of the state are increased and universities do improve their position. I am not against it. *I myself have come from a high school and know on which starvation diet they live.*

B. VĖSAITĖ. Honourable members of Seimas, we cannot deny that the reform of higher education is necessary and that it needs to be done today. *It is very well known to me* how hard is the time for high schools when the classrooms are not heated in winter, when the lecturers of the high school where I have been working for 15 years are forced to a leave of absence and still have to work. The funding of high schools is not sufficient today.

Increased funding of higher education is in the interests of universities to improve their poor circumstances, to stop being on “starvation diet”. These interests are known to B. Vėsaitė because of her personal experience as a lecturer: “I myself have come from a high school”, “It is very well known to me”, how tough the conditions of “the lecturers of my high school where I have been working for 15 years” are. The ability to emphasize requires the experience which is not always available to the members of Parliament because of the different social positions they occupy if compared to the ones of the represented social groups. Though almost every member of Seimas is able to

imagine the interests of students or their parents, those of them who have never worked in universities would be unable to imagine the position of lecturers concerning, for example, habilitation procedures. Because representation requires such sort of understanding which, because of their status and occupation, is not always available to the members of Seimas, they tend to rely upon authentic declarations of interests of some groups and not merely on their own imagination.

Extract 3. (Context: 21 December 2001, the stage of passage of the law. J. Razma proposes to break the established procedure of passage, which regulates that in the stage of passage only members of Seimas are entitled to give their opinions.¹³)

J. RAZMA. I proposed the chairman to be very democratic, even more democratic than the Statute of Seimas, and to give a possibility to speak what is the position of students representatives concerning the study fees, because here rectors are represented, there are members of Seimas who are lecturers. However, the other important part of higher education, I mean, students, is not represented. With the exception, perhaps, of some extramural students. Could we vote for my proposal concerning that non-standard solution?

As we can understand from the discourse of J. Razma, to represent a particular social group means to belong to that group, to be one of its members. Because parliamentarians are lecturers and not students (with the exception of a few of them who are extramural students), they cannot represent students and know for sure “the position of students concerning the study fees”. The incommensurability of the experience of parliamentarians and of “common people”, which causes the lack of understanding of the others’ interests, is noticed and criticized by members of Seimas themselves: “I have an impression that we live in this hall and do not see what is going on”¹⁴. That is why in cases when a decision requires taking into account the interests that surpass the personal daily experience of parliamentarians, they feel unable to “correctly” imagine these interests. This implies that the content of the problem may determine what sort of arguments (constructed in terms of common or local interests) will be provided. Members of Seimas can consider common interests exceptionally, because they have no knowledge as to what the interests of particular social groups could be. This lack of knowledge is determined by the area regulated by the bill: either some questions do not inter-

est society at all and it does not express its preferences for that reason, or the questions are in the interests of the social groups whose perspective cannot be perceived by the parliamentarians.

To summarize, the quantitative domination of the arguments that refer to common good, once interpreted in the context of the rest arguments, can possibly lead to a conclusion that Lithuanian politicians understand representation as an imperative, and not as an independent mandate. On the other hand, political discourse gives a counter-argument to that conclusion. The imperative mandate implies the image of a representative who is instructed by his particular local group and who protects its interests even at the expense of common interests. But in the political discourse that has been analyzed, it is not possible to point out the politicians who constantly presented themselves as the representatives of students, or lecturers, or universities, or of any other possible interest group. In other words, there are no politicians who would always describe their choices in terms of the interests of some particular groups. It is true, of course, that there are no political parties to identify themselves with the groups that have specific interests concerning the Law on Higher Education. But even in the case when the party position allows claiming the status of a representative of a certain group, members of Seimas tend to mention such a status only *en passant*. They do not ignore the interests of the groups which their party represents, but do not declare the unconditional readiness to defend them, either.

Extract 4. (Context: On 8 October 1998, a discussion on the problem and perspectives of higher education took place in Seimas. The speaker, K. D. Prunskienė, was the leader of the New Democracy / Women party.)

K.D. PRUNSKIENĖ. At the end I would like to emphasize a specific problem – the misbalance caused by the proportion of men and women in the higher school. Women make more than 60% today. *Perhaps, because of my party membership, I should rejoice over this*, but there is no joy, because these disproportions *are problematic not only for the higher education* in terms of staff manning, but also in terms of social and cultural consequences in general; after all, even family formation acquires specific nuances. I think it would be very good if this could be equalized that a mechanism of equal possibilities for men and women to get higher educations be ensured. I mean that *men discriminated themselves*, perhaps by giving up their position or even by not laying claims.

K.D. Prunskienė explains that her party membership makes her to evaluate the situation from the perspective of women's interests, in other words, "to rejoice over" the fact that "women make more than 60% today" in higher education. In some sense, she does take into consideration the interests of women, because it is clear that female domination among university students is problematic for women themselves: it is problematic "in terms of social and cultural consequences in general; after all, even family formation acquires specific nuances". But at the same time, she evaluates the misbalance between numbers of men and women from a wider perspective, comprising both the interests of universities ("these disproportions are problematic not only for the higher education in terms of staff manning") and the interests of men ("men discriminated themselves, perhaps by giving up their position or even by not laying claims"). In other words, the way she describes the situation in the higher education reveals her identity as of a representative of the interests of several groups – women, men, universities, and not the identity of a women's delegate.

The political choices are described in such a way that in the end it is not possible to conclude firmly which of the interests – local or common – he does represent. What is good for some specific group is at the same time presented as good for the whole society or state. The identity of a representative is not expressed by his constant identification with a certain social group. Even more, such identification is usually evaluated negatively as contradicting the rules which political representation as an activity has to abide. If someone gives priority to a particular interest over all other interests, the reaction follows: opponents enlist all the other interests which have been violated, implying that a member of Seimas cannot give priority to any particular interest.

Extract 5. (Context: On 25 August 2000, M. Briedis presented to Seimas draft amendments of the law on higher education. The provisions of the proposed bill intended to ensure the sufficient and undelayed funding of higher education. E. J. Kunevičienė expresses her opposition on the bill).

E.J. KUNEVIČIENĖ. I applaud your concerns with the financing of universities before the elections and would hundred percent assent to a proposal that the Ministry of Finance remits the allocations in time, but this requirement has to be applied with regard to every subject and not only with regard to universities. Now you want that despite the state's revenue, it was paid to universities only. If the

state gets no planned revenue, from whom you propose to expropriate: from hospitals or from the Government's reserve?

M. BRIEDIS. Dear colleague, thank you very much for your question, but I think this is a question addressed rather to Government or Ministry of Finance. *I really cannot say who has to be the first to get the allocations, but as the proponent of the bill I represent the academic community and take care of its proper funding.* Let me give no answer to your question, because I have no mandate to respond on behalf of Government or Ministry of Finance. The question is rather rhetorical. If there were money, I think, all areas in the competence of the state would be financed adequately.

When E.J. Kunevičienė claimed that the proposed bill gave an exclusive priority for the higher schools ("now you want that despite the state's revenue, it was paid to universities only"), the author of the bill M. Briedis denied such accusation by acknowledging that he did not think universities should get the priority. The only thing he cared about was a normal financing of higher schools, and there was no intention to propose that universities should be paid at the expense of other institutions. Though he presents himself as a representative of academic community, he does not want to be accused as being partial, and for this reason he does not claim that priority has to be given to those whom he represents. To use the expression by E.J. Kunevičienė, he does not think that it has to be expropriated from other interested actors for the sake of universities. The fact that he represents the interests of universities, though, does not give him a guideline how to answer the question: "Who should be *the first* to get the allocation". His choice is an adequate financing of "*all* areas in the competence of the state".

To sum it up, there are no descriptions of political choices that could unambiguously construct the choices in terms of the interests of a particular social group. The identity of a political representative is not expressed by identifying himself with a single constant group. Therefore, we could claim that the imperative mandate does not reflect the idea of political representation in the imagination of the political elite. Even when the argument is based on the clearly (in a written or oral form) stated interest of students, rectors or other groups, these interests are not "represented" unconditionally, but evaluated in a wider context of the possible interests of all the other groups or of the state.

It is tempting to conclude therefore that the doctrine of independent mandate offers a more adequate articulation of the ideal of political representation, which guides the judgments of politicians. However, this would be too fast to conclude. If members of parliament are reluctant to give priority to any single interest, is it not true that they should be reluctant to give priority to the interest of one particular actor – the state or the society? Such presumption is in accordance with the way, very popular among politicians, to describe the choices as reflecting a compromise among all the interested parties. They argue for a decision on the grounds that the supported decisions are the result of agreement and compromise.

Extract 6. (Context: In the plenary session on 12 July 2001, a draft of amended law on higher education was presented. R. Pavilionis presented the project as Head of Seimas Committee on Education, science and culture.)

R. PAVILIONIS. This *compromised* proposal is made with regard to the *agreement* reached by *harmonizing* the positions of *all interested parties*, especially of representatives of students, of the Conference of Rectors of Lithuania, of Science Council of Lithuania.

Two things are emphasized in the discourse produced by R. Pavilionis on the occasion of presentation of the draft of the amended law on higher education. First, he emphasized that the project was a kind of compromise, i.e. it reflected the agreement of interested parties. Second, it was emphasized that it reflected the agreement of all and not just of some interested parties. To ensure that their position is understood as reflecting a compromise, members of Seimas often use the following argumentation strategy. They give a precise list of the groups who support (or would definitely support) the bill which the political argument intends to justify.

The willingness of members of Seimas that their positions are identified as reflecting a compromise is evident not only in the way they describe the supported bill, but also in the way they criticize the bills. Justification of the negative attitude towards a certain bill or its proposition is done by showing that there is no overall agreement over that bill. Members of Seimas even tend to refuse to start considerations of the projects that have not yet been approved by all interested parties: “in principle, was it reasonable to present a draft and to start its consideration”, asks R. Melnikienė¹⁵, “if, as

far as I know, there is no agreement over many basic questions? Wasn't it necessary to reconcile these proposals before and to come with the bill without any significant discussions?". It is not very important for politicians which social group specifically does not consent to the bill. The most important thing is that a good law is the law that does not have opponents and which does not violate the interests of anyone.

The ideal of compromise has significant implications for the solutions of conflicts between the common interest and local interests. It implies that in the case of such conflict a political representative has to reconcile different positions and to seek for halfway options which do not harm any interested party. For example, V.A. Zabukas¹⁶ explains that in the case of the Law on Higher Education "the interests of several sides clash: there is a clash between societal interests, state interests, interests of university staff, lecturers and students". He does not distinguish state or societal interests as being higher than all the other interests. It seems that the common interest is just one interest among all the other interests and not prior with regard to these other interests. On the other hand, there are examples which seem to deny such a conclusion. Ž.J. Jackūnas¹⁷, who was Chief of Seimas Committee on Education and Science at the time, when the Committee had been preparing the bill on Higher Education, argued that the Committee "is ready to listen to the opinions of all interested parties" and that it "will take into account all the remarks of the public hearing, which will be acceptable". In such a way he acknowledges that the mission of political representatives is to reconcile divergent requirements and to aspire to an agreement. However, he does not commit himself to take into account *all* the remarks, but only those which are acceptable. Ž.J. Jackūnas does not explain what makes these remarks acceptable, but it is possible to make some conjectures from the way he defined the tasks of the Committee on Education, Science and Culture after almost half a year.

Extract 7. (Context: on 4 January 2000, Seimas considered the bill on higher education. In the beginning of the discussion, Ž.J. Jackūnas presented the fourth version of the bill, which was presented for consideration.)

Ž.J. JACKŪNAS. During the consideration of the current version of the bill on higher education in the working group, together with students, representatives of Conference of Rectors and of Government, some of the provisions or alterna-

tives proposed by the group were accepted, while the others were rejected by our Committee. The current text is a slightly changed compromised outcome not fully reflecting the interests of interested parties. *The task of the Seimas Committee was to achieve that these interests essentially reflect the interests of state, i.e. of society, because this is the essence of all the laws, consequently, the essence of the Law on Higher Education.*

The task of the Seimas Committee, according to Ž.J. Jackūnas, is to achieve that the law reflects the interests of state, i.e. of society. Hence, it follows that the acceptability of the remarks made by the interested parties is determined by the extent to which they match interests of the state, or at least by the extent to which they do not contradict state interests. Once the conflict between the common interest and local interests is irresolvable, the main function of a political representative is to observe the common interest. Ž.J. Jackūnas was not the only one whose discourse allows such a conclusion regarding the understanding of political representation. Another example is the way in which the proponents of the bill responded to the critique of that bill, where the latter constantly emphasized the lack of agreement of all involved parties. “In my opinion”, responds B.T. Visokavičienė¹⁸, “the law has achieved its fundamental purpose to nurture an educated personality receptive to science, new technologies and cultural values”. Even if the law does not reflect the general agreement, there exists another criterion for the evaluation of the laws. This criterion is whether the law ensures the purposes of the state by, for example, ensuring conditions necessary to nurture an educated and receptive personality.

Despite these few cases when the priority of common interest is explicitly declared, even those members of Seimas who expressed such priorities do not acknowledge that common good is always the main guide for political choices. For example, during presentation of the draft law on higher education Ž.J. Jackūnas¹⁹ promised that “many things which now worry academic community will be solved in a proper way”. In other words, he does refuse to represent the interests of particular social groups and acknowledges that these interests have to be taken into account. In one of the last stages of consideration of the bill on higher education, Ž.J. Jackūnas²⁰ gladly announced that “after long discussions in various forums and academic institutions, today we can say that there is an agreement concerning the absolute majority of the provisions, and the solutions that satisfy vari-

ous interested parties were found”, even though at the meeting before he claimed that the main purpose of the law was to reflect state interests. We see again that a compromise and agreement rather than common good is the basic guide to orient the choices of a political representative.

Such conclusion is supported by discourses indicating that members of Seimas are not willing to refuse the status of those who talk on behalf of the social groups (not only on behalf of the whole nation). That is, they do not want to be presented as politicians who care exceptionally of state interests, without taking into consideration what the positions of social groups towards a certain decision are.

Extract 8. (Context: 12 July 2001, the consideration of amendments of the Law on Higher Education is taking place. A. Kubilius presents the opinion of the Committee on the Budget and Finance, and J. Korenka replies him at the end of the discussion)

A. KUBILIUS. Our central remark is that the amendments proposed by Mr. R. Pavilionis, Head of the Committee on Education, Science and Culture, radically change many things related to students and financial obligations of the state. *It is absolutely obvious that much wider societal discussions are needed to discuss these things.* (...) Meanwhile, the discussions in the society are pretty hot, and, as I understood, *no common agreement with the representatives of students has been found.* The statement by D. Skučaitė, President of Students Union, in which *there are objections, rather categorical, to the provisions* proposed by the law has just reached us. Therefore the main suggestion is very clear – to make a break and to ask Government to give its opinion concerning this law.

(...)

J. KORENKA. We absolutely agree, dear Andrius Kubilius, that we have *to do a bit more of analysis of these provisions and to reach harmonization with the society.* It is not a merit of Conservatives alone that you deal with us, but *society wants to talk to us closer.* It is good that we will make a break.

A. Kubilius expresses his opposition on the proposed amendments by describing these amendments in the following way: he says that “no common agreement with the representatives of students has been found” and that students express “objections, rather categorical, to these provisions”. In this way the choice of A. Kubilius becomes the choice of students, because A. Kubilius, just the same as students do, does not accept that the proposed draft law could be passed. Besides, the imagined “good” law, with which a

political representative could identify himself, is the one that is more widely discussed in the society: “much wider societal discussions are needed to discuss these things”. In other, words the bill presented to Seimas, is subject to critique because it does not represent the interests of a certain part of society. From this it follows that members of Seimas who defend the bill cannot claim to be representatives of that part of society. We could predict that if the status of political representative meant to pursue welfare of the state only, it would suffice for those members of parliament who support the bill to respond to critique by giving references to the interests of state that are ensured by the bill. However, for example, J. Korenka, who is one of supporters of the bill, reacted in a different way, not in the way that could have been expected from an “independent” representative. In his discourse he seeks for an identity of a representative of these aggrieved social groups (“society wants to talk to us closer”, “we agree that we have to do a bit more of analysis of these provisions and to reach harmonization with the society”). Such reaction to critique allows interpreting the political discourse in the following way. Members of Seimas do not want to be identified as representatives of state’s interest exceptionally. They fight for an identity of the one who represents all interests, no matter whether these are interests of the state or of particular social groups.

Conclusions

Constitutional arrangements of the new democratic regime in post-communist Lithuania established an independent mandate for political representatives. The soviet institute of deputy recall was abolished, so it took almost two years after declaration of the independence of Lithuania for this to happen. At least in the first years of democratic transition politicians seemed to have an image of a political representative who is bound by the wishes and instructions of his constituents and does not use his independent judgment even against the preferences of those who have delegated him to make political decisions. Can we say that today, when more than a decade has passed after the adoption of the new constitutional order, that the doctrine of independent mandate fully articulates the image of a political representative in Lithuanian political imagination? To answer this question a discourse analysis has been conducted.

The starting point of the discourse analysis was to check whether the political discursive constructions of choices can be interpreted as expressing the independent mandate ideal or the imperative mandate ideal. The discourse analysis has revealed that both of these two doctrines only partially articulate the idea of political representation. Members of Seimas seek for a compromise, i.e. for a position that would be in accordance with all possible interests. The purpose of politics is to harmonize divergent interests as well as to protect the common interest, but the question of priorities is rather complicated. Members of Seimas, at least explicitly, do not declare an unconditional readiness to regard common interests and to subordinate to them any local interest. It seems that such an alternative does not look just. The discourse analysis reveals that politicians do not seek a position that would allow mobilization of a particular group. On the contrary, they seek a compromise which combines the conflicting attitudes and interests. Compromise, whether imagined or certified by all interest parties, is a basic guideline for a political action. This, for example, makes the work in a committee very important, because it is there where a politician has possibilities to show a compromise. Only the decisions that have already been approved by the interested groups are presented for a public consideration of parliament, as if the basic purpose of plenary sessions were to certify the existence of the compromise and grant it the status of a law.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, 29.

² Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 145.

³ There are different terms employed to refer to this controversy concerning political representation: „imperative mandate“ vs. „independent mandate“, „delegate“ vs. „trustee“, „mimetic representation“ vs. „aesthetic representation“. I use the first pair of the terms, because these are the terms used by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania as well as by Lithuanian politicians.

⁴ Frank R. Ankersmit, *Political Representation*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002; Nikolai Biryukov and Victor Sergeyev, „Parliamentarianism and *sobornost'*: two models of representative institutions in Russian political culture“, *Discourse & Society*, 4(1), 1993, 57–74.

⁵ It is also reasonable to say that these provisions not only reflected but also formed such convictions as well. The Provisional Basic Law was an adopted version of the Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania, which expressed the soviet ideology that has shaped many of the political conceptions of Lithuanians.

⁶ See the decisions of the Constitutional Court in cases No. ...

⁷ Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*, 151.

⁸ Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, 64.

⁹ The time limits were determined by the selection criterion. The first discourse was produced on 17 October 1998 in the discussion concerning the perspectives of higher education, and the last one was produced on 12 March 2004, when the amendments for the law on higher education were presented to Seimas. The transcripts of all discourses are available at Seimas database of documents: www.lrs.lt

¹⁰ Every discourse of every member of Seimas was divided into parts on the basis of the questions discussed (in case a member of Seimas considered more than one provision of the law). Then, each of these parts was assigned to one of the four categories: (1) gives references to common interest only, (2) gives references to both common and particular interests, (3) gives references to particular interests only, (4) gives references to constitution, experts, etc. Only the discourses that fell under the first three categories were counted.

¹¹ Vaidutis Laurėnas, „Kasdienybės politizacija: (ne)politiškumo efektas Lietuvos politikoje“. *Politologija*, 2, 2003, 99.

¹² Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*, 152–153.

¹³ Paragraph 7 of 156 article of the Seimas Statute provides that “during the passage of the law the floor shall be granted only to authors of presented amendments and supplements (up to 2 minutes regarding each proposal, except for the proposals mentioned in paragraph 5 of this Article), the reporter and those who wish to speak about the motives of voting; the reporter shall not be asked any questions”. In paragraph 5 of the same article it is provided that “the articles to which there are no proposals, may be passed all at the same time by common agreement, provided no Seimas Member shall be opposed to this. Only the articles on which there are proposals or disagreements shall be put to a vote”.

¹⁴ J. Korenka in 67(118) plenary session of Seimas, 12 July 2001.

¹⁵ R. Melnikienė at 44(341) plenary session of Seimas, 3 June 1999.

¹⁶ V.A. Zabukas at 58(421) plenary session of Seimas, 4 January 2000.

¹⁷ Ž.J. Jackūnas at 44(341) plenary session of Seimas, 3 June 1999.

¹⁸ B.T. Visokavičienė at 3(438) plenary session of Seimas, 14 March 2000.

¹⁹ Ž.J. Jackūnas at 44(341) plenary session of Seimas, 3 June 1999.

²⁰ Ž.J. Jackūnas at 60(423) plenary session of Seimas, 11 January 2000.

**PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS**

POLICY TRANSFER IN THE PRE- AND POST-ACCESSION PERIOD: EXPERIENCE OF THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES*

Vitalis Nakrošis

Abstract. This article analyses the process of policy transfer in the candidate countries/new member states before and after EU eastward enlargement. The analysis is based on the experience of Lithuania in several policy areas. Policy transfer is analysed at three different levels (macro, medium and micro), the analysis is based on the new institutionalist approach. The paper assesses the effectiveness of different policy transfer types, the impact of EU-level and domestic factors on policy transfer as well as main outcomes of policy transfer. Finally, the paper summarises main findings of the analysis and discusses the future of policy transfer in the enlarged EU.

1. Introduction and framework for analysis

Policy transfer has become an important issue of policy-making and an important research subject. Recently, the study of policy transfer has been linked to the EU studies. However, little research has been done about policy transfer in the candidate countries, despite their involvement in the policy transfer of an unprecedented scope and speed in the EU history.

On the one hand, in the pre-accession period policy transfer in the candidate countries was driven by the processes of transition to democracy / market economy and accession to the EU (the demand side of policy transfer). On the other hand, various policy and institutional models became available for these countries from various multi-national and bilateral sources of external assistance (the supply side of policy transfer).

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the process of policy transfer in the candidate countries / new member states before and after the EU eastward

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enlargement. Policy transfer is defined as the transfer of policies, institutions or their elements (policy aims, ideologies/ideas, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions/committees) from one political system to another (e.g., from EU political system to national systems). Policy transfer can be mediated by EU institutions or other international organisations.

The analysis is based on the experience of Lithuania in several areas covering both redistributive/regulatory policies of the EU (common agricultural policy, cohesion policy, environment policy, employment policy as well as justice and home affairs) under more or less institutionalised forms of EU governance (both the Community method and the open method of co-ordination). Policy transfer under the first and second Copenhagen criteria¹ falls outside the scope of this paper.

Often policy transfer is analysed on the basis of a pluralistic perspective emphasising the interface of certain rational actors (politicians or bureaucrats) in the transfer process.² The external incentives model, which was found to best explain the process of rule transfer in the candidate countries, was based on a rationalist approach (a combination of the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption).³ Since this perspective tends to underestimate the structural factors, it was pleaded for a broader approach, recognising that actors operate within certain structural constraints.⁴

This paper will be based on a broader perspective of new institutionalism. The basic claim of the new institutionalist approach is that institutions (of both formal and informal nature) matter. These institutions should shape the policy transfer process and its outcomes. The paper assumes that policy transfer varies depending upon different institutional settings. Both intentional (agency-based) and structural factors will be linked into one perspective of policy transfer in this paper.

Policy transfer is treated as both an independent and dependent variable in the literature. In this paper, policy transfer is applied primarily as a dependent variable. Various intentional and structural factors at the EU or domestic level constitute independent variables of the paper. However, policy transfer can also be regarded as an independent variable in view of explaining its effects on the implementation of EU policies at the domestic level.

The early literature on policy transfer emphasised the role of national actors in policy transfer. This orientation towards “methodological nationalism” was

Table 1. Levels of analysis and main research questions

<i>Level of analysis</i>	<i>Main questions of research</i>
<i>Macro</i>	How does the policy context affect policy transfer?
<i>Medium</i>	How do the main EU-level or domestic factors constrain or facilitate policy transfer?
<i>Micro</i>	How is policy transfer managed at the EU or domestic level?

reduced in a more recent literature. For instance, one article showed the power of the European Commission as an agent of transfer⁵. This paper will assess both EU-level and domestic factors in the process of policy transfer at different periods of time (in the pre-accession and post-accession periods).

The paper will also assess the management of policy transfer. Although the success of policy transfer depends to a large extent on the effectiveness of its management, this factor was largely neglected in the policy transfer literature. The paper will draw upon the literature of public management in assessing this question.

The policy transfer perspective employed in this paper balances the analysis of policy transfer at three different levels. As indicated in the table below, the macro-medium and micro-levels of analysis are brought into one framework.

The author of the paper is aware of various limitations of the policy transfer perspective. For instance, it was rightly argued that policy transfer is difficult to disentangle from other forms of policy-making.⁶ This limitation is less acute in the new member states due to the large volume and high speed of policy transfer from the EU during the accession process. Also, other authors argued that the policy transfer perspective can offer a more holistic perspective to the study of the EU compared to other public policy approaches.⁷

Where the EU has legal competence, upward policy transfer is conducted collectively by member states at the EU level with the mediation of EU institutions. Empirical evidence in a number of sectors shows that upward policy transfer in the context of EU legal competence is diffuse with a mix of national approaches.⁸ However, downward policy transfer from the EU to its member states, which usually occurs during the implementation stage, is more likely to be based on particular national models. Also, during their implementation EU policies can be re-domesticated in order to reduce adaptation costs.⁹ In the absence of EU-level competence, national administrations usually learn from each other. Therefore, such horizontal

learning is more likely to draw on a single national model. The paper will assess a link between EU-level competence, the direction of policy transfer and its effectiveness in the candidate countries.

Moreover, it is expected that contextual changes brought by EU membership will affect policy transfer in the new member states. First, the volume and speed of policy transfer should be much lower after EU eastward enlargement. Second, unlike in the pre-accession period when the European Commission was the main facilitator of policy transfer, domestic factors will primarily determine the nature of policy transfer in the post-accession period.

Bulmer and Pagdett in their paper have concluded that the strongest forms of policy transfer are found under more institutionalised modes of governance.¹⁰ The institutionalisation of governance was defined in terms of three dimensions: formal and information rules; the supranational institutions that produce, execute and interpret EU rules; and transnational society.¹¹ Therefore, it is expected that policy transfer, which is found under the Community method, should be more effective compared to a more voluntary transfer which is found under the open method of co-ordination.

The paper is divided into seven parts. In its second part the paper assesses the effectiveness of different policy transfer types in the candidate countries / new member states. The third part considers how the changing environment of policy transfer affects its nature. The fourth part examines various domestic factors affecting the process of policy transfer. The management of policy transfer is assessed in the fifth part, whereas the main outcomes of policy transfer are summarised in the sixth part of the paper. Finally, its last part summarises its main findings and discusses the future of policy transfer in the EU.

2. Types of policy transfer and their effectiveness in the candidate countries / new member states

The main types of policy transfer, depending on its direction, are as follows:

- *upward transfer* from member states to the EU;
- *downward transfer* from the EU to its member states;
- *horizontal transfer* between EU member states or inside individual member states;
- *imported transfer* from outside the EU.

This paper assesses the upward, downward and horizontal transfer where the EU institutions are involved in the process of policy transfer. However, more attention is paid to downward and horizontal transfer which prevailed during the pre-accession period. Imported transfer is not considered in this paper.

Upward transfer

This type of transfer occurs during the policy-making process at the EU level when policy models from national administrations are incorporated into the EU public policies. Such policy transfer can be initiated by individual member states which attempt to reduce the possible mismatch of national policies with the EU policies or the European Commission which searches for the most appropriate models in the EU member states.

Since the former candidate countries were not involved in the EU policy-making process in the pre-accession stage, they acted as “decision-takers”. Therefore, before EU membership there had been little upward transfer to the EU level.

However, a number of interesting caveats need to be mentioned here. First, the very prospect of EU enlargement affected to some extent the reform of the EU institutional structure and its policies. For instance, the effects of eastward enlargement were taken into consideration (although insufficiently) during the mid-term review and reform of the CAP. Also, the European Commission sometimes invited the former candidate countries to take part in the consultation process¹², but there is no evidence that this instrument brought any significant effects to the EU policies.

Moreover, the need to address the issues specific to some former candidate countries gave rise to the new policies at the EU level. In order to solve the Kaliningrad transit problem after EU eastward enlargement, the EU Council adopted the FRTD (facilitated rail transit document) and FTD (facilitated transit document) regulations which are applied to the transit of Russian passengers through Lithuania. An implementation mechanism of the facilitated transit scheme was designed on the basis of Lithuanian experience in managing Kaliningrad passenger transit in the pre-accession period.

Downward transfer

Downward transfer was the main type of policy transfer to the candidate countries during the pre-accession period. Therefore, the literature on Europeanisation or policy transfer focuses on this type of transfer. The EU facilitated this type of transfer through several instruments.¹³

First, the EU provided general legislative and institutional models or frameworks to the former candidate countries. In 2000, the European Commission presented an informal working document defining the main requirements for the administrative capacity of the candidate countries.¹⁴ It has been found that although there is no uniform model of managing the EU structural funds in the EU member states, the European Commission decided to propose to the candidate countries a centralised model based on the successful experience of Ireland.¹⁵

Second, the European Commission influenced policy transfer in the former candidate countries by monitoring their accession progress through its regular reports and the Accession Partnerships. For instance, in its annual reports or during the screening exercise the European Commission identified institutional or policy problems in the candidate countries and recommended certain institutional or policy solutions (drawing on the individual or collective experience of national administrations). A great deal of match between the Commission's recommendations, on the one hand, and Lithuania's legal/institutional measures outlined in its National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, on the other, illustrates the importance of this instrument in the pre-accession period.

The transfer of particular models was linked to the accession progress and shift to subsequent stages of accession (in particular, starting and concluding negotiations). A combined application of models and "gate-keeping" provided synergy effects and allowed the European Commission exerting a greater pressure on policy transfer.¹⁶

However, changing requirements at the EU level produced shifts of policy models at the domestic level. If in the period of 1997-1999 the European Commission recommended establishing an administrative, legal and budgetary framework for the national regional policy, in the period 2000–2002 it proposed the centralised system of managing the structural funds.¹⁷ Therefore, the Lithuanian government needed to replace the decentralised model of managing EU assistance by the centralised one.

Horizontal transfer

This type of transfer usually occurs in the implementation stage or in the areas where the EU has no legal competence. Horizontal transfer can be mediated by the European Commission (in the case of twinning or, more significantly, peer reviews) or can occur without the involvement of EU institutions.

Table 2. Number of twinning projects and their distribution in the period 1998–2003

Country	Austria	Belgium	Germany	Denmark	Spain	Finland	France	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	United Kingdom	Total
Bulgaria	8	–	25	2	9	–	12	8	2	1	8	–	14	13	92
Cyprus	–	–	–	1	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	3
Czech Rep.	7	–	37	5	10	2	16	2	5	6	16	1	3	29	139
Estonia	–	–	12	5	1	15	6	2	4	1	5	–	8	6	65
Hungary	11	1	24	7	11	5	16	3	1	4	12	–	8	13	116
Latvia	1	1	10	6	3	5	3	1	–	–	2	–	9	7	48
Lithuania	3	3	20	13	6	10	7	1	–	3	3	–	18	9	96
Malta	1	–	–	–	2	–	1	–	2	4	1	–	–	7	18
Poland	8	–	45	14	21	7	45	2	3	12	21	1	10	34	223
Romania	4	1	24	4	20	–	33	11	–	15	11	–	5	14	142
Slovakia	13	–	22	2	8	4	14	7	2	7	8	–	6	8	1014
Slovenia	13	–	18	–	12	–	6	1	2	2	4	1	6	6	71
Turkey*	–	–	3	1	–	–	1	2	–	2	1	–	–	2	14
Total	69	6	240	60	106	48	160	41	21	57	92	3	77	148	1,128

Source: The European Commission. *Continuing Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey*, 2004, p. 38. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/index.htm

*Twining: transfer of knowledge
with the mediation of the European Commission*

In 1998, the European Commission introduced a unique initiative of twinning in order to transfer experience from member state administrations to the candidate countries.¹⁸ According to the twinning manual, twinning should be a project jointly implemented by partners and yielding a concrete result.¹⁹

In the pre-accession period, twinning was funded from the PHARE programme, and after EU membership the new member states can finance twinning from the Transition Facility until 2006. The table above shows that more than 1000 twinning projects were implemented in the period 1998–2003 in the candidate countries.²⁰

A comparative assessment of the PHARE 1997–1998 twinning and non-twinning projects implemented in ten candidate countries showed that the use of twinning helped achieving slightly better impacts compared to the other forms of assistance.²¹ This can be partly explained by indirect benefits of twinning – if the focus of technical assistance is limited to delivering expected outputs, twinning is based on both formal and informal co-operation between twinning partners. Twinning was more effective in the areas where the beneficiaries needed to adapt to highly specific or very technical *acquis* of the EU.²²

However, the operational performance of twinning projects was mixed. The overall conclusion of several evaluation reports was that twinning produced excellent results only in “a minority of cases”.²³ The effectiveness of twinning assistance sometimes suffered from the inadequate design of twinning projects (e.g. lack of measurable benchmarks).

Often the candidate countries lacked sufficient administrative capacity to absorb twinning assistance. Therefore, in addition to the transfer of knowledge, many twinning projects included institution building actions aimed at strengthening administrative capacities in certain areas of the *acquis*. However, the excessive focus on operational needs sometimes reduced the scope of knowledge transfer to the beneficiaries.²⁴

The twinning instrument also had serious shortcomings on the supply side. The capacity of national administrations (in particular of small size) to send their best officials to the candidate countries for sufficiently long periods of time was limited.²⁵ Therefore, some twinning projects were contracted

Table 3. Peer reviews organised in the period October 2002 – September 2003

Candidate or acceding country	Chapter 1 ¹ Free movement of goods	Chapter 3 ² Freedom to provide services	Chapter 7 ³ Agriculture	Chapter 9 ⁴ Transport	Chapter 13 ⁵ Social policy	Chapter 19 ⁶ Telecommunications and information technologies	Chapter 22 ⁷ Environment	Chapter 24 ⁸ , 25, 28 Justice and home affairs, customs union, financial control	Total
Bulgaria	1	1	3		1				6
Cyprus	1	1	3	1			1	1	7
Czech Resp.	1	1	8	2			1	1	14
Estonia	1	1	8	1			1	1	12
Hungary	1	1	9	2			1	1	15
Latvia	1	1	8	3		1	1	2	17
Lithuania	1	1	9			1	1	3	17
Malta	1	1	3	1			1	1	8
Poland	1	1	9	2		1	1	2	17
Romania	1	1	3		1		1		6
Slovakia	1	1	7	1			1	2	13
Slovenia	1	1	9			1	1	1	13
Total	12	12	79	13	2	4	10	15	147

Notes:

- 1 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points; market surveillance, metrology
- 2 Financial services
- 3 Bovine database, milk quotas, veterinary establishments, wine, animal feedings, animal welfare, beef carcass classification, Paying Agencies, trade mechanisms (not all topics in all countries)
- 4 Maritime, road and rail transport
- 5 Communicable diseases
- 6 Postal services
- 7 Industrial pollution prevention and control, nature protection, water quality
- 8 Justice and home affairs, including topics such as: implementation of the Schengen Action Plan and external borders, judiciary, asylum, drugs, visa policy, money laundering, fight against economic and financial crime, fraud and corruption, police co-operation, police co-operation, counterfeiting of the euro.

Source: The European Commission. *Continuing Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey*, 2004, p. 39. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/index.htm.

only after a few rounds of selection. During the project implementation, short-term experts were not available for missions to the candidate countries because of work commitments in their own administrations. Also, twinning suffered from complicated management procedures, producing delays in the preparation of twinning covenants.²⁶

Finally, the European Commission linked twinning to monitoring the progress of the candidate countries. The EC Delegations used twinning as a channel of information for monitoring purposes through regular meetings with twinning advisers, regular progress reports, participation in steering committee meetings and other means. This allowed the European Commission exerting an additional pressure on the candidate countries in using twinning advice.

***Peer reviews: transfer of knowledge
combined with monitoring***

In addition to twinning, the European Commission used the instrument of peer reviews for the purpose of institution building and monitoring the progress of the candidate countries.²⁷ The instrument of peer reviews was applied more extensively in the candidate countries during the latest stages of their accession to the EU, in particular during the negotiation process. However, there was a gradual reduction of peer review missions with the advance of EU membership.

All candidate countries, which were involved in the process of negotiations vis-à-vis the EU, were subject to peer reviews, but to varying degrees. The table above shows that about 150 peer reviews were carried out in the candidate countries through the European Commission or the TAIEX office in the period of one year.²⁸

Peer review was usually conducted by a group of peers composed of experts from the European Commission and national administrations in particular areas. The peer review process involved the exchange of experience among existing member states and the candidate countries. Peer review reports contained the assessment of progress in applying the *acquis* and the formulation of recommendations in particular areas. To implement these recommendations, the beneficiary administrations needed to produce separate action plans whose implementation was monitored by the European Commission.

A combination of peer reviews and monitoring of the European Commission provided synergy effects to policy transfer, because peer review

recommendations were backed up by the external pressure to implement them. For instance, in the area of agriculture the National Paying Agency in Lithuania together with other responsible institutions (Ministry of Agriculture, Market Regulation Agency, etc.) translated recommendations from five peer review missions into a separate action plan (containing such actions as adoption of the single area payment scheme or the allocation of additional funding from the budget to implement recommendations of high importance as well as their implementation guidelines and responsible institutions)²⁹.

Transfer without the facilitation of EU institutions

The application of horizontal transfer instruments without the involvement of EU institutions was underdeveloped in the pre-accession period. The Common Assessment Framework, which is used for assessing the quality of public services by many European governments, is one of instruments of horizontal transfer in the area of public management. This framework was recently linked to the reform of European governance at the EU level. However, Lithuania had not been involved in this framework until 2004.

Another form of horizontal transfer can occur under bilateral co-operation between the member states and candidate countries. For instance, Denmark, which is the most important bilateral donor to Lithuania, provided assistance in various sectors (including agriculture, preparation for the structural funds and environment). However, this assistance essentially supported efforts of the EU in the pre-accession period by focusing on certain issues of priority to the Danish government. One example is the DANCEE fund (a special Danish fund for Central and Eastern Europe) which funded a few environment projects (including the establishment of new protected areas for the Natura 2000 network in Lithuania).

The UK and other international organisations (the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD) have promoted the instrument of public-private partnerships (PPP) in the candidate countries³⁰ through visits, meetings, seminars and press reports. However, the Lithuanian government has not been very receptive to this instrument for various reasons (its complexity, internal co-ordination problems, the absence of a clear PPP policy at the EU level, etc.).

This type of transfer was of a much lower scope and effectiveness compared to the instruments of horizontal transfer mediated by the EU (twinning and peer reviews). This can be explained by the lack of external pressure from the European Commission and limited willingness for reform within the political system. It also shows that the mediation of transfer from other institutions (national administrations or international organisations) is not a sufficient condition for policy transfer.

3. Changing environment of policy transfer

The main incentive for policy transfer in the candidate countries was associated with the prospect of EU membership. The European Commission was the main facilitator of transfer in the pre-accession period. In those policy areas where the EU has legal competence, policy transfer was coercive because the candidate countries were obliged to transpose, implement and enforce the *acquis* as a condition of EU membership.³¹ Therefore, policy transfer produced more significant policy outcomes (see the section on main outcomes of policy transfer below).

However, the reward of EU membership stopped plying an important role in the post-accession period. Also, EU membership removed the *ex-ante* control of the EU and replaced it with instruments of the *ex-post* control. It is argued that the absence of conditionality as well as the *ex-post* nature of the EU control reduced the willingness of national administrations to engage in policy transfer after joining the EU.

Table 4. Different models of policy transfer in the pre-accession and post-accession periods

<i>The pre-accession period</i>	<i>The post-accession period</i>
<i>External context</i>	
Conditionality of EU membership, <i>ex-ante</i> control of the European Commission	No conditionality Ex-post control of the EU institutions
<i>Focus of policy process</i>	
Focus on policy adoption Instruments of the EU's influence mediated by domestic factors	Mix of negotiation, adoption and implementation Stronger role of domestic factors
<i>Possible outcome of policy transfer</i>	
Copying Insufficient ownership of policy Less effective implementation	Learning Higher ownership of policy More effective implementation

In the pre-accession stage, the candidate countries primarily focused on policy adoption. After their accession to the EU the workload of policy adoption has substantially decreased. For instance, the number of EU-related legislation in the Lithuanian legislature decreased about three times.

However, this reduction was offset or even exceeded by the involvement of the new member states in the EU decision-making process. For instance, it has been estimated that about 1,500 negotiating positions are annually prepared in Lithuania for the EU decision-making process, what corresponds to the annual number of Lithuania's cabinet decisions.³² Also, actual implementation / enforcement of EU policies at the domestic level has gained increased priority in the post-accession period.

These factors limit attention of the new member states to policy adoption where policy transfer usually takes place. Even if policy transfer can occur because of new policy and legislative developments at the EU level or policy failures at the domestic level, the volume of policy transfer is definitely much lower at least in the first years of EU membership.

It is possible to conclude that the pre-accession period was more conducive to policy transfer because of a larger willingness of the former candidate countries to engage in policy transfer and adopt new policies (or modify existing ones). However, in the post-accession period policy transfer depends to a greater extent on important domestic factors (see the section below for the assessment of domestic factors).

Higher external pressure coupled with the focus on policy adoption in the pre-accession period generated a transfer of *quantitative* nature. However, one can expect that this policy transfer was based on copying rather than learning, policy stakeholders had an insufficient ownership of new policies. In turn, this could have negatively affected the implementation of EU policies at the domestic level.

Although the external environment became less favourable in the post-accession period, one can expect certain *qualitative* benefits: policy transfer can be based on learning and higher ownership of policies by policy stakeholders, what could lead to more effective implementation. However, different models of policy transfer in the pre-accession and post-accession periods are not mutually exclusive. For instance, it is possible to find learning and high ownership of EU policies under policy transfer in the pre-accession period.

Despite the early stage of implementing EU policies in the new member states, there is some evidence that voluntary transfer can produce less contention at the domestic level. It was found that the adoption of the CAP produced a widespread resistance in Poland, whereas the more voluntary transfer of the central bank independence enjoyed wide acceptance.³³

Finally, policy transfer is affected by the changing content of EU public policies. The reform of the CAP at the EU level constrained candidate countries' preparation for its implementation during the pre-accession period. For instance, there was an uncertainty about the management of direct payments in the new member states until the European Commission proposed a single farm payment³⁴.

The problem of the "moving target" also occurred in the environment area. For instance, efforts of the Lithuanian administration to prepare best available technology annotations and applications for the implementation of EU integrated pollution prevention and control legislation were impeded by the slow preparation of EU reference documents on best available technologies at the EU level.

4. Nature of national factors and policy transfer

If the previous section discussed contextual EU-level factors, this section examines domestic factors affecting the policy transfer process. Since the accession process was of the top-down and bureaucratic nature, most domestic factors are found in the executive branch of power. The effect of these factors on policy transfer can change over time, but their importance should particularly increase in the post-accession period. Although it is often argued that insufficient administrative capacity is the main obstacle to successful policy transfer or adoption in the candidate countries, this section shows that various agency-based or structural factors can constrain policy transfer at the domestic level.

Overloaded agenda

The overloaded agenda of the executive and legislature used to constrain the capacity of the candidate countries to adopt new policies or modify existing ones. It is associated with the high volume of EU legislation that needed to be adopted in a rather short period of time. Also, this problem is linked with the legalistic nature of policy-making (see below in this section) –

often there is a strong reliance on primary or secondary legislation during the policy-making process as well as too little delegation of authority to lower levels of decision-making.

Although the agenda was dominated by EU issues, their importance varied in the pre-accession period. For instance, priority was accorded to the legal transposition of the *acquis*, whereas soft policy issues (in particular in the employment area) were not properly addressed in terms of policy content. This factor partly explains the limited alignment with the European Employment Strategy in Lithuania.³⁵

Achieving the desired priority of EU membership brought a certain degree of “integration fatigue” in the beginning of the post-accession period. Also, this period marked the return to a “normal” agenda at the domestic level with more emphasis on the policy sectors neglected during the pre-accession period (such as health, social security or education that are not part of the EU competence)³⁶. Moreover, as argued in the previous section, the involvement of the new member states in the EU decision-making process and their pre-occupation with the actual implementation and enforcement of EU policies increased the agenda overload and reduced their attention to policy adoption.

Small size of administration and staff turnover

The small size of national administrations used to put limits on the ability of the candidate countries to transpose and apply EU policies. This constraint was particularly binding in smaller candidate countries and in such areas as environment or agriculture, where the large scope of the *acquis* demanded more administrative resources. However, the utilisation of available resources is often inefficient – the internal distribution of administrative resources is inadequate or civil servants have a limited motivation to perform in the absence of performance-related pay.

Also, the turnover of staff in the civil service used to be a problem in many candidate countries during the pre-accession period. The turnover of staff was associated primarily with the fast growing private sector, which attracted qualified civil servants, and a politicisation of the civil service. However, a higher level of staff stability has been reached in recent years in Lithuania. Nevertheless, there is a risk that this problem will become more acute because of “brain-drain” to the EU institutions.

Legalistic nature of decision-making and the concentration of power

In many candidate countries policy-making is based on the adoption and application of legal rules. However, the legalistic nature of decision-making does not favour lesson drawing and, in turn, policy transfer. Empirical data and feedback mechanisms are underutilised in the policy-making process. Major policy modifications are unlikely unless there is a credible threat of incompliance with the *acquis* or serious policy failures at the domestic level.

Although Lithuania has introduced new public policy instruments (e.g., strategic planning, programme budgeting, impact assessment), domestic decision-making still remains very legalistic. Also, the application of these instruments suffers from several problems (in particular the insufficient quality of planning / evaluation results and their limited application in the decision-making process)³⁷.

Moreover, in Lithuania decision-making power is often concentrated at the high level of political or administrative authority with little delegation to middle or low levels of administration. Therefore, policy formulation and adoption depends heavily on the priorities of top political appointees or senior career servants. In the absence of higher level support, there is a risk that policy lessons will not result in the adoption of new policies or the modification of existing ones.

Underdeveloped policy networks

It was argued that in the cases of learning and lesson-drawing, the presence or absence of epistemic communities, which promote certain EU policies, was a key factor.³⁸ It explains the transfer of EU rules to several candidate countries in several areas (e.g., the import of EU environmental rules in the Czech Republic)³⁹. However, it seems that policy transfer occurred within relatively closed policy communities in different EU policy areas. This could have empowered technocratic decision-makers who gained new knowledge or even changed their preferences during the transfer process.

Broader policy networks, which could include such additional actors as business, science or NGOs, remain underdeveloped in many new member states. One example is the lack of partnership in the cohesion policy area in Lithuania. This can be explained by weak capacities of partners (such as

socio-economic partners, local and regional authorities, NGOs) as well as limited capacity and willingness of responsible authorities to involve relevant partners in the consultation process.⁴⁰ Even in the employment policy, which is based on the principle of social partnership, the involvement of social partners in the preparation for EU membership was found to be limited.⁴¹ In the regulatory field, Lithuanian business and science became more closely involved in the regulation of economic activities, but it is still not sufficient. For instance, adequate policy networks which could link administrative, science and business sectors such as integrated pollution prevention and control are missing in several environmental areas.

Overall, national administrations are not capable of drawing information and knowledge on specific matters from relevant organisations and using it effectively during all stages of the policy transfer process. It has been found that decision-making in Lithuania is dominated by stronger interest groups (such as the Confederation of Industrialists).⁴² In the absence of well-developed networks, policy learning can be limited in its scope and intensity.

Weak mechanisms of co-ordination

In many candidate countries, policy co-ordination was narrowly defined and equated with central control of legal nature. The embedded principle of ministerial autonomy and underdeveloped co-ordination capacities at the centre hindered the application of more ambitious co-ordination mechanisms (e.g., there is a weak system arbitration of inter-ministerial conflicts in Lithuania).⁴³

It was found that there is no adequate steering of public management reform in Lithuania at the central level. It is limited to proposing and enacting legal changes and does not involve important mechanisms of promoting, evaluating and monitoring reforms in the public sector.⁴⁴ Also, the exchange of experience and good practice in the public sector is not properly facilitated by central co-ordinating units. For instance, since the EU priority of better regulation is not institutionalised in Lithuania, no institution is responsible for its promotion.⁴⁵

Although there are several co-ordination mechanisms at the higher level (such as cabinet meetings, meetings of ministers or state secretaries), they are less developed at lower levels of administration.⁴⁶ Although a number of co-ordination mechanisms (in particular various working groups) was

established in the pre-accession period, most of these arrangements concern negotiations at the EU level rather than policy adoption. Weaker coordination capacities at lower levels increase the agenda overload at upper levels of administration.

Domestic interest structure

Domestic interest structure had a mixed impact on the process of policy transfer. The number of very points in the redistributive policy areas (such as cohesion policy and CAP) was low because these policies brought benefits to various societal groups (such as farmers and business companies).⁴⁷ Also, the capacity of domestic actors to constrain change was limited by the priority of EU membership in the domestic political system.

However, in the agricultural area the pressure of relatively strong interest groups influenced the process of policy transfer. The Lithuanian government selected a new single area payment scheme, because it favours a broader range of smaller farmers (although no experience of its management was available from the old member states). Also, pressure from agricultural lobbies brought the need to increase the percentage of direct payments for Lithuanian farmers (compared to farmers in the old member states) by redistributing more than Eur 100 million from the Guarantee section of the EAGGF (providing support for rural development) to the Guidance section of this fund (providing direct payments to farmers).⁴⁸

Other studies have shown that costs and benefits of EU membership can be unevenly distributed at the domestic level. The main burden of adjustment with stricter EU regulatory standards was likely to fall on domestic small and medium-sized businesses, whereas larger companies trading with the EU were likely to be main winners of this adjustment⁴⁹. Therefore, there was no strong and coherent position from the business community as regards the introduction of the new regulatory standards in Lithuania.

Only in a few cases domestic interest groups managed to translate their interests, which were opposite to the main priorities and objectives of the EU policies, into domestic policy changes. One interesting example is the introduction of early retirement schemes for older workers⁵⁰, which does not conform to the idea of life-long learning promoted in the European Employment Strategy and efforts of many member states to retain older workers in employment until their retirement. However, this decision, which was

prompted by active pressure from an interest group representing older workers, was possible due to the absence of the “hard” *acquis* in the employment area.

5. Management of policy transfer

Policy transfer does not occur automatically, its success depends on the management of its constituent stages (location, assessment and adoption) by decision-makers. However, little attention has been paid to the management of policy transfer. This section of the paper seeks to shed some light on the process of managing policy transfer.

Under PHARE twinning projects, policy transfer is managed on the project basis. The design of twinning projects contains benchmarks, activity and resource schedules, budgets, etc. This managerial approach can be contrasted with a more legalistic approach when policy transfer is usually delegated to divisions of international relations formally responsible for international co-operation and funded from existing budgetary appropriations. The former approach to transfer management is clearly superior and can produce better outcomes because of planning, performance-orientation and other factors. However, a mix of both approaches is still applied in the Lithuanian administration.

Policy transfer occurs in several stages. First, a certain policy should be located in another political system. The second stage of this process is the assessment of a policy on the basis of its feasibility or transferability or institutionally embedded values. And the final stage of the transfer process is the adoption of a new policy, or the modification of the existing policy, at the domestic level. Although in practice these stages can overlap, this paper assesses them separately.

Location of lessons

It is argued in the policy transfer literature that a search for policy or institutional solutions is carried out according to the proximity principle (geographical or ideological).⁵¹ However, empirical evidence shows that lessons are usually drawn from the available sources of information (such as the European Commission or twinning partners). Also, there is a tendency to search for solutions in the old member states rather than in the new member states of the EU or even at the domestic level.

During the selection of twinning partners, priority is often accorded to the administrations whose policies or institutional arrangements are similar to the beneficiary. The possibility of selecting more proximate partners was constrained by a limited competition between the national administrations (there may be no proposals from such administrations) and certain selection procedures (proposals should be selected on the basis of quality). However, the study tours, which were organised under many twinning projects, provided an important source of information on policy models in other member states.

The fact that lessons are usually drawn from the available rather than proximate sources means that they may be insufficiently appropriate in the domestic political system, and more efforts should be taken in adapting them to the national context. For instance, in its preparation for the management of the EU structural funds the Lithuanian administration additionally sought advice from Portugal and Ireland whose administrations operate fairly centralised systems, because of limited transferability of available experience from Finland where the structural funds are managed on a decentralised basis.

It is striking that there is a limited exchange of lessons among various public authorities at the domestic level. There is a limited exchange of information among the Lithuanian public institutions, despite their involvement in similar processes (e.g., development of the information systems that are prerequisites for EU membership). Although the location of lessons at this level would be less costly, it is prevented by a high degree of institutional fragmentation, weak co-ordination and underdeveloped policy networks.

Although the candidate countries had access to policies or institutional arrangements from other sources (e.g., twinning under the PHARE programme, bilateral assistance), the European Commission was the most authoritative source of general policy models and advice during the pre-accession period.⁵² Although the Commission does not play this role in the post-accession period, the reduced facilitation was not offset by domestic facilitators. Examples from other countries show that facilitation from special agents of transfer⁵³ could provide certain benefits to policy transfer.

Assessment of lessons

The second stage of policy transfer is the assessment of policy lessons. The importance of this stage is often neglected despite its relative importance. Since similar policies may produce different policy outcomes

in different settings, thorough analysis should be conducted during this stage. However, sometimes no relevant experience is available that can be used during this stage of policy transfer. For instance, the capacity of twinning partners to provide relevant advice on new CAP measures (such as the single area direct payments or new rural development measures) or existing CAP measures not applicable in their own administrations (such as support schemes for dairy products of strategic importance to Lithuania) was limited.⁵⁴

External policies or institutional arrangements are often assessed on the basis of effectiveness (whether or not they have achieved relevant objectives elsewhere) or feasibility (whether or not they are appropriate under existing domestic conditions). However, the quality of such assessments can be low because of underdeveloped application of policy analysis tools (such as impact assessments).

Although the policy transfer literature often claims that domestic actors play the leading role in the assessment of lessons, empirical evidence shows that the assessment of lessons can be a joint exercise between the candidate countries and the EU member states. Also, the European Commission was actively involved in the assessment of lessons through many instruments of influence under both vertical and horizontal types of transfer (see the second part of the paper).

The effectiveness of policy transfer depends on various forms of its delivery. Under the twinning projects, advice to the former candidate countries was provided mostly in the form of training, papers and study tours. Joint activities performed by twinning partners (such as joint audits) proved to be a very effective form of learning because of their interactive nature.⁵⁵ However, some PHARE beneficiaries perceive twinning as an additional workload, although twinning should be a joint project between the twinning partners.

Adoption of policies

The final stage of the transfer process means the adoption of a new policy or the modification of an existing policy at the domestic level. This stage has been subject to extensive research both in the policy transfer and Europeanisation literature, but the emphasis was placed on middle-level EU or domestic factors.

The location and assessment of lessons, which bring higher knowledge, are not a sufficient condition for policy transfer to occur. They require the adoption

of policies (or the modification of existing policies) by appropriate national authorities. However, the capacity of the candidate countries to translate policy advice into policy decisions was not sufficient. The capacity of the beneficiaries to absorb the PHARE assistance under the twinning component used to suffer from the limited availability of counterpart staff or its frequent change.

Also, policy transfer sometimes occurred at an inappropriate point of time in the reform process, thus reducing the relevance of lessons. For instance, twinning advice on the disability pension reform was provided too early, while advice on the general pension reform followed too late in the reform process.⁵⁶ This occurred because of EU-level factors (complicated management procedures of twinning projects, producing delays in the preparation of twinning covenants⁵⁷) or such domestic-level factors as limited willingness to undertake new reform efforts.

Many decisions were adopted in the form of laws in the legislature, despite their preparation in the executive. Therefore, the adoption of policies depended on the effectiveness of parliamentary performance. However, the adoption of policies in the Lithuanian parliament suffered from long delays associated with from the overload of its agenda or priorities different the adoption of EU-related legislation (e.g., the impeachment of one Lithuanian president). Also, in several cases the executive failed to submit draft legislation of sufficient quality and based on the consensus of major stakeholders.

6. Main outcomes of policy transfer

Outcomes of policy transfer can be defined in different terms. According to one typology⁵⁸, *emulation* entails borrowing a policy model from another political setting; *synthesis* involves combining policy features from more than one political setting; influence only provides a source of inspiration; and finally, the *abortive* transfer occurs when a transfer is blocked at the domestic level. However, this typology is limited to the presence / absence or strength of policy transfer and does not concern its actual outcomes. In addition, it is useful to divide outcomes of policy transfer according to elements of policy transfer (policy aims, ideology / ideas, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions / committees, etc.).

It is too early to make a final assessment of policy transfer outcomes at this period of time. The new member states started implementing many EU policies

only after their accession in 2004, and some time is needed for the materialisation of policy outcomes (in particular for policy impacts). However, it is possible to discuss the preliminary outcomes or their likelihood in the future.

In the pre-accession period, the candidate countries perceived policy transfer as a necessity for securing EU membership rather than a tool for improving the quality of policy design and implementation at the domestic level. Therefore, the fact of joining the EU can be interpreted as a success of policy transfer. However, this indicator is not sufficient to determine the degree of success. Success can be defined as the extent to which original aims of EU or domestic policies have been achieved as well as the extent to which key stakeholders are satisfied with policy outcomes.⁵⁹

The most striking feature of the EU's impact on the political system was a proliferation of regulatory institutions independent of or semi-independent on the elected legislative and appointed executive.⁶⁰ This impact is associated with the transfer of the EU regulatory model to the candidate countries in the internal market area. However, it strengthened the technocratic nature of governance, thus exacerbating the problems of institutional fragmentation and insufficient accountability in the domestic political system.

Table 5 below shows selected outcomes of policy transfer at the level of policy aims, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions and ideologies / ideas in several policy areas. For instance, in the cohesion policy area policy transfer from the EU, among other things, entailed a new policy aim of reducing regional disparities, a new ideology of regional economic development based on public investment and partnership, new policy instruments (such as state aids to the private businesses co-funded from the EU structural funds to private businesses) as well as new institutions (in particular new policy implementation agencies). Some outcomes became an integral part of the domestic political system, whereas other outcomes are still questioned at the domestic level (e.g., a new policy aim of reducing regional disparities or state aids to private businesses; see below for the latter outcome).

In the employment area, policy transfer from the EU, among other things, entailed several new aims (e.g., more active labour market policy, equal opportunities, social cohesion) and ideas (e.g., social partnership, life-long learning, mainstreaming), new policy instruments (in particular tripartite council) and programmes (in particular new employment strategy and action

Table 5. Outcomes of policy transfer from the EU in different policy areas

	<i>CAP</i>	<i>Cohesion policy</i>	<i>Employment</i>	<i>Environment</i>
Policy aims	Compliance with EU environmental and welfare standards, a fair standard of living, higher competitiveness of the agricultural sector	Reduction of regional development disparities	More active labour market policy (employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability), equal opportunities, social cohesion	Higher level of environmental protection
Ideologies/ideas	Rural development based on public investment, income support based on farming area rather than the volume of production, etc.	Regional economic development based on public investment, partnership, etc.	Social partnership, life-long learning, mainstreaming, etc.	More preventive and horizontal character of environmental policy, “polluter pays” principle,
Policy instruments	Investment support to farmers, agricultural companies or other entities, direct support based on the single area payment scheme	State aids to private businesses, investment in infrastructure and human resources	Project-based investment in human resources, tripartite council, etc.	Many new instruments such as environment impact assessment, integrated pollution prevention and control
Policy programmes	New plans and programmes co-financed by the EU (both the guarantee and guidance sections), new budgetary programmes	New programmes co-financed by the EU structural funds, new budgetary programmes	New employment strategy, action plan, programmes and initiatives	New programmes and regulation
Institutions	National Paying Agency, monitoring committees, etc.	Managing and paying authorities, intermediate bodies, implementing agencies, monitoring committees, etc.	ESF implementing agency, tripartite council, etc.	New institutions (such as the Environment Protection Agency) or committees (e.g. on sustainable development)

plan) as well as institutions. However, as argued above, policy transfer in this area was more limited. Existing policy instruments were re-grouped drawing upon main pillars of the European Employment Strategy, its ideology is not shared by all policy actors at all levels.⁶¹ However, it was expected that assistance

from the European Social Fund would contribute to the practical implementation of the European Employment Strategy at the domestic level.

Moreover, EU public policies can suffer from a smaller or larger implementation gap at the domestic level. The implementation gap can occur because of inappropriate transfer—high EU environmental standards may be inadequately implemented or enforced because they are not appropriate for less developed economies of the new member states.

Although the majority of policy transfer papers assume that the process will produce successful implementation⁶², there is empirical evidence of policy failure as a result of policy transfer. Although during the transitional period Lithuania (along with other candidate countries) was obliged to reduce state aids to private businesses, during the programming of the EU structural funds for the period 2004–2006 it was decided to introduce new state aid schemes co-funded from the EU structural funds. This decision entailed policy transfer from the EU level (making use of all eligible areas under the structural funds) as well as individual member states (in particular poorer Mediterranean countries that co-finance state aids to their companies in order to ensure the level playing field with businesses in richer member states). Although the benefits of state aids for international competition are still uncertain, they have already brought negative side-effects to internal market competition and the transparency of public management.⁶³

7. Conclusions

Main findings of the paper

This paper showed that various agency-based and structural factors at the EU and domestic level affected the process of policy transfer and its outcomes in the candidate countries. Different institutional settings can explain the varying effectiveness of policy transfer in the pre-accession and post-accession periods.

Downward transfer was the main type of policy transfer during the pre-accession period.⁶⁴ Also, this paper showed that vertical policy transfer, which was carried out or facilitated by the European Commission, was more effective. Its effectiveness can be explained by a combination of external context (conditionality of EU membership, ex-ante control of the European Commission) and the focus on policy adoption due to the priority of EU membership during the pre-accession period.

As found in other papers, downward policy transfer was usually based on particular national models (e.g., the centralised management of the structural funds was based on the successful Irish experience). Also, some upward policy transfer from the candidate countries to the EU level was based on a particular national model.

However, in the post-accession period the likelihood of adopting new policies or modifying existing policies as a result of policy transfer is lower. The willingness of national policy makers to engage in policy transfer was reduced due to the absence of conditionality, the ex-post nature of control from the EU as well as a greater importance of other policy stages (negotiation, implementation, enforcement).

The effectiveness of horizontal transfer instruments among the EU member states and the former candidate countries was lower during the pre-accession period. Peer reviews, which involved a closer monitoring of the European Commission, proved to be more effective. The performance of twinning, which operated at a lower level of policy transfer (operational transfer), was mixed. Although other institutions facilitated horizontal policy transfer, it was not a sufficient condition for successful policy transfer.

The paper shows that both substantive and procedural transfer occurred during the pre-accession period. Policy transfer concerned policy aims, ideologies / ideas, policy instruments and programmes as well as institutions. Also, it was found that the European Commission was the main source of policy lessons at the strategic level, whereas at the operational level lessons were drawn more often from individual member states. It shows that the vertical type of transfer was rather of the strategic nature, whereas horizontal transfer was executed rather at the operational level.

This paper supports the previous conclusion that policy transfer was weaker under the open method of co-ordination (because of its lower institutionalisation).⁶⁵ For instance, there is some evidence that policy transfer was less effective in the area of the EU employment policy compared to the other EU policies.

The lower effectiveness of horizontal transfer mechanisms raises some doubts as to the implementation of the open method of co-ordination in the new EU member states after the EU enlargement. Based on the recent research of policy transfer, one can expect that the implementation of stronger modes of the

open method of co-ordination (such as EMU), which are based on higher determinacy, sanctions and clarity⁶⁶, are likely to be more effective than weaker forms of the open method of co-ordination (in the area of pensions).

The capacity of policy transfer should have increased in the candidate countries / new member states through the involvement of their administrations in the accession process or the management of twinning and peer reviews. However, the use of this capacity remains constrained by such domestic factors as the overloaded agenda, small size of national administrations, legalistic nature of policy-making, weak mechanisms of co-ordination and unfavourable interest structure.

Future of policy transfer

In the pre-accession period, the former candidate countries primarily acted as “policy-takers” in policy transfer, but there are a few instances of “policy-giving” (e.g., the implementation mechanism of the facilitated transit was transferred upwards from Lithuania to the EU). If in the pre-accession period the transfer of knowledge was executed in the direction from the EU member states to the candidate countries, this trend can be somewhat reversed in the post-accession period. The new member states became involved in the EU decision-making process as well as various management structures at the EU level (such as “commitology” committees).

However, the capacity of the new member states to represent their interests is likely to remain limited, at least in the beginning of the post-accession period. Also, they may have no policy models that could be appropriate for upward transfer in light of the current agenda of the EU decision-making. For instance, it has been argued that the new member states have underdeveloped regulation of economic activities in the area of the single market⁶⁷. Yet the object of upward transfer to the EU level can include the domestic models of co-ordinating EU affairs or transposing EU legislation that were developed in the pre-accession period. For instance, it was argued that Lithuania’s experience in the areas of strategic planning or impact assessment could be useful in the implementation of the EU better regulation initiative in other EU member states.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, the situation may be different in the redistributive policy areas. For instance, the new member states can transfer their knowledge about the single area payment systems applied from 2004 to old member states where the new system will be introduced in 2005 or 2007. Or the

proposed reform of the EU cohesion policy and the structural funds for the period of 2007–2013 will reduce the relevance of previous experience accumulated in the old member states and increase the importance of reform capacity that may be more developed in the new member states.

The absence of conditionality as well as the ex-post nature of the EU control is likely to reduce the effectiveness of policy transfer in the post-accession period. As mentioned above, prospects of policy transfer in the future depend primarily on domestic factors. Although some factors of the structural nature (such as the legalistic nature of policy-making) are difficult to control, it is possible to mobilise the capacity of policy transfer under certain conditions (in particular adequate political priorities should be defined and sufficient amount of administrative resources should be made available for the location, assessment and adoption of policies). Similar mobilisation of administrative resources occurred in several candidate countries (including Lithuania) towards the end of the accession process.

The good co-operation established between the Lithuanian and the EU twinning partners in the pre-accession period should positively affect policy transfer. There is evidence of the continued co-operation between twinning partners after the EU enlargement in several areas. It shows that twinning contributed to extending existing co-operation networks or establishing new co-operation networks that involve the new member states. This co-operation could also support the emergence of possible coalitions in the EU decision-making process at various levels.

Also, the transfer of knowledge will be executed from the new member states to new applicants to the EU. Policies of several new member states deliberately promote co-operation with new applicants. The twinning programme became open to new member states, which can be involved in the implementation of the twinning covenants. Apart from twinning in new applicant countries, there are a few EU programmes promoting co-operation between national administrations at the EU (e.g. the Mattheus / Customs 2007 programme in the customs sector or the sixth framework programme in the area of research and development).

The Commission's role in the candidate countries during the pre-accession period prompted certain reforms of European governance at the EU level. Drawing on the experience with applicant countries, the European Commission suggested twinning arrangements between national administrations to share

best practice in implementing measures within particular sectors.⁶⁹ However, this twinning action was not implemented, partly because the Commission did not have specific allocations for that purpose.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, it remains possible that a certain twinning scheme for national administrations will be launched under new administrative co-operation provisions of the Constitutional Treaty (depending on its ratification and entry into effect in the future). Also, a multi-annual work programme on European governance, which is currently under preparation at the EU level, is likely to include several co-operation actions among the EU member states.

Finally, in draft regulations for the new programming period 2007–2013, the European Commission proposed to make institutional capacity strengthening eligible under the EU structural funds. If this provision stays in the final regulations, it could provide necessary funding for various kinds of co-operation actions among the EU member states (e.g., dissemination of good practice or the exchange of information), thus facilitating policy transfer in the enlarged EU.

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- 2 Dolowitz, D., Marsh, D. Who learns what from whom: a review of the policy transfer literature. *Political Studies*, 1996, XLIV: 355.
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- 12 The participation of the candidate countries in the Cohesion Forum organised by the European Commission offers one of such examples.
- 13 Adapted from Grabbe H. How does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity". *Journal of European Public Policy* 2001 8(4): 1013–1031.
- 14 The European Commission. *The Main Administrative Structures Required for Implementing the Acquis*, 2000.
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- 16 Nakrošis. *The influence of the EU and domestic change*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 18 It is unique, because all international donor agencies (including the EU) previously provided assistance through private sector consultants under technical assistance contracts. Twinning as a form of assistance is based on the direct transfer of knowledge from seconded national experts with good understanding of the public sector.
- 19 The European Commission, Directorate General Enlargement. *Institution Building in the framework of European Union Policies: a reference manual on twinning projects*, 2004, p. 2. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/twinning/>
- 20 The administrations of larger member states (such as German, French and UK administrations) were most often involved as leaders or partners in the implementation of twinning projects. About 100 twinning projects were implemented in Lithuania in many areas.
- 21 The European Commission. *PHARE Ex Post Evaluation of country support implemented from 1997-98 to 2000-01: Consolidated background report*. April, 2003, p. 130. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/phare_evaluation_ex_post_evaluation_97_98.htm
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 132.
- 23 *An Evaluation of Completed Twinning Projects*, Brussels, 2003, p. 25. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/phare_evaluation_pdf/phare_ex_post_twinning.pdf
- 24 Public Policy and Management Institute. *Country Summary Evaluation Report*, January 2005, p. 13.
- 25 Nakrošis, V. *Assessing Governmental Capabilities to Manage European Affairs: the Case of Lithuania*. EUI Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper, No. 2000/58, Florence, 2000, p. 37.
- 26 *PHARE Ex Post Evaluation of country support implemented from 1997-98 to 2000-01*, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
- 27 Although this instrument is assessed separately, its application was linked with twinning during the pre-accession period. For instance, twinning advisers provided assistance to the beneficiary administrations to prepare for peer review missions or implement their recommendations. Also, peer review missions were not the only source of recommen-

- dations to the candidate countries. In addition to peer review recommendations, the Lithuanian administration needed to implement recommendations of the Commission's progress reports, recommendations of various audit reports, etc.
- ²⁸ The European Commission organised about 20 peer review missions in Lithuania in ten different chapters of the acquis. A largest number of peer reviews in Lithuania was undertaken under Chapter 7 (agriculture) in several areas of the acquis.
- ²⁹ The National Paying Agency. *Action plan for the implementation of the European Commission recommendations given after peer review missions*, Vilnius, October 2003. <http://www.nma.lt> (in Lithuanian).
- ³⁰ PPP is a special instrument of procuring and providing infrastructure and services to the citizens through partnership agreements between the private and public sector. See International Financial Services London. *Public Private Partnerships: UK Expertise for International Markets*, 2003.
- ³¹ Although the candidate countries decided to join the EU on a voluntary basis, policy transfer is treated as coercive because of the EU membership conditionalities.
- ³² Zeruolis, D. Presentation "New priorities into old agendas: national and EU dimensions of change" for the conference "Challenges of the new EU: Have Expectations and Fears Materialised" in Vilnius, Lithuania on 9-10 December 2004.
- ³³ Schimmelfenning, Sedelmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 674.
- ³⁴ Such payment scheme, which is based on arable area and independent of the volume of agricultural production, was introduced in order to "decouple" subsidies and production in the agricultural sector.
- ³⁵ West, Ch. *An analysis of learning, adaptation, and institutional change: The case of the European Employment Strategy in Lithuania*, draft Master's thesis, Stockholm University, 2004, p. 46. (Unpublished paper)
- ³⁶ European Social, Economic and Legal Projects. *Impact Assessment of Better Regulation Initiatives at the EU Level*, 2004, p. 28. (Unpublished paper)
- ³⁷ Nakrosis, V. *Public Policy Evaluation System in Lithuania*. Vilnius, 2004, p. 33. (Unpublished paper, in Lithuanian)
- ³⁸ Schimmelfenning, Sedelmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 673.
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- ⁴⁰ Public Policy and Management Institute. *Impact assessment of the draft 2007-2013 EU structural funds regulations*, 2004, p. 16. (in Lithuanian) <http://www.vpvi.lt/dokumentai.php?pid=28>
- ⁴¹ West, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
- ⁴² Nakrosis, *Assessing Governmental Capabilities to Manage European Affairs*, *op. cit.*
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.
- ⁴⁴ Angleryd, T., Cooper, Ch. *Public administration in the service of democracy: some strategic priorities in order to improve the public administration in Lithuania*, Concept Paper, the ISPELL-PROJECT, 2002, p. 10. (Unpublished paper)
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- ⁵⁰ West, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
- ⁵¹ Rose, R. "What is Lesson Drawing?" *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1993, p. 9.
- ⁵² This can be explained by the fact that the assessment of candidate countries' progress and their access to subsequent stages of accession depended upon the Commission's opinion.
- ⁵³ An example of agents is the Centre for Management and Policy Studies attached to the British Cabinet Office. It promoted lesson drawing in the British Civil Service through seminars, guidelines and a website. See Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 550.
- ⁵⁴ Interview in the Lithuanian National Paying Agency with a senior official, 8 January 2004.
- ⁵⁵ Interview in the National Audit Office with an official, 24 November 2004.
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- ⁶⁰ Maniokas, K. *EU Enlargement and Europeanization*. Eugrimas, 2003.
- ⁶¹ West, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
- ⁶² E.g., Dolowitz, Marsh, "Learning from Abroad", *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- ⁶³ A controversial decision to stop the intake of applications for several elements of the Objective 1 programme in the area of energy and business support was followed by an intensive public discussion on the need of state aids and its possible forms. The Lithuania's Prime Minister even argued that Lithuania would be better off without the EU structural funds.
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- ⁶⁵ Bulmer, Padgett, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
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**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION**

FROM IRAQ TO UKRAINE: EU FOREIGN POLICY AND AMBITIONS OF THE SMALL(ER) STATES*

Gediminas Vitkus

Abstract. The main objective of the paper was to evaluate already existing contribution of the smaller Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to EU's common foreign policy during the course of 2003-2004. These two years were chosen deliberately, because during that period of time we were able to observe two dramatic cases. The first case was – the so-called the Iraqi crisis of February 2003, when the smaller CEE states didn't align themselves with the Franco-German anti-American stance. The second case is the successful mission carried out by the Polish and Lithuanian Presidents and EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on behalf of the European Union in Kyiv in December 2004.

Both cases showed very obviously that (non)involvement of the smaller states contributed to the (un)success of the each case. Also both of them made obvious that the European common foreign and security policy cannot be by definition equaled to the French and German opinion. The common policy will come up only when the smaller member states will be involved in the process.

The second point of the paper is a demonstration that one of the main obstacles for wider involvement of the smaller CEE states into common European foreign policy is widely-assumed prejudice, which considers the CEE states as russo-phobic, pro-American and not interested in the EU's CFSP at all. As the Ukrainian case displays the smaller states are much more eager to comply to the European Union's values than the great powers do. In difference from the great powers the smaller states are not burdened by the frame of mind about their own special mission and could more easily to transfer their attention to the common values, which the European Union is based on.

Introduction

There are many books and studies written about small states and their foreign policy peculiarities. Occasionally we observe an increased interest to these actors in the world of politics. The 20th century experienced at least two instances of this kind. One became clearly apparent when the League of Na-

tions began operations and treated the small states as their legal equals, thus providing them with more space for independent foreign policy actions and influence on the world politics than ever before¹. However, the League of Nations did not help to avoid the next World War. That gave cause for the rise of a notion that probably the small states, especially those that were located between Germany and Russia, were to a high degree responsible for that failure².

The next wave of interest concerning the phenomena of small states arose when a new bipolar world order emerged. The issue under consideration was the experience of those small and neutral countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland) which managed somehow to escape direct involvement into one of the two rival political and military blocs³.

Today we can observe a new academic interest in the problematic of small states. This interest was encouraged by the increased number of small states due to collapse of the communist bloc and the Soviet Union as well as the EU and NATO enlargements, which have brought many new smaller states into the already well settled decision-making structures and political culture. It is natural that the amount of literature on that subject is growing very rapidly.⁴

This paper aims to contribute to this mainstream research. Its main objective is to evaluate already existing contributions of the smaller Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to the EU common foreign policy within the 2003–2004 time frame. These two years were chosen deliberately, because during that period two dramatic cases were observed. The first case was the so-called Iraqi crisis of February 2003, when the smaller CEE states didn't align themselves with the Franco-German anti-American stance. The second case is the successful mission carried out by the Polish and Lithuanian Presidents and EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on behalf of the European Union in Kyiv⁵ in December 2004.

It might be controversial to place Poland in the category of small states. Poland is by no means a small state. However, it is important to take into account that the very concept of small state is not an absolute but a relative one. For instance, in the context of France, Germany and Russia, Poland certainly would be a smaller state. And this is exactly the meaning of the concept as used in the title and text of this paper.

1. Demand for “shutting-up-states”

It is quite apparent that the Western European perception of the new EU Member States for the Central and Eastern Europe is somewhat ambiguous, especially when the issue under consideration is the EU foreign and security policy. There the CEE countries are usually regarded as those most Russo-phobic and therefore most pro-American. Furthermore, sometimes the CEE countries are treated as an open pro-American lobby, as the American Trojan horse which is supposed to undermine any of EU initiatives in the field of foreign and security policy that America may not like. The most powerful argument in favor of this perception was the behavior of the CEE countries during the Iraqi crisis in the early months of 2003. At that time the EU was unable to formulate a common position towards the USA's openly expressed readiness to attack Iraq at any price. The smaller EU and the acceding CEE countries were openly supporting that decision and therefore became, at least partially, responsible for the dramatic split within the European Union itself.

However, the split within the EU started as a conflict between France and the UK but not as a conflict between smaller and bigger states. France and the UK were not able to find a common ground for their stance in the UN Security Council. Finally, the collision went into full swing, when Germany (at that time also a member of the Security Council) behaved in a very untypical way. Germany decided to unconditionally support French diplomacy despite that its role usually was only to mediate. This was a big surprise to many observers, who did expect a different development⁶.

It is worth mentioning that the conflict between the UK on one side and France and Germany on the other was initially assumed by the general public to be a conflict between the continental Europe and the traditionally opportunistic pro-American British counterpart. The French President and the German Chancellor also believed that they were expressing the European opinion⁷. However, very soon it became obvious that this was not true. It turned out that the French and German opinion did not equal the European opinion; hence their assumption that their policy expressed the opinion of the majority of European governments was wrong.

First of all, a letter from eight countries – the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom –

was published in the *Wall Street Journal (Europe)* in January 2003. This was soon followed by another letter from the Vilnius-10 (V10) group of smaller states. Bruce Jackson, a tireless campaigner for the cause of NATO enlargement, drafted this letter and sent it to Lithuanian embassy. The Lithuanians sent it, in turn, to the other members of the V-10. The text was non-negotiable: “Take it or leave it, the e-mail said⁸. In view of that, some of the V10 governments could have become nervous about the EU’s reaction. However, they did not want to lose the chance to demonstrate their solidarity with the USA. At stake in just a few more weeks was the pending vote by the US Congress on whether to accept seven of V10 countries into NATO. And as we know today, this letter made certain that any hesitant senator had no doubts about the loyalty of the Eastern Europeans to the US. The outcome of the vote was unique – 96-0 “pro”.

In this atmosphere it was little wonder that these letters made French President Jacques Chirac furious. In a statement made in Brussels on 17 February after a special EU summit on Iraq, he launched a diatribe directed at the Central and Eastern European candidates for EU membership. Chirac branded the V10 group move “childish” and “dangerous”, saying the Central and Eastern European countries “missed a great opportunity to shut up”. “These countries had been all at once, let’s say, not too well behaved and a little unaware of the dangers of an excessively rapid alignment with the American position... When you are in the family, after all, you have more rights than when you are asking to join and knocking on the door,” he said⁹.

In that situation ancient Romans would say: *nil novo sub solo*¹⁰. We have got a classical situation – when the great powers are in a conflict they look for allies. The importance of the smaller states at that instant increased disproportionately. Of course, the bigger states did not want them to become political actors. They preferred the small states to remain pawns only. But at least one side made a proposal – “take it or leave it”. The other side came up with its reaction later just by indicating that the smaller ones had lost a chance to “shut up”. The first option was certainly more attractive to the small states. At least, it was demonstrated that it was possible to have a choice.

Nevertheless, let’s examine the consequences of this drama from the perspective of European Union’s common foreign policy development. The case under discussion has clearly shown that in order to have a common

European foreign policy it is not enough to have an accord between the two leading states, France and Germany. As the case shows, they didn't realize that. Both countries, though differing from Americans, did nothing to mobilize a wider European support, and attract to their side the smaller members and acceding states. European Union's Mr. CFSP Javier Solana was not involved in this from the very beginning. France and Germany accused the United States of unilateralism, but, in fact, they behaved in the same manner in the context of the European Union.

There was not a big surprise when the Franco-German unilateralism didn't bring any visible results. It was not possible to stop the Americans anyway. In addition, they have severely damaged inter-European relations and the future development of the common European foreign policy. But let's put aside the unilateralism of France and Germany. It might be the subject for separate consideration. Let's turn to the smaller CEE states, which in their response behaved in pro-American manner. The question at stake is the motivation and way of thinking of the smaller states. Were they really unconditionally pro-American or was there still some space for compromise, if someone had been willing to work at it?

2. Forced bandwagon

To my mind, the correct answer is the second one – there was still room for compromise. My argument is that smaller states in practice are much more interested in having an international order with the rule of law, which curbs hegemony and prevents eventual aggression. Various studies on the small states' security and foreign policy and especially on relations between bigger and smaller states show very clearly that the smaller states, in order to compensate for their limited resources, are always looking for some additional security guaranties. Internationally recognized neutrality or participation in alliances usually are options to consider. Another option is a jumping on hegemonic bandwagons. However, this option is generally taken only as the last resort¹¹. In other words, sometimes the situation forces the smaller countries to choose between two evils – to be damaged or to jump on the bandwagon, the lesser evil. Therefore, it may frequently become a preferred option, or a lesser evil.

The Iraq war case has shown very clearly that bandwagoning was not the best option for the smaller states, neither even for the hegemon nor for the

smaller partners. The “new friends” of Washington may be more compliant but weren’t nearly as rich and powerful as the old ones, or as able to help shoulder burdens. Poland, the largest of the new democratic states in Eastern Europe, has limited resources, especially in tough economic times. America is supposed to pay the lion’s share of the costs in any case¹². On the other side, American defiance of generally accepted international norms and accustomed international order caused real troubles for the smaller partners. For them, the stability of the international norms is a cornerstone of their very existence and security. The crux of the matter is that there is a possibility that somebody else, who is also powerful, may decide to follow the American example.

For instance, immediately after the Iraq war, the well-known Russian analyst Sergei Karaganov published an article in the Russian daily “Izvestia”, where he wrote that Russia made a mistake when it objected to the American action. Of course, first of all, with his article Karaganov was preparing the ground for Russian–American reconciliation after the conflict over Iraq. However, his argument was rather controversial. Karaganov argued that in order to understand what the US did in Iraq it is necessary to accept a “new concept of sovereignty”. Since the so-called Third World and partly the Second World consist mostly of failing or already failed states, the leading powers of the World should take a burden of responsibility to restore and to maintain the order. Although no one could present any proof of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the American action should have been legitimized for the removal of the bloody Saddam’s regime¹³.

Later Karaganov developed his argument in the article written together with Vladislav Inozemcev and published in the journal “Russia in Global Affairs”. They openly used the Iraq precedent as an argument on behalf of Russian involvement into the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Osetia as well as Moldova’s Transdnistria¹⁴. Furthermore, Russia has already declared several times that it reserves for herself the right of preemptive strikes against terrorists even beyond Russian borders. It can be surmised that the most likely target for such an action may be the Republic of Georgia.

This paradoxical coincidence between American and Russian behavior was noticed by the UPI analyst Peter Lavalle. In his commentary published in the website “Untimely Thoughts” on occasion of Putin’s meeting with Bush in September 2003, he stated: “...The United States has no problem

with violating international law; it has shown contempt for international public opinion. Russia refuses to take advantage of numerous international institutions to resolve the continuing human catastrophe in the troubled republic of Chechnya. Both the United States and Russia have become international outcasts, to a degree, for these reasons¹⁵.

Probably there is not enough ground for a 100 percent agreement with Laval, however, his statement illustrates what kind of negative consequences the unconditional bandwagoning with the USA may bring. It is a risky enterprise since such actions by the hegemon create a new international order which may not always be advantageous for smaller states. Also, this new order might be easily exploited by other countries whose increased influence may not be welcomed at all. Moreover, these "other countries" may feel a "responsibility" to ascertain occasionally whether or not the smaller neighbours can already be treated as failing states.

One may ask why these smaller CEE countries chose the bandwagon despite the above described costs. As stated before, they have chosen the lesser evil. The lesser evil was to support the hegemon with all possible negative consequences to the international order. It would have been even a greater evil to undercut the perspective of joining NATO by losing the unconditional US support at the end of the long effort. That might have even caused the collapse of some governments in CEE, while the European Union, as we know, did not become a forum for elaboration and development of any reasonable alternatives.

It would have been possible to interpret the desire of the CEE states to join NATO as soon as possible as an expression of their instinctive Russo-phobia, like Peter Schultze and others did in their study¹⁶. But I have selected Schultze's study for a different reason. Schultze expressed a widely prevalent prejudice that the acceding EU member states "have no ambitions (*Anspruch*) to become actors within a new and, for them, hardly understandable EU foreign and military policy structure which is also disliked by the USA"¹⁷. That's not true at all. The CEE states were probably lacking power, wealth or influence, but they have never lacked ambitions.

On the contrary, in the EU common foreign policy, the CEE countries are considered as one area where smaller new EU member states are ready to contribute and thus make the EU policy towards Eastern neighborhood more consistent

and coherent. There is another question – to what extent France or Germany are ready to welcome these ambitions. Since the European Union is a community of states not based on calculations of realpolitik but on precisely described sets of values, there is space for hopes of a more positive development. The Ukrainian case proves that these hopes are not baseless.

3. Spillover of ambition, or “Europeanization” of small states’ policy in actu

At the end of November, 2004 the EU had got a new headache – the Ukrainian election. For many in Europe, the Ukrainian crisis sprung from nowhere. However, already during the course of the election campaign it was already possible to predict that something was going to happen. Ukrainians in those elections were deciding to support either the pro-European or the pro-Russian candidate. At stake was geopolitics. There was no doubt that the Ukrainian choice was extremely important for Russia. Russian President Putin himself visited Ukraine twice during the campaign in order to support his favorite. Meanwhile, the attitude in many European countries was very different. Russia’s closest neighbors were worried as much as the EU bigger countries, Germany or France, were rather indifferent.

Nevertheless, a dilemma for western leaders arose when at the end of the voting day many observers from the OSCE reported massive violations and fraud, which brought a tiny majority to the Russian-backed candidate. The dilemma became even more acute when thousands of aggravated demonstrators occupied the central Kyiv and blocked the governmental buildings. They had sworn not to leave the Independence Square until their right to fair election became policy. Tension hit the highest point when the number of demonstrators was increasing to tens of thousands. It was a revolution since the government was not able to function any more. The solution had to be either the use of force or negotiations between the two candidates.

As Alexander Rahr, the well-know German expert on Russia, noticed in his interview for “Deutschlandfunk”, when the crises in Ukraine arose it suddenly became obvious that the main EU countries were never really interested in Ukraine. All their attention was always concentrated only on Russia¹⁸. And now they had again a dilemma: Either they recognize the results of the election expressing at the same time a concern about viola-

tions, or recognize the election as illegal and go into conflict with the Russian president Putin who had already managed to congratulate the “winner”. To make things worse, Russia was sending very clear signals to Western Europe that any sort of international European interference would not be welcomed.

This tough Russian position was easy to explain. President Putin at this time was very close to his “promised land”. His “Grand Design” of the second presidential term was to create a more coherent community of the post-soviet states around Russia. The success key of this project was Ukraine, and the chances to involve this country were very high. The potential competitors of Russia like the US or the EU during the last few years were very passive in Ukraine for different reasons. The US was busy with Iraq and was also disappointed by the corrupt rule of President Leonid Kuchma. The EU, again, was mostly concerned with its further enlargement, but it had no plans for that further enlargement. The EU wanted to pursue a special “New Neighborhood” policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Therefore, finally, Ukraine turned to Russia. The results became apparent immediately. On September 19, 2003 Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed the Agreement on the Single Economic Space¹⁹. The Agreement provided that Ukraine would coordinate its economic policies and external economic relations with Russia. Therefore, it was very important for Putin to assure a continuity of the Ukrainian politics after change of government as well.

Probably Putin’s friends in Europe, Schröder and Chirac, would have been happy to close their eyes as they did with Chechnya or “Yukos” Oil Company problems. However, the pro-Russian stance of those leaders was a permanent target for severe critics in Western European mass media. It appeared that an open concession to Mr. Putin was not possible at this time. Use of force in Kyiv would certainly cause casualties or even civil war with unpredictable consequences for the whole of Europe.

However, the situation was not hopeless. An alternative solution came from Ukrainians themselves. Acting president Kuchma phoned to Mr. Alexander Kwańiewski, President of Poland, and Mr. Valdas Adamkus, President of Lithuania, and invited them to come to Kyiv in order to undertake a “honest broker” mission between the two candidates and to help find a political solution. It was obvious that Russia was not in a position to take on this mission

since it had already congratulated “the winner”, despite the recorded violations and fraud. Later Polish President Kwaśniewski narrated to the Polish weekly “Polityka” that it was extremely important to ensure the European backing for this mission and even to present it not as a Polish–Lithuanian effort but as a complete European Union mission. Before flying to Kyiv, Kwaśniewski had made telephone calls to key European leaders. He also addressed German Chancellor Schröder. According to Kwaśniewski, the first conversation was rather cold (*pierwsza rozmowa była zimna*)²⁰, nevertheless, Schröder promised to contact Putin and to explain to him that this mission was not anti-Russian but oriented only towards helping Ukrainians to reach a political compromise in order to exercise fair elections. And as we know today²¹, it was helpful, since Russia sent its representative to the negotiations as well.

Finally, the mission received the informal EU mandate. Mr. CFSP Solana also arrived in Kyiv. Thus, the loyalist Russian pro-Putin media were in difficulty, because it was not very persuasive to present the whole enterprise as a routine Polish anti-Russian intrigue.

However, the European mandate was not a guarantee for success of the mission. There are already numerous failures on record at the EU, if we take into account the unsuccessful efforts to mediate crises in former Yugoslavia or the Middle East. Therefore, this case needs to be studied in detail in order to determine the reasons for its success this time. This case pointed out that the decisive factor might have been not the size of the mediating actor, but its previously accumulated capital of political co-operation and even personal contacts. It can be argued that sometimes the smaller states may be in a much better position to do that than the bigger ones.

Note what President Kwaśniewski had observed in another interview, which took place after the “third” round of the Ukrainian elections: he stressed that the most helpful factor for him was his knowledge of Ukrainian politics and politicians. This was knowledge accumulated during the long years of communication and co-operation. Since he had personal knowledge of the people on both sides, he was able to persuade them to talk to each other and to de-escalate the situation. According to Kwaśniewski, “...you cannot get credit from nothing. You cannot just come and say – I am Kwaśniewski, Polish President, and now I will be helping you”²².

Of course, it is natural that Poland, being a neighbor to Ukraine, was able to achieve success more effectively than, for instance, a more remote

European country. At the same time it is important to recognize that the chance for success would be less if Poland had not been backed by the whole European Union. So, this case stands out as an interesting example of how the common European foreign policy could effectively bring visible results in combination with the policies of separate member states who contribute their unique experience and expertise.

Conclusion

We have discussed two cases – the Iraqi and Ukrainian crises – and tried to identify what kind of importance the smaller states had for the EU's common foreign policy. We have had a chance to see how (non)involvement of the smaller states contributed to the (un)success of the case. The common European foreign and security policy cannot be equaled to the French and German opinion by definition. Common policy will arise only when the smaller member states become involved in the process.

The second point was to demonstrate that one of the main obstacles for a wider involvement of the smaller CEE states into common European foreign policy is a widely-assumed prejudice which considers the CEE states as Russo-phobic, pro-American and not interested in the EU's CFSP at all. As we see, the Ukrainian case allows us to reach a completely different conclusion. The smaller states are much more eager to comply with the European Union's values than the great powers are. Unlike the great powers, the smaller states are not burdened by mindsets about their own special missions and so can transfer their attention more easily to the common values the European Union is based on.

Conversely, if we look only outwardly we may easily get the impression that the smaller states are already playing an important role in the EU's foreign policy. The US President Bush, during his recent and important visit to Europe, spent more than a half of his working time communicating with representatives of the smaller states. He met Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker who also held the EU's Presidency, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hopp Scheffer who is Dutch, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso who is Portuguese, and Ivan Gašparovič, President of Slovakia who was hosting the American–Russian summit in Bratislava.

However, this was only the official side of life, suggesting a different reality. Of course, the smaller states cannot change the world order and dictate the political agenda. Nevertheless, what they can do is enrich policy options, which may become based less on interests and more on values.

In conclusion, I would like to take a zestful liberty using some metaphors from the culinary arts. Every cook knows that for a good meal he needs not only main ingredients (the great powers) but also various spices (the smaller states). And in case of Iraq we had rather flavorless Franco-German food. Therefore, it was no big surprise that Chirac, being French and having good taste, noticed that the food was bad. However, he had forgotten that he was the main chef at that time. On the other hand, we need to keep in mind that spices do not always improve the taste. It may become too spicy as happened with the US effort in Iraq. When one uses spices he ought to know how to use them well. And, as we had a chance to try, the Ukrainian borsch²³ tasted good.

Therefore, for the sake of future of the common European foreign policy, it would be useful to suggest establishing a sort of gentlemen's agreement among the Member States. As far as the new Constitution for Europe foresees two new important positions, the President of the European Council and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would be useful to agree that the representatives of the Great Powers would not keep both positions at the same time. This system is already functioning in NATO. As far as the SACEUR is always American, the NATO Secretary General is European. In the future, if and when European armed forces equal the American, probably even a rotation of those positions would be possible.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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THEORIES OF TERRORISM AND THEIR POSITION IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

Asta Maskaliūnaitė

Abstract. Although the phenomenon of terrorism is not new, serious theoretical investigation of its occurrence, causes, and effects commenced only well into the second half of the twentieth century. When this problem of the lack of theoretical investigation was solved, another one appeared on the horizon – many researchers still had doubts about the scientific value of these theories, and their abilities to meet the demands of positivist science.

In this article, three main questions are investigated. First, the position of terrorism studies in the field of social sciences. It is argued that, though terrorism studies can hardly be considered a separate discipline, some of the theories advanced here have a substantial scientific value. Thus, the debates over the political engagement of some of the experts on terrorism, or the question of the exact place of terrorism studies in the field of social science should in no way obscure the achievements of these works.

Secondly, the theories themselves are examined. The article divides these theories into three sub-topics: the examination of causes of terrorism, investigations of the dynamics of terrorist organizations, and lastly, the examination of the state response to terrorist activity. And finally, the current state of the field is evaluated. Though it is often argued that the current forms of terrorism are completely different from those of the past, demanding for a distinction to be made between “old” and “new” terrorism, it is claimed here that the apparent changes in the outlook of the terrorist groups do not necessarily make obsolete the whole effort of theoretization. To the contrary, valuable insights can be gained from the application of the already created pool of knowledge to explain the modern challenges.

When, after the first wave of terrorism in the 60s, social scientists started spilling more ink in trying to understand the phenomenon than the terrorists themselves spilled blood, to paraphrase Alex Schmid¹ (1988), they commenced their work in a virtually void land. Terrorism as such, of course, was not an unheard-of phenomenon at the moment: the Reign of Terror in the French revolution that brought the term into the political vocabulary prompted also numerous examinations of this form of the phenomenon and the attempts to explain its occurrence; Russian revolutionaries of the 19th century

resorted to terrorist tactics at one point of their development; “national liberation” movements in Ireland, Israel or Algeria incorporated terrorist tactics into their struggles to achieve independence. While many researchers and intellectuals saw these struggles and the means employed to win them as legitimate and understandable in the face of oppression that the countries were suffering from their colonial rulers, it was the developments of the “urban guerrilla”² in the midst of the economically advanced and democratic states of Europe and North America that brought up intensive discussions about the nature of the phenomenon, its causes and effects.

The initial theories analyzing this type of violence in the so-called developed world focused mainly on the extraordinariness of terrorism and terrorists, attempting to explain the incidents of this violence by conspiracy theories and/or the psychopathological makeup of the people engaged in terrorist violence. These theories (while never losing their attraction in popular culture and the pseudo-scientific lore) soon gave way to a more seriously grounded researches and theories that tried to examine terrorist violence in its many places and means of apparition, and eventually managed to create within the framework of social sciences a corner also for the studies of terrorism.

However, this situation was put to doubt by the events of the new millennium. September 11, 2001 attacks in the US seemed to indicate the failure not only of the security services, but also of the theorists that were expected to predict and prevent them. The attacks of March 2004 in Madrid and of July 2005 in London prompted new questions to the agenda – it appeared that the security services of the respective countries paid more attention to the so-called “old” terrorist groups, ETA in the first case, and the IRA in the second, and somewhat overlooked the threat of Islamic terrorists. This brought up the excuse that the “new” terrorists were completely different from the old ones and that the theories were lacking the arguments able to explain such events, their causes and effects. The “terrorologists” were put to blame here as well – the lack of prediction seemed to indicate the lack of theoretization.

Is it, however, the case that the occurrence of these attacks carried as much of a responsibility of the theoreticians of terrorism and their inability to explain and by so doing prevent the terrorist acts from taking place? Can “terrorology” in general be expected to act as a positivist science with its demands for the predictability of social events? What is the place of the

study of terrorism both within the social sciences and in between the theory and practice, e.g., prevention of terrorist acts? These are some of the questions that should be addressed in discussing the theories of terrorism. In this article, thus, I would like to discuss the nature of the “terrorology,” its basic premises, the value (or lack of such) of this discipline and its position among other social science disciplines. Secondly, I would discuss the most important theories of terrorism and finally see whether these theories are applicable to the challenges of nowadays.

“Terrorology”: a discipline?

As mentioned above, the scientific qualities of terrorism research are often considered doubtful to such an extent that even the term “terrorology” itself is regularly employed in a negative or disdainful manner. There are several reasons for that. First of all, of course, it is the aforementioned lack of scientific quality in a great part of terrorism research that relies so much on rumors, stereotypes and prejudices. Secondly, the topic itself is often considered to be that of the popular “entertainment” than the matter of serious political science which should not concern itself with such fancy subjects but study serious matters (e.g., parties and party systems). And last but not least, the policy concerns the majority of the leading figures in terrorism research that makes the scientific neutrality or a critical viewpoint doubtful.

The first of these criticisms can be easily dismissed – though it is true that a lot has been written about terrorism and most of it is crap, it does not warrant the claim that there are no serious theories of terrorism. The ones who are saying so are just perpetuating the same prejudice as the people they are accusing. The second is also easily dismissed as whether we like it or not, it still remains a fact that terrorism is a *political phenomenon*, and has thus to be studied with the same concern as the other phenomena of the kind.

It is much more complicated to deal with the third matter. Already long before the events of 11 September and the resulting “war on terror” there has been a disquiet in the academic circles about the exclusive policy-orientation of terrorism research. As, for example, Ronald Crelinsten once emphasized, the lack of quality in the studies of terrorism is often due to a “narrow policy orientation on prevention and control.”³ This aspect got even more to light after the events of September 11 and especially the

current war in Iraq. In this Second Gulf War the notion of embedded journalism entered vocabulary, to indicate a certain “court-journalism” characterized by a lack of neutrality and the view of the events from only one side, usually the American or British military. The same way recently a term of “embedded expertise”⁴ has been coined to talk about the academicians in the field of terrorism research that are closely related to governing circles and use their expertise to promote and encourage a certain policy agenda in the counter-terrorism sphere. The emphasis on effectiveness of a counter-terrorism campaign, according to these criticisms, leads to the lack of appreciation of the causes of terrorism, to the preferential treatment of the analysis of methods of combating it and forgetfulness of the fact that terrorism is born *in the context*, and without understanding the contexts in which it is born it is hardly possible to work on its *prevention*, to say nothing of punishment.

As an evidence of this “embedded expertise” in the field, the RAND-St. Andrews nexus is often cited. The two most influential groups of terrorism research are closely connected to one another – the strongmen of RAND founding the St. Andrews *Center for Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence*; the members of both are editors of the two most important academic journals in the field: *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*; in addition, the two organizations maintain one of the most authoritative data bases of terrorism incidents.⁵ Obviously, all of the above does not give any reason for worry: however, the relation of the two organizations with the respective governments and, what might be seen as resulting from this relation, methodological flaws both in the research focus (exclusively international terrorism and counter-terrorism measures) and in the actual data collection (e.g., to include even non-violent protests involving some “risk-groups” as terrorism⁶) is disturbing. The voice of reflexivity and criticism is lost in such circumstances; the effectiveness of the counter-terrorist campaign is seen as a superior aim, without considering its costs; and the resulting flaws in research downgrade the studies themselves.

Even if we do agree that no matter what is the real situation at the moment, there is still a possibility of conceiving the idea of a neutral study of terrorism, and there are still other doubts about its understanding as a scientific discipline. It is questionable, for example, whether terrorism studies would actually certify

as a discipline, as (the same regards, for example, area studies) they do not possess a unified methodology. What unites the different theories into one is just their focus on one of the political phenomena – terrorism, which, in addition, is widely and differently defined in different studies.⁷ Therefore, there are no common methodology and no common focus of enquiry. Furthermore, there is a very narrow subject and comparably very few cases. All this rises strong doubts about calling terrorism studies a separate discipline.

From yet another angle, Douglass and Zulaika, for example, in their seminal work *Terror and Taboo*⁸ propose arguments for rejecting the idea of terrorism studies as a discipline and, even more so, as a separate field of enquiry. In their view, terrorism studies should be dismantled into separate pieces; the other fields of research to which various theories of terrorism are related, according to them, would be doing a good enough job and the whole idea of keeping terrorism as the focus of a field of study only works to perpetuate the already created image of terrorism as a tabooed category of discourse.

It could be said, though, that the attempt to confirm terrorism studies as a discipline is more of a bureaucratic need than a scientific demand. Establishment of research centers and university departments might be easier when one is considering a discipline. However, the judgment of the area as a separate discipline or only an object of scientific enquiry does not change the quality of the theories created in the field, and the very fact that the subject of terrorism is studied from so many different angles may well be an advantage and not a shortcoming of the field.

Theories of terrorism

Despite all these various reservations about the value of “terrorology” and the possibilities to see it as a separate discipline and not just as a number of works that have one (however vaguely defined) object of investigation, we still decide to pursue the quest of explaining the phenomenon. We would be dealing with three sets of theories. Understandably, the clustering of these theories is only a matter of convenience and different authors can use different constellations for their specific purposes. I would distinguish theories that try to examine the causes of terrorism, in the first place, then move on to the ones that discuss the development of a terrorist organization and its inner dynamics, and finally, to the theories that examine state responses to terrorism. Here we are dealing with

a grouping based on a narrower object of inquiry. Other possible classifications might include differentiations according to disciplinary affiliations of these theories (in this case we would have, for example, psychological, sociological, anthropological theories, etc.) or according to the methodology used (quantitative or qualitative methods, discourse analysis, etc.), or even according to authors' aims (apologetic, explanatory, policy-oriented, etc.). My own option to distinguish among the narrower objects of inquiry within the theories of terrorism goes in line with the idea discussed in the previous section – it is only the object of analysis that keeps those theories together.

Why, who, when? Search for the causes of terrorism

The attempts to find reasons for the birth of terrorist organizations in one part of the world or another are at the forefront of the analytical approaches to terrorism. The questions why certain groups or individuals resort to violence to achieve their objectives, who the individuals most prone to make such a step are, and what the conditions for their engagement in violence are comprise the issues that bother social scientists and sometimes even policy makers. Attention paid to the subject is thus understandable.

It was already mentioned that in discussing terrorism the temptation to succumb to the it-is-beyond-understanding or conspiracy explanations is rather easy. After all, so many definitions of terrorism insist that the perpetrators of these crimes have a pathological disregard for innocent lives. Can there be a better explanation to this than existence of a set of individuals with innate or acquired psychological disturbances, who are all connected through a web of organizations enlacing all the world, which are themselves manipulated by an evil puppeteer? Probably the best example of such a “theory” is the book of Claire Sterling *The Terror Network: the Secret War of International Terrorism*⁹, which became popular in the circles of the American administration in the early 80s. Though extremely scantily grounded, such “theories” tend to resist all the attempts to uproot them, constantly resurging to claim their place, at least in the popular understanding. As the former Spanish minister of foreign affairs once claimed, “everything is possible in that world of darkness”¹⁰ and thus every explanation, no matter how improbable or ungrounded, can well find its audience.

More serious researches are also concerned with the conditions of a possibility of terrorism and the individual motivations for joining the groups.

The findings, however, differ significantly from those exposed by Sterling and those who share her ideas. On the micro level concerned with the question of who and why engages in terrorism, numerous psychological research projects took place after the wave of terrorism in Europe withered away in the 80s. The results of the studies showed that those who were engaged in terrorist activities in Europe of 70s were not very much different from other politically active people. For example, as Franco Ferracuti writes, “psychiatric studies have not identified any psychopathological characteristics common to the Italian left-wing terrorists”¹¹ that were under examination in his study, and the same findings were confirmed in case of (West) German leftist terrorists¹². Though certain “personality disturbances” are quoted in such studies¹³, the general message is that those who engage in terrorist activities are “more like us than we ordinarily care to admit.”¹⁴

Psychological theories also discuss the ways in which individuals abandon the usual moral codes of behavior and start using violence, the so-called “mechanisms of moral disengagement” that allow an individual through “intensive psychological training”¹⁵ to distance him / herself from the moral control of society. These include the ways of attributing blame, creating the positive image of oneself, the dehumanization of victims, etc. Such mechanisms should be kept in mind not only in trying to understand the terrorist behavior, but also in designing policies of countering terrorism as they highlight the difficulty of exit from a terrorism that eventually demands replacement of a positive image of oneself (e.g., as a freedom fighter) by a negative one (e.g., murderer).

Other theories trying to explain the behavior of terrorists discuss the rationality of terrorist acts. For example, Martha Crenshaw emphasizes that engagement in terrorism comes after a calculation of costs and benefits.¹⁶ Thus, terrorism may be seen as a rational choice of the groups that fail to achieve their objectives by other means (terrorism is regarded here as the last resort) and want to compensate by their violent actions what they lack in numbers¹⁷. Ronald Wintrobe in his article “Can suicide bombers be rational?” tries to prove an even more difficult point – that suicide bombers are also perfectly rational individuals and that suicide bombings can be seen as a kind of rational activity, “an extreme example of a general class of behavior in which all of us engage”¹⁸. He maintains that by joining a terrorist organization (and here he takes inspiration from the analysis of religious sects) an

individual gives up part of his / her autonomy to act according to his / her own beliefs in exchange for solidarity. If the value of solidarity is high enough, it is rational for such an individual even to commit suicide for the cohesion of the group.

If, then, we agree with these theories arguing that terrorists are as “normal” as most of us and that their decision to start a career in terrorism is a rational decision, the question arises what the conditions that prompt such a choice are. In her classical work on the topic, Martha Crenshaw distinguished between two types of the factors that encourage terrorism in certain societies: preconditions – factors that “set stage for terrorism over a long run” and precipitants – “specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism”¹⁹. Within the former she distinguishes modernization and urbanization as general “permissive” preconditions for terrorism. In addition, she also mentions society’s view of violence against government as justified; existence of concrete grievances; lack of opportunities to participate in political processes; and disaffection of the part of the elite usually because of the passivity of the masses²⁰. A precipitating event, on the other hand, can be almost anything, but most often it tends to be a violent reaction of the government against the broader movement with which the future terrorists identify themselves.²¹

Most of the other theories on the causes of terrorism echo Crenshaw’s ideas, adding more details to the picture. Thus, for Weinberg and Davis, as well as for Wilkinson, one of the most important “preconditions”, to borrow Crenshaw’s term, is the existence in the given society of a long tradition of resistance to the state and the existing order²², the historical memory of which may be reactivated by a certain group in a particular situation. Sabino Acquaviva accentuates the existence of a “crisis of values” and the creation of a strong anti-culture²³, while Ehud Sprinzak stresses the process of delegitimation of the state²⁴. For Donatella Della Porta²⁵, an essential factor for the occurrence of terrorism is the reaction of government to a broad protest movement with which the future terrorists identify themselves; the harsher the suppression of the movement, the more likely it is that a terrorist group will spring us from it.

*Always deeper underground:
the development of terrorist organizations*

Martha Crenshaw emphasized that “[t]errorism as a process gathers its own momentum, independent of external events”²⁶ and often independent of the people that initiated it²⁷. To gain some understanding of the terrorist

dynamics, we should look at the path of development of terrorist organizations. Theories dealing with the subject emphasize similarities between a terrorist group and any other small group with its pressures of conformity and consensus and provision of “a sense of belonging, a feeling of self-importance and a new belief system”²⁸. The most significant work in this field, to my mind, is that of Donatella Della Porta who devoted her study to the German and Italian left-wing groups.²⁹ While her theory also gives a lot of attention to the two other levels of the analysis (macro level conditions and micro level reasons for joining violent clandestine groups), it is mainly concerned with the dynamics of terrorist organizations.

A study based on Charles Tilly and Sydney Tarrow’s protest cycles theory³⁰ analyzes how a terrorist group is born from a wide protest movement. To put it in the crude terms, the movements, such as those of 1968, gradually gather their force to reach the phase of highest mobilization. Subsequently, the enthusiasm withers away, leaving a surplus of activists and movement organizations that have to compete for their place within the movement and for the “scarce resources. At the same time, the encounters with hostile police forces, experience of violence from the state prompt some of these organizations to develop certain self-defense groups whose goal is to protect the movement from repression and rivals (e.g., as in Italy, the radical neo-fascists). These groups adopt radical tactics in order “to become more competitive in the more violence-prone movement areas.”³¹ Subsequently, these groups, “socialized in violence”, follow the dynamics of their own, which leads them to more and more violent engagements, “deeper and deeper underground”³². This involves a variety of internal processes within the group, such as adjustment of ideology, a change of self-image and the image of the enemy and even a change in language. Further on, these groups have to find a balance between the different interests that they might have, as, for example, between seeking to win supporters and find new recruits, a task that demands more openness and a need to protect the group. The terrorist groups exhibit many differences which mainly stem from the characteristics of the movements from which they are born. However, these differences, the author notes, tend to diminish with time as they stay underground.³³

Thus, whether we regard it as the dynamics of small groups or of closed (underground, outcast) societies, the development of terrorist organizations is not significantly different from the trajectories that the non-violent actors

undergo. It could be even said that the actual violence plays a little role inside the group. Here, like in ancient Rome, barbarians and the fights against them remain outside the gates.

State responses to terrorism

As was already mentioned while discussing the problems of considering studies of terrorism as a separate discipline, it is mostly in the area of state responses that terrorism studies have been attacked. It could be said that the research on terrorism in general has started from such “response” studies. The first books to be written on the issue were those of the influential leaders of British armed forces involved in the fight against insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, or later in Ireland. The best known names here are those of Richard Clutterbuck and Frank Kitson.³⁴ Strategies with a little heed to the human costs (it is, for example, recommended to cut off food supplies for the populations that are suspected of supporting the insurgents) characterize these accounts and the idea is that any insurgency can be toppled by military means. “[T]errorism can be and has been eliminated by a ruthless response to it, for power does ultimately lie with the government and its security forces.”³⁵ Supposedly, the author had to eventually rethink this idea, because what worked well in the “ruthless” setting of the colonial world did not seem to be as useful in the more spot-lighted area of Northern Ireland where it was attempted to use the same military strategies as in the colonial Malaya.³⁶

However, already when they seemed to be rather forgotten, the recent war in Iraq and the subsequent insurgency there revived some of these old theories of counter-insurgency to be employed in the country. The aforementioned RAND-St. Andrews circle is closely connected with the counter-insurgency school and the studies of the latter are well respected and used in the former,³⁷ so that the same measures are often advocated also in the recent war on terrorism. How problematic that eventually might be is well represented by the Irish example: the increase of military pressure only allowed the movement to increase and gather strength, while the decline of the IRA and the whole “armed struggle” in the Northern Ireland was more due to the change in circumstances and strategic political decisions of the leaders than to the military pressure.

The neutral studies of response to terrorism are more difficult to find, their findings are usually less optimistic than those of the “embedded” experts, and their works so far raise more questions than provide answers.

The attempts to find a unitary way to fight terrorism failed both in the works of “embedded” scientists and in those of the neutral ones – it turned out that there was no recipe of how to handle terrorism. For example, “betrayal” strategies, where the members of organizations were given legal incentives to exit organizations (receiving shorter sentences, etc.) worked very well in the case of Italy, but have proven a disaster in the case of Northern Ireland, and had only a partial success in Spain. Amnesty can sometimes be a solution (e.g., in Spain, it was argued, the lack of amnesty greatly lowered the chances that the democratic transition would also result in the ending of terrorism), but at others is a precipitated action (e.g., in France, the amnesty given to the members of the Leftist *Action Directe* only led to their rejoining the armed struggle).

However, the most problematic issues appear when we look deeper into the response agenda. For example, nobody has yet written a satisfying account on the contradiction between the counter-terrorism measures and legislation and the subsequent penal treatment of the terrorism convicts. It has been noted in some works³⁸ that the terrorism legislation with its draconic measures often results in a completely “normalized,” to borrow Northern Irish term, treatment of the convicts. Or, to put it in other words, while the political aspect of terrorism is very much emphasized in the period leading to capture and the trial of the suspects, it is inexistent in their subsequent treatment in jails, a contradiction that has not yet been solved and is very doubtful to be.

***Instead of conclusion:
“Old” theories for “new” terrorism?***

“Bombs, beards and backpacks: these are the distinguishing marks, at least in the popular imagination, of the terror-mongers who either incite or carry out the explosions that periodically rock the cities of the western world. A century or so ago it was not so different: bombs, beards and fizzing fuses.”³⁹

A century has passed, but the scare is not much different (neither is the response to it), the only change is the name – for the current jihadist reads anarchist of the early 20th century, a grounded analogy which shows that our new demons can well have counterparts in the past.

Then, what is new about “new” terrorism? It has been a while since the idea that terrorism has changed enough to demand a prefix “new” has emerged. Supposedly, it was first mentioned already in 1986 by Paul Wilkinson⁴⁰, one

of the leading experts (from the St. Andrews Center) in the field. He cited the religious factor as an indicator of this change, and the danger that the new terrorism carried. The same element was further on elaborated by other theorists, such as Hoffman (another leading specialist, from RAND)⁴¹ or Simon and Benjamin.⁴² All of them talk about the same elements that distinguish the “new” terrorism from the “old”: the change in the structure of organizations (more loose, the cells less connected with one another and the leadership more symbolic than real); the possibility of access to weapons of mass destruction; religious justification of the actions; and the increasing lack of discrimination in the targets, all of them leading to the increasing lethality of attacks.

It might eventually appear that what appears to be new is, as the saying goes, a well-forgotten old. It is possible to question most of these assumptions concerning new terrorism. The loose structures, for example, have been employed also by more traditional terrorist groups, which also often have “sleeper commandos” that lead normal life until triggered to action. The religious justification of actions is also one of the most dubious qualities. Al Qaeda, for example, is taken as a “new” terrorist organization *par excellence*, but its political demands (state of Palestine, pulling out the troops from Saudi Arabia and Iraq) might be more significant than the religious rhetoric, though the former is left in the shadow in the public discourse while the latter is accentuated. The greater access to WMD also receives no serious proof, for it might have been as well accessible to the old groups, for example, in the period of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Thus, the usual explanations of indiscriminate targets and the higher lethality of attacks are not so plausible.

Furthermore, what is doubtful is not only the novel qualities of this phenomenon but also the fact that it needs a completely new theoretical assessment and that the theories created to explain the “old” terrorism are not valid for the “new” one. One can still work with the ideas of preconditions and precipitants as in Crenshaw’s explanation of the phenomenon, one can still use the theories of development of terrorist organizations to see how they work in the case of “new” terrorism. It is even necessary to test the possibility to apply these older theories in order to gain a real understanding of the phenomenon at hand. The idea that the reasons of terrorism are not knowable, that its explanations are not possible and its inner logic is not accessible is not acceptable. As we now know, it has been tried before and has been proven false.

What we know about the phenomenon of terrorism so far is that it is impossible to study it without a context. If we want to understand the “new” terrorism, it is not enough to say that the current organizations have a better access to WMD and thus their attacks are more lethal. The lack of discrimination, for example, may well rest in the isolation of Muslim communities in the Western world and the violent life of the suburban ghettos. The real impact of the Western, and especially American, foreign policy in the Middle East is also insufficiently researched, but the works on political situation in the countries of the region show findings similar to those of the researchers working on the older groups.⁴³ Though it is true that the “new” organizations are “new” in the sense of their being established later than the old ones, explaining the difference between them by the religious factor rises a lot of reasonable doubt. Though it is easy to dismiss the theories of terrorism created thus far on various grounds, it is not advisable to throw away a lot of scholarly effort that was put into explaining the phenomenon without really assessing its abilities to explain the challenges of the nowadays world. While the possibility of prediction of terrorist events (the same as many other social events) remains slight, their explanatory value might still prove to be significant enough.

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- ¹ Schmid, A. *Political Terrorism. A Research Guide to Concepts, Data Bases and Literature*. Amsterdam: SWIDOC, 1983.
- ² The term “urban guerrilla” to describe what in other places would be called “terrorism” was coined by Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian guerrilla leader and theoretician, and was widely used both in Latin America and in Europe of the 1970s. While with the first appearances of “terrorism” in the vocabulary of politics, it was used as a positive term (for Robespierre, terror was an indispensable companion of virtue in times of Revolution), the term soon invoked rather unfavorable connotations. Therefore, the last group to use “terrorists” as their own denomination was the Russian Narodnaya Volya of the 1870s-1880s, and the new violent actors of the 20th century, even when using similar methods as the former, preferred to use another term for self-description. Thus, the “urban guerrilla” became a useful denomination for such purposes.
- ³ Crenslin, R. “Terrorism as political communication: the relationship between controller and the controlled”. Wilkinson, P. and Steward, A.M. eds. *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987.
- ⁴ See, for example, Burnett, Whyte, “Embedded expertise and the new terrorism”. *Journal for Crime, Conflict and Media*, 2005 1(4), pp.1-18.
- ⁵ See, *ibid.*, pp.8-10.

- ⁶ In Burnett and Whyte two such incidents are noted: the occupation by Kurds of a German embassy in Athens in response to the police killing of a Kurdish youth in custody and a peaceful protest outside the Turkish National Airline office, see, *ibid.* p.10.
The flaws like this are often found in official databases of terrorism. For example, the attacks of pipelines in Colombia (or now Iraq) are always treated as “terrorism” in the American reports on terrorism. See, for example, Brian Whitetaker, “The definition of Terrorism” in *The Guardian*, May 7, 2001.
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- ⁹ Sterling, Claire. *The Terror Network: the Secret War of International Terrorism*. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981.
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- ¹¹ Ferracuti, F. “Ideology and repentance: Terrorism in Italy”. Reich, W., ed. *Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, p. 60.
- ¹² *Ibid.*
- ¹³ See, for example, Post, J. “Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces”. Reich, W., ed. *Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, p. 27.
- ¹⁴ Rubenstein, Richard. *Alchemists of Revolution. Terrorism in the Modern World*. N.Y.: Basic Books, 1987. p. 5.
- ¹⁵ Bandura, A. “Mechanisms of moral disengagement”. Reich, W.r, ed. *Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, p. 163.
- ¹⁶ Among the former – punitive governmental reaction, possible loss of support and the possibility that the groups will be seen as elitist, among the latter – power of terrorism to set agendas, possibility of creating a revolutionary condition and the same governmental reaction can be seen as beneficial as it would supposedly show the “true face” of the government.
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- ¹⁸ Wintrobe, R. (2002). “Can suicide bombers be rational?” in http://www.diw.de/deutsch/service/veranstaltungen/ws_consequences/docs/diw_ws_consequences200206_wintrobe.pdf p. 2.
- ¹⁹ Crenshaw, M. “The causes of terrorism”. Besteman, C. ed. *Violence. A Reader. Main Trends in the Modern World*. N.Y.: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 101 (Original article was published in 1981).
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.101–105
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.
- ²² Weinberg, L., Davis, P.. *Introduction to Political Terrorism*. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1989, p. 45; Wilkinson, P. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. London: McMillan Press Ltd, 1977, p. 38.

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RETHINKING RUSSIA*

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Abstract. In this paper, the author argues that “high politics” of the ever-complicated Lithuanian-Russian relations are over. Yet, it is maintained that tensions persist in “low politics” and the security concerns related to Kaliningrad region, and Russian energy policy top the agenda. The author maintains that Lithuania needs to become more pragmatic in its daily business with Russia, more flexible within the EU about its policies towards Russia but also stay assertive in its long-term interest to see Russia becoming a normal democracy.

Introduction

Against all odds, in only fifteen years of independence the Baltic States managed to transform themselves from former Soviet republics with ruined economies and sovietised peoples into full-fledged members of the EU with galloping economic growth and vibrant civil societies. With the accession of the Baltic States to NATO, “the most challenging part of NATO enlargement puzzle”¹ has also been solved. The issue of the Baltic security has thus been removed from the top of the agenda of the EU and NATO and lost the urgency of “high politics”. To use an increasingly fashionable term, the Baltic security question has been “desecuritised” and became a matter of normal day-to-day politics.

Paradoxically, the Baltic States now face a more complex agenda, which will have no clear landmarks and will extend over decades to come. By and large, the top issue for the Baltic States remains the ever-strained relations with Russia. Although EU and especially NATO enlargement did not evoke the widely anticipated (but rarely specified) hostile reaction of Russia, the progress of bilateral relations over the past ten years has been stagnant at most.

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Russia cannot “let go”, the Baltics cannot get their message across, and the rest of the Europeans cannot understand why the two cannot find a mutually acceptable *modus vivendi*. Russian government is unwilling or unable to understand that it cannot treat the Baltic States as their “near abroad”, and hence a legitimate sphere of influence. The Baltic decision makers cannot persuade the Russians that they are willing to cooperate, and explain to fellow Europeans that they are not inherently anti-Russian. Other European states cannot understand why both sides venture into such a stubborn miscommunication and misperception. These “cannots” may best summarize the current status quo in the relations between the Baltic States and the Russian Federation.

This article examines the reasons behind the strenuous and seemingly irreconcilable state of relations between the Baltic State and their big Eastern neighbour. For the Baltic States, it is Russian unwillingness to admit and apologise for the crimes of the Soviet occupation and shed its imperial nostalgia towards the territories it once subjugated. For Russians, it is the “treacherous” Baltic membership in NATO - the former enemy of Russia, alleged mistreatment of Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and the isolation of the Kaliningrad region by Lithuania. The author argues that “high politics” of the ever-complicated Baltic–Russian relations are over. Yet, it is maintained that tensions persist in “low politics”. The paper will conclude with the discussion of the policy options that Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius could pursue in building their relations with Moscow in a more confident manner.

1. The invariable geography

In order to understand the lingering distrust of the Baltic peoples towards their Eastern neighbour, one must take into account their turbulent history. The historic destiny of the Baltic countries was to a large extent determined by their unfortunate geographic location in-between two belligerent nations to the West and to the East – the Germans and the Russians respectively. Since the early 1300s there was hardly a century in which the three Baltic nations were not caught up in a war with either or both of the two neighbours. Only Lithuania experienced a long period of statehood before being swallowed by Russian empire at the end of the 18th century.

The end of World War I provided the Baltic nations with a window of opportunity, which they successfully seized in 1918 by declaring

independence. It was terminated by the Soviet occupation in 1940, followed by the German occupation from 1941–1944 and the second Soviet occupation from 1944–1990. Hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians fell victim to the Nazi and Soviet occupations. The Nazi regime killed some 70 000 Jews in Latvia and 200 000 Jews in Lithuania as well thousands of other nationalities. The Soviet regime deprived the Baltics of their political, business and intellectual elites by imprisoning or deporting to labour camps some 90 000 people from Estonia, 200 000 from Latvia and 300 000 from Lithuania. Many of them died from torture, famine or were executed. Tens of thousands of people fled to the Western countries or were repatriated. In the post-war years, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania put up a fierce armed resistance against the occupation.²

Before World War II, the three Baltic States were relatively homogeneous in terms of the ethnic structure (see Table 1). During and after World War II, the Baltic States lost approximately 1/4 of their population (Estonia lost some 200 000 inhabitants, Latvia – 500 000, Lithuania – 1 000 000³). These losses opened the way for massive voluntary and forced migration of Eastern Slavs (primarily Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians) into the Baltic States, which continued throughout the Soviet era. The ethnic population in Estonia fell from 94 percent prior to 1940s to 60 percent by early 1990s and in Latvia from 77 percent to 52 percent respectively. Latvians were a minority in 7 of the country's 8 largest towns, including the capital Riga.⁴ While Lithuania

Table 1. Changes in the ethnic structures of the Baltic countries

	Before WWII		Soviet period			
	Population	Titular nationality	1959		1989	
			Population	Titular nationality	Population	Titular nationality
Estonia	1 126 400 (1934 census)	94 percent	893 000	75 percent	1 565 662	61.5 percent
Latvia	1 950 500 (1935 census)	77 percent	1 298 000	62 percent	2 666 500	52 percent
Lithuania	3 100 000 (1940 est.)	84 percent	2 696 000	79 percent	3 674 800	80 percent

Source: compiled by author. Data collected from national and Soviet censuses.

also “received” sizeable numbers of migrants, repatriation of some 200 000 Poles from Vilnius and a rather rapid natural growth rate allowed Lithuanians to retain a rather significant majority in their own country. By 1989, 5.3 million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were living in the Baltic States, forming 67 percent of an overall 7.9 million constant population.⁵ Today Estonia and Latvia are the only European countries that have fewer inhabitants of titular nationality than they had in the beginning of the 20th century.

Inspired by national uprisings in the countries of the Warsaw pact and seizing the opportunities provided by Gorbachev’s *Perestroika*, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians started their own “singing revolutions” in 1987–88. The three nations became the first republics of the late USSR to declare independence in spring 1990. While Gorbachev “let go” the Warsaw pact countries, the same was clearly not in the plans of the Soviet elite with regard to the Baltic countries. The myth of the bloodless break-up of the Soviet Union is not quite accurate – it did cost lives.⁶ Western powers were anything but ready for the events unfolding within the Soviet Union. It was one thing to take the Iron Curtain down and dismantle the Berlin Wall, but seeing the Soviet Union tumble altogether was quite another. International recognition of the Baltic States started with Yeltsin’s Russia itself. In summer 1991, the three countries signed treaties with Russia whereby each side recognised the other’s international status and established bilateral relations. The failed coup d’état in Russia in August 1991 opened the way for the further international recognition.

In the early 1990s, with sovereignty still fragile, some among the Baltic political elites contemplated returning to the neutrality policy of the interwar period. With Russian troops still on the soil of the Baltic States and the Western countries reluctant to issue any security guarantees, not many options were available. Fortunately, there was a somewhat favourable momentum in the Baltic–Russian relations, partially caused by Russia’s belief that the Baltic States would remain in its “legitimate sphere of influence”. Lithuania was first to use this window of opportunity and negotiated the withdrawal of the Russian army from Lithuanian territory by August 1993. A year later, Russian troops also left Latvia and Estonia.

However, the security climate shortly changed. The democratic transformation of Russia was stalled by the inability or unwillingness of Yeltsin’s administration to foster reforms. By that time, NATO’s PfP program was already

well in progress and the EU offered the Europe Agreements to the Central and Eastern European countries. Encouraged by the changing Western attitude, the Baltic authorities completely abandoned the idea of neutrality in favour of the idea of returning to Europe. In 1994 Lithuania officially applied for NATO membership. Latvia and Estonia followed soon after. In 1995, the Baltic States signed the Europe Agreements with the EU.

2. The “high politics” of low stakes

Relations between the Baltic States and Russia became stormy when Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius declared membership in the EU and NATO to be their primary strategic goals. This move triggered a mini-Cold War between Moscow and the Baltic capitals. Baltic countries saw NATO membership as the only possible guarantee of their long-term security. Russia pictured NATO enlargement as an ultimate challenge to its own security. Meanwhile, the Euroatlantic community was anything but ready to offer security guarantees to the Baltics, fearing hostile reaction from Russia.

In 1997, the US and the EU tried to smooth the edges by offering the ‘Northern European initiative’ and the ‘Northern Dimension’ initiative respectively. Both initiatives focused on building a network of non-governmental institutions and cross-border economic ties, which were supposed to help transcend the security dilemma. With hindsight, one could argue that the objectives to assuage the Baltic States’ strive for membership while also comforting Russian concerns had little success. The Russian government in its own right offered a series of unilateral and multilateral security guarantees to the Baltic States, which they promptly rebuffed. In 1998, the Clinton administration signed the Baltic-US charter, which declared full American support for the Baltics’ NATO integration efforts. Finally, the tragedy of 9/11 enabled rapprochement between Russia and the US and spurred a new wave of NATO enlargement, immediately followed by EU enlargement. Americans, Europeans and Russians all found themselves on the same side of the barricades facing the old-turned-new threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMD. However, these events did not mean “the end of history” in the Baltic–Russian relations.

The Baltic States, as well as some other Central European countries, continue to suspect the Kremlin of trying to regain its geopolitical presence in this part of Europe. In his 2005 annual address to the Federal Assembly

V. Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.⁷ Many in the Baltic States saw the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Moscow on May 9th 2005 as another manifestation of unfaltering imperial nostalgia. The Lithuanian and Estonian Presidents Valdas Adamkus and Arnold Rüütel rejected V. Putin’s invitation to attend the ceremony, while Latvia’s President Vaira Vike-Freiberga accepted it, explaining that it was necessary to remind the world what the end of World War II meant to Latvia and other Central and Eastern European countries. Despite different responses, Russian officials and the media castigated all three states for anti-Russian inclinations, support for fascism, disrespect of the fallen World War II heroes and other alleged sins. These accusations reinforced suspicions held in the Baltic States that the 60th anniversary was intended to justify the occupation rather than to offer reconciliation.

V. Putin offered his account of history in a press conference on 9 May 2005, maintaining that under the Brest-Litovsk treaty in 1918 “Russia turned over some of its territories to Germany. In 1939, Germany returned them to us, and these territories joined the Soviet Union. In 1941 we could not possibly have occupied them, inasmuch as they were already a part of the USSR.”⁸ Russian officials dismissed claims that Soviets occupied the Baltics as “inappropriate and inopportune”.⁹ International community does not favour the Russian version of history. On 12 May 2005, the European Parliament passed a resolution recognising that “for some nations the end of World War II meant renewed tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet Union”¹⁰. On 19 May 2005, the US Senate passed a resolution urging Russia to “issue a clear and unambiguous statement, admitting to and condemning the illegal occupation and annexation” of the Baltic States.¹¹ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also prompted Russian government to settle the issues of “compensation for those persons deported from the occupied Baltic States”.¹²

Despite much ado, relations between Russia and the Baltic States since 1991 have never descended into any armed engagement with human casualties. In the official national security strategies of the Baltic States there are no direct references to Russia as a military threat. There are only indirect assumptions that there are countries in the immediate neighbourhood who do not exert full democratic control over their armed forces and could

therefore pose a potential security risk, but it remains of very low likelihood in the foreseeable future.¹³ Even the latter assumption is somewhat exaggerated given the membership of the Baltic States in NATO. Moreover, there is no direct or indirect mention of Russia as a threat in NATO's strategic concept of 1999 or in any of NATO's subsequent communiqués.

The most recent Defence White Paper of the Russian Federation also states unambiguously: "a global nuclear war and large-scale conventional wars with NATO or other US-led coalitions have been excluded from the list of probable armed conflicts for which the Russian Armed Forces are prepared".¹⁴ A more ambiguous statement indicates that "the expansion of military blocs and unions to the detriment of the military security of Russia or its allies" is an external threat "whose neutralisation is the function of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation."¹⁵

No military action followed the 2004 NATO enlargement, nor did tension increase when four NATO fighter aircrafts started patrolling the Baltic airspace from the day of their accession. The Russian political and military leadership, apart from some trigger-happy cold-warriors, never dared to call the four NATO fighters policing the Baltic skies "a significant deployment" threatening Russia. The only consequence of this NATO move was a drop in the attempts of Russian aircraft to breach the Baltic airspace. In 2005, NATO–Russia Council signed the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces agreement, which enabled an ever-closer military cooperation between the two parties. The likelihood of a military conflict between Russia and the Baltic States is nil for the foreseeable future, unless some dramatic changes would take place within the Kremlin, along the lines of a military coup. No one could reasonably expect Russia to try to use military force against the Baltic States, or NATO to use the Baltic States for any kind of hostile endeavor against Russia. It does not mean, however, that "low politics" are tension-free.

3. The "low politics" of high tensions

The Russian government has an active albeit little advertised agenda aimed at influencing the politics and the policies of the Baltic States. This agenda encompasses political measures (e.g., financing the political parties and minority movements, sending public relations experts to advise in electoral campaigns), cultural influence (via Russian media and entertainment)¹⁶ and economic

pressure (via the overwhelming Russian presence in the Baltic energy sector). Moscow is also not hesitant to use certain “special” measures. Almost every year Russian “diplomats” are expelled from Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius for spying. The shadow of the Russian secret services was behind the presidential campaign of Rolandas Paksas in 2003 and during his short presidency.¹⁷ The Russian diplomatic corps seeks to influence the opinion of other EU members by undermining the image of the Baltic States as credible partners. The Estonian member of the European Parliament Toomas H. Ilves has expressed concern that these efforts are not totally fruitless.¹⁸

The Russian government is also using the “Baltic factor” in its domestic politics. The Russian mass media keep “informing” the Russian public about the severe conditions of the Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, isolation of the Kaliningrad region, attempts to “rewrite the history of World War II”, neofascist demonstrations in the streets of Riga, even support for the Chechen terrorists.¹⁹ Many Russians still blame Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for the break up of the Soviet Union. The Baltic States are thus handy scapegoats to divert public attention from Russia’s own numerous domestic and international problems.

Not surprisingly, polls indicate that Russians perceive the Baltic States as the most hostile countries to Russia: Latvia is perceived as a hostile country by 49 percent of Russians, Lithuania - by 42 percent, Estonia – by 32 percent (Georgia, the US and Ukraine lag further behind).²⁰ At the same time, 70.5 percent of Russian inhabitants believe that the annexation of the Baltic States was voluntary in 1940.²¹ There is hardly any evidence to maintain that anti-Russian moods are equally pervasive among the Baltic public. Only 20 percent of Latvians have negative feelings towards Russia.²² In the parliamentary elections of 2004, a political party established and led by a Russian businessman Viktor Uspasskich received the majority of votes in Lithuania. Russian TV programs, movies and music successfully compete with the Western cultural production in both Lithuania and Latvia.

3.1. De-dramatising the issue of the Russian minorities

The question of the Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia is one of the central dimensions of Russian policy towards the Baltic States.²³ The Russian version of the story holds that there are continuous and severe violations of human and minority rights in the two countries. In 1997, the

Russian government adopted long-term policy guidelines towards the Baltic States. The document insisted that the integration of the Baltic States into NATO could not proceed without Russian agreement, coupled with the explicit linkage of the border question to the condition of the Russian *diaspora*.²⁴ Moscow has thus sought to delay the integration of both countries into the EU and NATO for not fulfilling the criteria of liberal democracy.

The citizenship policy in both Latvia and Estonia in the early 1990s was hardly in line with the standards of the international law. Latvia and Estonia sought to re-assert their national identity, which was greatly weakened due to the heavy Russification of the two countries. The political elites in Riga and Tallinn feared that large cohesive minorities would have a decisive influence over the political direction of their countries. Both states set up strict citizenship laws, effectively limiting citizenship to the indigenous inhabitants and to those who had lived in the region before 1940. As a result, at the beginning of 1990s, some 30 percent in both Estonia and Latvia were people with “undetermined citizenship”, in other words, non-citizens, who were not eligible to vote, travel abroad or occupy public offices. By contrast, in 1991, Lithuania adopted a liberal citizenship law with the so called “zero option”, granting citizenship to all legal residents of Lithuania, including recent immigrants.

Moscow was not happy with the way Riga and Tallinn handled the citizenship issue and directly linked the withdrawal of Russian troops with the issue of minorities. To dissolve the tense situation and prevent a major crisis, the OSCE established monitoring missions to both Latvia and Estonia in 1993. They turned out to be instrumental in helping the two countries bring their citizenship and naturalisation policies up to international standards. Although many in Latvia and Estonia saw the missions as interference in their internal affairs, these missions mitigated Russian attacks by providing an objective analysis of the minorities' situation.

Estonia's and Latvia's aspirations to join the EU required significant improvements in their citizenship and naturalisation policies. In 1995, Estonia approved a new citizenship law, which eased the naturalisation procedures. In 1998, after a referendum, Latvia also eased its citizenship rules. In 2001, Estonia's parliament amended laws on parliamentary and local self-government elections, abolishing language qualifications for

candidates. In 2002, Latvia's Parliament also passed a law that lifted the requirement for persons running for elected office to speak Latvian.

In Estonia, from 1992–2005, some 133,000 persons have acquired Estonian citizenship through the naturalisation process.²⁵ By 2005, some 142 thousand (10 percent of the Estonian inhabitants) still did not have any citizenship. From 1995–2005, the number of non-citizens in Latvia has decreased from 735 thousand (29 percent of the population) to 452 thousand (19 percent). The naturalisation board of Latvia estimates that some 130 thousand people would still choose to retain the non-citizen status for the rest of their life.²⁶ While young people are expected to naturalise and exercise their full political rights, there will remain a hardcore of older Russian speakers and hardliners who will refuse and keep calling for automatic citizenship.²⁷

Today, the procedures of the naturalisation process in Estonia and Latvia are similar to those of many other European countries. For example, a person who wishes to acquire Estonian citizenship by naturalisation must have been a permanent resident of Estonia for at least five years, have a basic knowledge of the Estonian language, have knowledge of the Constitution and the Citizenship Act. Yet, life remains difficult for almost every fifth Latvian inhabitant – they cannot vote, cannot hold most types of public posts and require a visa to visit other EU countries.²⁸

Russian policies in support of their compatriots were ambivalent at best from the early 1990s. The break up of the Soviet Union left some 25 million ethnic Russians living outside Russia. Yeltsin's initial policy line to help all those who intended to return changed abruptly by the end of 1992. Russia's policy towards its "near abroad" became increasingly aggressive and the Russian diaspora question gained geopolitical significance.²⁹ The policy of the "right to return" turned into a policy the "right to stay". Under the banner of the protection of the rights of compatriots, the Russian government expected to forge re-integration with the "newly independent states". Although some of the Central Asian countries had a much worse human rights record, Latvia and Estonia became the primary targets of Russian political and diplomatic pressure on all fronts: the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN. Despite a lot of international attention garnered by Moscow, Russians in Latvia claim they have "felt no real help from Russia".³⁰ In 2003 Moscow allocated some 210 million rubles³¹ (6 million euro) for the 25 million

Russians living abroad, i.e. 24 cents per person. Not surprisingly, only some 25 percent of the Eastern Slavs in the Baltic States opted to return to their countries of origin (the number of Eastern Slavs decreased from 2.1 million in 1989 to 1.5 million in 2000).³²

The Russian government continues to exploit the minority issue in its domestic politics. In his 2005 annual address to the Federal Assembly, V. Putin declared: “We hope that the new members of NATO and the EU in the post-Soviet area will show their respect for human rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities, through their actions”.³³ Evidently, Russian government still considers the Baltic States as constituting part of “*the post-Soviet area*” and not part of the Euroatlantic area.

There are good reasons to believe that minority rights are no longer a major problem in Latvia and Estonia. The European Commission, well known for its close scrutiny of candidate countries during accession negotiations, already in its 1997 Opinion concluded that Latvia and Estonia fulfilled the political criteria, including respect for and protection of minorities. The OSCE missions to Latvia and Estonia were terminated in December 2001. The reports of the missions presented to the Permanent Council of the OSCE concluded that citizenship legislation and its implementation in the two countries had been brought into conformity with their international pledges.³⁴

To conclude, the Russian government’s attempts to “securitise” the minorities issue in Latvia and Estonia failed and Russia did not gain the political leverage to influence the strategic policy choices of Riga and Tallinn. Minority movements did not turn into separatist movements. Complete removal of the minority issue from the agenda of Baltic–Russian relations depends on the further pace of naturalisation in Estonia and Latvia. Another longstanding Russian objective, to delay the signing and ratification of border agreements with Latvia and Estonia and the demarcation of the border with Lithuania, has also failed. The European Commission made it clear that it would not be possible to move over the long term towards suppression of visa obligations as long as Russia does not settle the border issues with the Baltics.³⁵ The Russian government finally agreed to sign the border treaty with Estonia in May 2005, only to renounce it in June 2005 objecting to the way Estonian parliament carried out the domestic ratification procedure.³⁶

Russia also cancelled the signing of the treaty with Latvia objecting to the unilateral declaration that Latvia wanted to add to the treaty, which mentioned the Latvian–Russian peace treaty of 1920. The Russian side interpreted the declaration as a “territorial claim” on the part of Latvia.

3.2. Kaliningrad – a problem with an opportunity

Just as the minorities were a tool Russia used to exert pressure on Latvia and Estonia, the question of civil and military transit to the Kaliningrad region was a tool Russia sought to use to influence Lithuanian foreign and security policy. Sander Huisman contends that “Russia has not conscientiously developed a real policy or approach towards Kaliningrad”.³⁷ Although the policies of the Kremlin towards this region seem chaotic, Raimundas Lopata argues that there is a rather sophisticated rationale behind Moscow’s inconsistent approach, calling the Kaliningrad region Russia’s “geopolitical hostage”.³⁸ In any case, it is clear that the primary goal of Russia’s strategy is to maintain its sovereignty over and assure connection to Kaliningrad, whereas region’s social and economic development is of secondary importance. Such a policy line is based on the assumption that more openness for Kaliningrad would undermine Russia’s sovereign rights over the region. While the top Russian officials every now and then present Kaliningrad as “the European façade of Russia”, or a “pilot region of EU–Russia partnership”, in practice Russia deliberately prevents this special status of the region from manifesting itself in any substantive form.

In the early 1990s, Kaliningrad was assigned the role of a Russian military outpost – the last fortress of the tumbling empire in Central Europe. Some of the troops withdrawn from the surrounding countries were moved to Kaliningrad. The Russian military leadership even contemplated putting tactical nuclear warheads in the region if NATO went ahead with its expansion plans³⁹. However, economic recession in mainland Russia was beginning to take its toll, and the numbers of troops and major equipment stationed in Kaliningrad dropped significantly by 1998. Moscow made a rather desperate move by offering demilitarisation of Kaliningrad in exchange for Poland and the Baltic States refraining from entering NATO.⁴⁰

Russia also tried to exploit the issue of military transit, pressing Vilnius to sign an international treaty that would have given an uncontrolled civil and military transit corridor through Lithuanian territory to Kaliningrad.

Lithuania saw these demands as an attempt to undermine its sovereign rights over its own territory. Vilnius was also concerned that such a treaty could infringe on its NATO membership prospects and kept rejecting Russia's proposals. The Lithuanian government adopted domestic regulations for the transit of military and hazardous materials over its territory in 1994. Russia consented to the unilateral decision of Lithuania, as it did need a ground transit route to Kaliningrad. Although on several occasions Russia tried to re-launch the negotiations and sign a bilateral treaty, the issue may now be considered closed, as Lithuania succeeded in rebuffing all Russian efforts. Today, Russian military transit continues to function smoothly in accordance with the Lithuanian domestic rules.

The idea of Kaliningrad as a pilot experimental region for liberal economic reforms was another key concept in the Kremlin's policy towards the region. In 1991, Russia granted Kaliningrad the status of a Free Economic Zone, which in 1996 was transformed into a Special Economic Zone. Neither project led to a substantial improvement in the economic performance of the region – the vision of the “Baltic Hong Kong” has never materialised. By that time, Vilnius had started to promote the idea of Kaliningrad as an economic bridge for developing West–East relations. Lithuanian diplomats argued that the “problem of Kaliningrad” should be seen as a window of opportunity to improve Europe's relations with Russia by engaging into a common endeavour. By the end of the 1990s, Kaliningrad finally found its way onto the agenda of the EU and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Russia's initial reaction was positive. Vilnius and Moscow even launched a common “Nida initiative” – a package of various economic projects - under the auspices of the Northern Dimension in 2000.

Moscow's ambivalence towards the region resurfaced during the EU–Russia negotiations over civil transit to Kaliningrad. Instead of dealing with the numerous consequences of EU enlargement for the region, Moscow concentrated on a somewhat secondary matter – how to retain the regime of free transit of persons to Kaliningrad after Lithuania joined the EU. For the Kremlin, the dynamic economic development of Kaliningrad was not a priority – ensuring Russia's territorial integrity and free access to its strategic outpost was.

Lithuania got a chance to reap the benefits of the structural power the EU provides to its individual members even before the actual accession.

The European Commission adopted a strong stance to separate the issue of Lithuania's accession from the issue of Kaliningrad transit, while providing Lithuania with the possibility of participating indirectly in the negotiation process with Russia. Despite rather uncompromising positions of both sides – Russia's insistence on a visa-free transit, and the Commission's rejection of any notion of "corridors" in the Schengen space, the agreement was reached in November 2002. The EU agreed that inhabitants of Kaliningrad would be issued facilitated transit documents instead of visas for travel through Lithuania.

Relations with Kaliningrad for Lithuania are of particular political and economic importance. Politically, it provides a rare opportunity to pursue cooperative relations with Russia, albeit at a technical, administrative level, as manifested by a few common, and to a certain extent successful, projects. The economic stakes are no less important: investment in Kaliningrad constitutes some 20 percent of the total amount of Lithuanian foreign investment abroad – the largest Lithuanian investment in the world. However, Moscow's stance remains an obstacle to further strengthening this cooperation. The new amendments of the law on the special economic zone in the Kaliningrad region established a preferential treatment for "large-scale" (read Russian) capital at the expense of small and medium enterprises (read Polish and Lithuanian), which now dominate in the region.⁴¹ In addition, the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has warned the leaders of the Russian regions not to pursue any relations with the Baltic States that would not be at first endorsed by the Kremlin. Revealingly, in July 2005, the Kremlin did not invite the Polish and Lithuanian presidents to the celebration of 750th anniversary of the Kaliningrad city.⁴² Appointment of the next governor of the region by V. Putin himself (under the law passed in 2004) will further limit prospects for a more local autonomy and prosperity of Kaliningrad.

To sum it up, quite a few problems persist in realising the opportunities that Kaliningrad could offer for the improvement of the relations between Russia, Lithuania and the EU. In Kaliningrad, the EU faces a dilemma between the external security issue and the internal one. An isolated, militarised, socially and economically backward region could well become an external source of instability in the middle of the EU. On the other hand, loosening the border control and allowing more mobility could boost

the internal threats of illegal migration, organized crime, spread of HIV, etc. While positive changes can only occur with a constant, pro-active and all-around engagement of the EU and its members, Russia does not seem to be ready to loosen its centralised grip on the region. If the status quo persists, the economic, social and environmental situation in Kaliningrad may deteriorate further. On the positive side, the principle “the worse, the better” may backfire on Moscow, forcing Russia to reassess its current policy and let the “hostage” go back to normality.

3.3. The energy sector: business as usual?

With political leverage slipping from Moscow’s hands after the double enlargement, the Kremlin sought alternative ways to retain influence in the Baltics.⁴³ Baltic dependence on Russian energy supplies is arguably the strongest tool Russia currently possesses to influence the policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The sheer size of Russian energy sector is a factor neither the Baltics nor the EU can disregard, – Russia is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and second largest of oil.

Central and Eastern Europe as a whole is a transportation and processing zone of Russia’s raw energy resources. Through this region, Russian oil and gas flow to the lucrative Western European markets. In recent years, Russia has started to pursue a rather aggressive energy policy in Central and Eastern Europe with the objective of gaining full or at least partial control of the oil and gas sectors of all the transit countries. Russia seeks to obtain key segments of the oil and gas industries, including refineries, transportation infrastructure, wholesale and retail sale networks. Russia already supplies more than 75 percent of the new EU members’ oil and gas, compared to 20 percent of Western European supplies.⁴⁴ The gas imports of the Baltic States from Russia amount to 100 percent, while oil imports stand at nearly 90 percent.⁴⁵

Russia pursues its energy policies via such giants as “Lukoil”, “TNK-BP” and “Gazprom”. The companies that do not succumb to direct or indirect governmental control are ousted from the equation as illustrated by the “Yukos” case. “Yukos” had developed a dominant presence in the Baltic oil market before the clash with the Kremlin. This is why the crack down on Mikhail Khodorkovsky raised fears among the Baltic authorities about the possible consequences if (or rather when) the Russian government should attempt to take over “Yukos” shares in the Baltic oil industries.

During the Soviet era, key oil export terminals were located in Ventspils (Latvia), Tallinn (Estonia), and Klaipeda (Lithuania). After the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia itself became dependent on the countries in the transportation and processing zone and had to pay significant fees for the transit of its resources westwards. To reduce this dependence, Russia undertook a twofold strategy: building new terminals and pipelines bypassing the Central European countries and recapturing control over existing infrastructure. By 2001, Russian "Transneft" company finished a major project encompassing a new system of oil pipelines in the Baltic Sea and a new export terminal in Primorsk. This project reduced Russia's dependence on the Baltic terminals. It also allowed Moscow to exert pressure on the Latvian government to give preference to the Russian companies in the privatisation of the "Ventspils Nafta", Latvia's oil transit company (Russia stopped shipping its oil through Ventspils).

The Lithuanian government's experience in the privatisation of the "Mažeikiu Nafta" company (which encompasses a refinery and export terminal) was also revealing. Lithuania rejected the Russian bid and chose an American company "Williams" as a strategic investor. The "strategic investment", for which the American government itself heavily lobbied, proved to be everything but profitable due to the reluctance of the Russian oil suppliers to supply the crude. In the end, "Williams" sold its shares to "Yukos" without even informing the host country.

In the oil sector, the Baltic States do have some space to manoeuvre by buying more expensive crude from other suppliers. In the gas sector the dependency on Russia's supplies is total. "Gazprom" already has a strong foothold in all three national gas distribution companies of all three countries. Besides, there is no crucial gas transit infrastructure in the Baltics, which further diminishes the chances of the Baltic governments to rebalance their dependence on Russian gas supplies. Not surprisingly, central bankers in Lithuania and Estonia grew concerned that the chances of adopting the euro in 2007 could be dashed had Gazprom sharply increased the price of gas causing a surge in inflation⁴⁶. The plan agreed between "Gazprom" and the German company BASF to build a North European Gas Pipeline under the Baltic sea that would allow Russia to deliver gas directly to the Western European markets will further diminish the strategic importance of the Central European transit infrastructure.

Electricity is of rather limited importance in the structure of Russia's energy exports, standing at some 1 percent of all energy materials exported in 2004 (oil – 46 percent, gas – 36 percent).⁴⁷ Electricity is cheap and easily available in the European markets. Both Estonia and Lithuania are electricity exporters. Latvia is the region's only electricity importer, buying electricity from other Baltic States and Russia. However, even in this sector the Baltics may end up depending on Russia's supplies. Lithuania will shut down its Soviet-era Ignalina nuclear power plant in 2009. Estonia may also see its environmentally hazardous oil shale-fired electricity generation decline under EU environmental policies.⁴⁸ A plan to integrate the energy system of the Baltic States with that of Western Europe via Poland remains stalled due to lack of interest in the latter country in pursuing such a project. In order to avoid future dependence on Russian electricity supplies, Lithuania may have to consider developing a new nuclear facility. Latvia is working with Estonia and Finland to develop the "Estlink" project, which should link the Baltic States to the Nordic power grids by 2006.

To sum it up, energy policy is a significant factor in Russia's political relations with its neighbours⁴⁹. The Baltic States are losing the only leverage they probably had vis à vis Russia in the energy business – the transit of oil. The interests of the Western European countries and the Baltic States hardly coincide in their energy policies towards Russia. While some Western European countries are deliberately increasing their dependence on the Russian energy supplies, the Baltics see this dependence as a vulnerability in their security. The governments of the Baltic States themselves seem to be liable to the pressure of the large Russian companies in the business in which the line between legitimate lobbying and corruption is a very thin one.

Several factors could prevent the possibly negative consequences of Russia's politics of energy in the Baltic States. There are vital economic interests at stake for Russia, which effectively limit Moscow's willingness to use its energy policy for geopolitical purposes. Russian economic growth remains extremely dependent on energy exports and sensitive to fluctuations in world oil prices. According to some estimates, a \$1 per barrel change in oil prices results in a \$1.4 billion change in Russian revenues⁵⁰. If the Russian dependency on the EU market increased further, the political

undertones of Russian investments in the Baltic energy sector would likely fade away. Meanwhile, the EU should uphold its policy of diversification of suppliers.⁵¹ American and Western European plans to increase their presence in the Russian energy sector, if carried out, could also serve as a safeguard ensuring that Russian investment motives remain purely economic. But the likelihood of the latter scenario remains limited given the iron grip of the Russian government over the oil and gas industries.⁵²

To summarise the status quo of the Baltic–Russian relations, the longstanding fears that the membership of the Baltic States in the EU and NATO will cause a major crisis between these organisations and Russia has proved to be hollow. The risks that the Baltic States face in their Eastern neighbourhood are no longer of a traditional military nature. Yet, there is more than enough evidence to believe that Russia seeks to retain political, economic and even cultural influence in the Baltic States. Paradoxically, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Baltic States – the things Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians so feverishly sought to defend from the “Eastern” threat – are not at stake today. After all, Russia may not be all that worried about the membership of the Baltic States in the EU and NATO. Moscow may have started considering it an opportunity to gain an inside access to these organisations via vulnerable Baltic governments. In the long run, the EU may have to worry rather about the growing Russian influence in Brussels via the Baltic and other Central and Eastern European states, and not about their influence on the EU’s policy towards Russia.

***Conclusions:
building confidence into cumbersome relationship***

A flourishing European-style democracy in Russia is the most important long-term interest of the Baltic States, which, if accomplished, would render most of the other security concerns irrelevant. Meanwhile, the Baltic States will have to find a way to build more confidence into their cumbersome relations with Russia:

- *Using new opportunities, minding new constraints.* Membership of the EU and NATO gave the Baltic decision makers a firm ground, confidence and structural power they never had before to deal with Russia. On the other hand, the gains in structural power go hand in hand with a certain

loss of autonomous policy line towards Russia. The Baltic decision makers will now have to negotiate, adjust and often to concede to the policies agreed upon by all member states. The Baltic–Russian relations will now be subsumed under the EU–Russia and NATO–Russia relations. The Baltic leaders will have to be more cautious with initiatives of their own that could cause disputes between these organisations and Moscow.

- *Reassessing ambitions.* The Baltic States should understand that “playing” at the geopolitical level with Russia bilaterally puts them in an unfavourable position. They do not have sufficient resources and are simply too small to become interlocutors between Russia and the EU at large – a role contemplated by some Baltic leaders. Russia itself does not see the Baltic States or even the whole Central Europe as a “bridge” to Europe. V. Putin does not need to fly to Vilnius or Warsaw to get his message across to the EU – he flies directly to Brussels, Berlin or Paris. The only way for the Baltic States to achieve their long-term goals in their relations with Russia is working through the EU and NATO.
- *Becoming realistic and pragmatic.* Baltic leaders must apprehend the fact that Russia will not offer recognition of or compensations for the Soviet occupation as long as it remains a “managed democracy” of “directed capitalism”. Building relations with Moscow on the condition that Russia will redeem historical grievances is a naïve and counter-effective approach. Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius should concentrate instead on more earthly and pressing challenges, such as the activities of the Russian intelligence services, Russia’s tightening grip over their energy sectors, and the development problems of Kaliningrad region.
- *Being confident, flexible, and assertive.* It is no secret that the policy of most of the EU member states and the European Commission itself towards Russia are *interest-* rather than *value-*based. The Baltic governments thus face a tricky dilemma. On the one hand, an interest-based approach towards Russia is not encouraging democratic transformation in this country and would need to change if progress in Russia is to be expected. On the other hand, if the Baltics tried to push the rest of the EU to get tougher on Russia, the end result could be counter-effective – the Baltics would only reinforce their anti-Russian image, alienate some of their own friends within the EU and end up being the oddballs outside the official EU-

Russia dialogue. To overcome this dilemma, the Baltic States must be confident and pragmatic in their day-to-day affairs with Russia, flexible within the EU about their policies towards Russia, but also assertive in their long-term foreign and security policy goal – to encourage real, not managed democratic transformation of Russia.

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